Curriculum, complexity and representation: rethinking the epistemology of schooling through complexity theory by Osberg, Deborah Carol
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Curriculum, complexity and representation: rethinking




Osberg, Deborah Carol (2005). Curriculum, complexity and representation: rethinking the epistemology of
schooling through complexity theory. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2005 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk





Rethinking the epistemology of 
schooling through complexity theory 
. by . 
Deborah Carol Osberg 
B. Sc. University of Natal 
B. Sc. (Hons. ) (Zoology) University of the. Witwatersrand 
M. Sc. (Zoology) University of the Witwatersrand 
A thesis submitted in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of 
Ph. D. 
Educational Theory 
The Open University 
31' March 2005 
1 
-AtxxiI nb., T92%o6dii 
31 riWA-2-045 









THE OPEN UNIVERSITY 
RESEARCH SCHOOL 
Library Authorisation Form 
Please return this form to the Research School with the two bound copies of your thesis to be 
deposited with the University Library. All candidates should complete parts one and two of the form. 
Part three only applies to PhD candidates. 
Part One: Candidates Details 






Thesis title: CUR ktCuýi, ý. ý^. ý. 
ý x. tT i ýrvý QC toU:, '..... ý`t:.. ...................................... 
NK, u. 4.. FýýSTýiýacA4 y of S'c ºo..... 7ýfieauýfý ýaMPCýXý ý 'TýtýZºýi , ........... .................................................................................. 
Part Two: Open University Library Authorisation 
I confirm that I am willing for my thesis to be made available to readers by the Open University 
Library, and that it may be photocopied, subject to the discretion of the Librarian. 






. .......... .................................... 
Part Three: British Library Authorisation [PhD candidates only] 
If you want a copy of your PhD thesis to be available on loan to the British Library Thesis Service as 
and when it is requested, you must sign a British Library Doctoral Thesis Agreement Form. Please 
return it to the Research School with this form. The British Library will publicise the details of your 
thesis and may request a copy on loan from the University Library. Information'on the presentation of 
the thesis is given in the Agreement Form. 
Please note the British Library have requested that theses should be printed on one side only to enable 
them to produce a clear microfilm. The Open University Library sends the fully bound copy of theses 
to the British Library. 
The University has agreed that your participation in the British Library Thesis Service should be 
voluntary. Please tick either (a) or (b) to indicate your intentions. 
I am willing for the Open University to loan the British Library a copy of my thesis. 19/ 
A signed Agreement Form is attached 
EI do not wish the Open University to loan the British Library a copy of my thesis. 




Many are my debts for the profound support I received during all stages of this 
work. First of all I would like to thank my family and friends in South Africa and 
the friends I have made in England over the past four years for their much needed 
emotional support during a difficult period of my life. In particular, Carol, Ivar, 
Nicola, Lorian, Derick, Teresa, Claire, Vivienne, Moira, Andreas, Mandy and Marc. 
Thanks also to Professor Philip Higgs at the University of South Africa for his 
kindness, generous hospitality and advice during a difficult time with the research, 
and for introducing me to the work of Gert Biesta. I am deeply indebted to my four 
supervisors: Joan Solomon for having offered me an opportunity to do this work, 
despite a lack of theoretical background in this field. Without this initial supportive 
gesture this work would not have begun. Roger Harrison for his encouragement, 
and support throughout the process. Paul Cilliers for his patient engagements with 
my many, tedious emails about the paradoxes of complexity, a task he undertook 
with considerable good humour, and Gert Biesta, my principal supervisor, for his 
inspirational theoretical input and for always `complicating the scene' thereby taking 
me further and further out of my depth. I now know that when one is out of one's 
depth, it is not simply a case of learning how to swim We survive in unimaginable 
ways. 
This work was partially supported by a grant from the Epistemology Group. 
vii 

Contents in brief 
Abstract v 
Acknowledgements vii 
Contents in full xi 
List of tables and figures xix 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Presenting/prefacing the research 
Chapter 2: The epistemology of schooling 59 
Modern curricular thought and its representational foundations 
Chapter 3: The crisis of representation 99 
Representation, semiology, Cartesian epistemology and beyond 
Chapter 4: Introducing complexity 149 
A brief review of various attempts to represent the unrepresentable 
Chapter 5: The epistemology of complexity 195 
Thinking beyond representational conceptions of knowledge 
Chapter 6: Curriculum and emergence 247 
Re-thinking schooling from an `emergentist foundation' 
Chapter 7: Summary and conclusions 297 





Contents in full 
Abstract v 
Acknowledgements vii 
Contents in brief ix 
List of tables and figures xix 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
P'resentiing/prefacing the work 
1.1 Preamble 1 
1.1.1 Presenting/prefacing a work 1 
1.1.2 Presenting/prefacing and pedagogy 3 
1.13 A note on transdisciplinarity 6 
12 The Research `Fields' 8 
1.2.1 The `field' of curriculum studies 9 
1.2.2 The `field' of epistemology 13 
12.3 The `field' of complexity science 16 
1.2.4 Positioning the research 24 
1.3 The Research Focus 24 
1.3.1 The argument and the research questions 24 
1.31 Significance of the research 25 
xi 
1.3.3 Contributions to the literature 26 
1.4 The Research `Methodology' 29 
1.4.1 The methodological approach 30 
1.4.2 The road taken 37 
1.43 The structure of the argument 43 
1.5 Summary of Chapters 47 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: The epistemology of schooling 47 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: The crisis of representation 49 
15.3 Chapter 4: Introducing complexity 52 
1.5.4 Chapter 5: The epistemology of complexity 53 
1.5.5 Chapter 6: Curriculum and emergence 55 
Chapter 2: The epistemology of schooling 59 
Modern curricular thought and its representational foundations 
2.1 Preamble 59 
2.2 Curriculum and Representation 62 
2.11 Different uses of the term `curriculum' 62 
2.2.2 Modem curricular assumptions and questions 63 
2.23 Two representational theories of knowledge 66 
2.2.4 A representational theory of signification 69 
X11 
2.3 The Origins of Representational Curricular Thought 74 
2.3.1 Aries's account of the origin of modem schooling 74 
2.3.2 Mollenhauer's account of the origin of modem schooling 77 
2.4 Representational Vs. Presentational Pedagogies 82 
2.4.1 Comenius and representational pedagogy 83 
2.42 Dewey's progressivism. A `presentational' pedagogy 85 
2.43 Situated learning and `presentational' pedagogy 88 
2.4.4 The representational-presentational binary 92 
2.5 Summary and Closing Remarks 96 
Chapter 3: The crisis of representation 99 
Representation, semiology, Cartesian epistemology and beyond 
3.1 Preamble 99 
3.2 Representation and Personal Knowledge 103 
3.2.1 Von Glasersfeld's `radical constructivism' 104 
3= Difficulties with the subjectivist position 108 
3.3 Representation and Scientific (Public) Knowledge 110 
3.3.1 From `positivism' to `post-empiricism. ' 111 
3.32 The objectivist view 114 
33.3 The relativist view 117 
33.4 Beyond objectivism and relativism 121 
xlll 
3.4 Representation, Semiology and Writing 124 
3.4.1 De Saussure's `semiology' 125 
3.4.2 Derrida's `deconstruction' 135 
3.5 Summary and Closing Remarks 145 
Chapter 4: Introducing complexity 149 
A brief review of various attempts to represent the unrepresentable 
4.1 Preamble 149 
42 Defining Complexity 152 
4.2.1 Why `defining' complexity is difficult 152 
4.2.2 The distinction between chaos and complexity 153 
4.2.3 The `generic' features of complexity 155 
42.4 A'sketch' of a complex system 156 
4.3 Describing Complexity - Insights from computer modelling 158 
4.3.1 A computer model of a complex system 159 
431 Non linearity and determinism 164 
43.3 The notion of emergence 167 
43.4 Problems with the modelling approach: boundary issues 174 
4.4 Explaining Complexity - Insights from thermodynamics 178 
4.4.1 Background to Prigogine's work 179 
4.42 Non-equilibrium and self-organisation 182 
xiv 
4.43 Bifurcation and chance: the roots of `strong' emergence 185 
4.4.4 Probability and irreversibility 187 
4.7 Summary and Closing Remarks 191 
Chapter 5: The epistemology of complexity 195 
Thinking beyond representational conceptions of knowledge 
5.1 Preamble 195 
5.2 The Structuralist Challenge to Representation 197 
52.1 Nonhnearity (`incompressibility' 198 
5.2.2 The undecidability of boundaries 207 
523 The relativist and pragmatist alternatives 213 
5.3 The Poststructuralist Challenge to Representation 220 
53.1 A non-linear understanding of temporality 220 
53.2 Two challenges to linear temporality 221 
5.33 Complexity's challenge to the notion of presence 226 
5.4 The Epistemology of Complexity 228 
5.4.1 Epistemology without `presence' 231 
5.4.2 Knowledge of the past (the loss of truth in history) 232 
5.4.3 Knowledge of the future (openness to the unimaginable) 237 
5.4.4 Knowledge of the present (experiencing the impossible) 239 
5.4.5 Complexity and poststructuralism 242 
xv 
5.5 Summary and Closing Remarks 244 
Chapter 6: Curriculum and emergence 247 
Rethinking schooling from an `emergentist foundation' 
6.1 Preamble 247 
6.1.1 The `emergentist' critique of representational schooling 248 
6.12 The logic of the argument 250 
6.2 The Emergence of Knowledge. Pedagogies of invention 253 
62.1 Inventing meaning in `romantic' progressive education 254 
622 Inventing knowledge for the `knowledge society 255 
6.23 Ulmer's `applied grammatology 259 
6.2.4 The pedagogical effect of `discipleship' 264 
625 Double emergence 267 
6.3 The Emergence of Subjectivity. Pedagogy without humanism 269 
63.1 Moving from `what' to `who' 270 
632 Arendt and Levinas on human subjectivity 273 
633 Biesta's `pedagogy without humanism' 277 
6.4 Undoing the Representational Logic of Schooling 285 
6.4.1 The death of the subject not the death of education 285 
6.4.2 Transcending the crisis of representation in education 288 
6.43 Schooling, curriculum and emergence 290 
xvi 
6.5 Summary and Closing Remarks 293 
Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 297 
Significance of the research and possibilities for further study 
7.1 Summary of thesis 297 
7.2 Main findings and contributions to the literature 300 
7.3 Shortcomings of the research and further work 303 





List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1: A classification of different methodologies and paradigms 33 
Figure 1.1: The sequence of emergence of the content. 42 
Figure 1.2: The logic of the argument: `Linearising' the 42 
emergent structure. 
Figure 1.3: The logic of the argument in conventional terms. 44 
Figure 1.4: Stage 6: Developing the argument by rewriting the 45 
chapters a second time in the sequence shown. 
Figure 1.5: Stage 6: Refining the argument by rewriting the 46 
chapters a third time in the sequence shown by the solid black 
line (with considerable back-and-forth movement between 
chapters throughout this process). 
Figure 2.1: A dualistic or representational understanding 69 
of the sign. 
Figure 2.2: The ternary sign: A sign which makes it possible 73 
to see in one thing (e. g., a fingertip) the mark of a second thing 
(e. g., an astrological principle). 
Figure 2.3: The binary or dualistic sign is a representation or 73 
reflection of what exists, as is the case in this biological 
drawing representing the bones in the hand. 
xix 
Figure 2.4: A lesson from Comenius's Orbis sensualium 81 
pictus. The book simplified the `real world' in such a way 
that children could gain an `adequate' understanding of it. 
Figure 3.1: de Saussure's diagrammatic representation of 127 
the `sign' as a two-sided psychological entity (adapted 
from de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 67) 
Figure 3.2: de Saussure's illustration of the shifting 127 
`nothingness' of (A) thought and (B) sound (reproduced 
from de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 111, with permission of 
Duckworth Publishers, London). 
Figure 3.3: The individual meaning of the signified 131 
emerges from the play of difference between signifiers 
(illustration adapted from, de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 113) 
Figure 4.1: A checkerboard. 160 
Figure 4.2: A cell surrounded by its `neighbourhood' 160 
of eight adjacent cells 
Figure 4.3: Some possible neighbourhood configurations 161 
that would lead to state changes of an initially black cell, 
in a cellular automaton operating according to 3 rules 
of interaction. 
Figure 4.4: Localised structures such as the one made of 163 
five cells in the top left hand corner of the grid above, 
`emerge' and `glide' across the grid (shown by arrows) as 
individual cells in the grid `blink' on or off (black or white) 
xx 
following the simple set of Class 4 rules that guide the 
automaton's behaviour. 
Figure 4.5: A linear cause-and-effect sequence results in a 165 
predictable `final' state that is the sum of the effects of the 
component parts. 
Figure 4.6: Complex, non-linearly connected systems 167 
produce unpredictable `emergent' effects. 
Figure 4.7: A hierarchical model of emergence. As 170 
non-linear interactions produce emergent features at 
new hierarchical levels, these in turn interact to produce 
yet another emergent hierarchical level of order. In 
this diagram, different shapes represent different hierarchical 
levels of order (i. e., `State 1', `State 2' and `State 3'). 
However note that each of the three `states' can exist 
simultaneously and, although not shown in this diagram, 
there can be interactions which cut across different 
hierarchical levels. 
Figure 4.8: Fractal tree showing how simple binary 188 
branching can quickly lead to an inordinate number 
of outcomes. 
Figure 5.1: In this illustration the `rules' are depicted by 211 
means of interconnecting lines. Note that the light grey 
`system' in the dotted circle in the centre of the 
illustration - which is `isolated' in the solid circle in the 
top left-hand corner - is only a 'system' if it is artificially 
od 
delineated as one. Its `behaviour' is therefore contingent 
on `rules' which cannot be contained within its boundaries. 
The `isolated' model in the top left-hand comer would 
therefore exhibit different behaviour from its interconnected 
`real' counterpart, or, if it showed the same behaviour, it 
would do so only by means of a completely different set of 
rules, i. e., a set that operated with different boundary 
parameters. 
Figure 5.2: A linear understanding of temporality, in 233 
which history is immutable. 
Figure 5.3: Diagram to show how each new present 235 
brings a reconstruction of the past. For example 
theories `a, "b' and `c' about the possible origin of the 
universe (these being theories which arise from different 
presents, a, b and c, respectively) would be qualitatively 






Presenting/Prefacing the Research 
1.1 PRELLE 
But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise 
resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until he 
had learned to swim (Hegel, in Derrida 1981a, p. 47) 
... the problem of the `preface, ' 
discussed in [Derrida's] Outwork, is 
identical with the problem of pedagogy in general - of a 
communication between teacher (the one who is supposed to 
know) and a student (the one who thinks he is supposed to learn 
what the teacher knows). Everything that Derrida says apropos of 
the deconstruction of the preface applies equally to the 
pedagogical discourse, with the student being in the position of the 
reader of a text about which as yet he knows nothing (Ulmer 
1985, p. 161). 
1.1.1 Presenting/prefacing a work 
To preface a work, to present it as a completed body that can be grasped, 
implies the `completed' work has been completed before the preface is 
1 
written, that it closed, and hence `prefaceable' or presentable (in particular 
Ph. D. dissertations should be presentable). The preface, then, should be 
nothing other than a repetition of what is presentable, a re-presentation, or 
`mere' supplement to the work `proper. ' But 
while pretending to turn around and look backward, one is also in 
fact starting over again, adding an extra text, complicating the 
scene, opening up within the labyrinth a supplementary 
digression, which is also a false mirror that pushes the labyrinth's 
infinity back forever in mimed - that is, endless - speculation. It is 
the textual restance of an operation, which can be neither opposed 
nor reduced to the so called `principal' body of a book (Derrida 
1981a, p. 27). 
For Derrida it is not possible to look at a work (i. e., a text, in Derrida's 
terms) without touching it. Every repetition produces a supplement, a 
remainder, which is outside the text/work it supposedly represents. Every 
attempt at `transmission' is therefore also a self invention. The problem 
with `representing' my research - this work - as a `completed' entity, which 
I have attempted to do in this chapter (and which has hopelessly 
complicated the scene, inciting me to begin again, this being something I 
shall do outside the confines of Ph. D. research), is identical with the 
pedagogical problem I explore through the research process itself. 
2 
1.1.2 Presenting/prefacing and pedagogy 
Gregory Ulmer makes the point that every pedagogical presentation, just 
like every reading of a text or `work', adds something to what it transmits 
(Ulmer 1985, p. 162). Yet pedagogical practices are organised as if what is 
presented is a `mere' representation. Ulmer offers the following translation 
of Derrida's thoughts on this (Derrida 1976a) which, to my knowledge, 
have not appeared in English. 
Derrida's analysis of the place of pedagogy in Western thought is a 
corollary of his analysis of writing in general... It is necessary, he 
argues, to bring educational practice into line with contemporary 
epistemology - to help pedagogy negotiate the same paradigm 
shift that altered the arts and sciences at the beginning of our 
century, leaving pedagogy behind in the age of Hegel (Ulmer 
1985, p. 163). 
It is towards this aim that the current research contributes. It is focussed on 
`rethinking' the epistemology of schooling taking into account the 
`paradigm shifts' (Kuhn 1996/1962) that have taken place in the arts and 
sciences which have problematised the idea that a representation is nothing 
other than a repetition of what is present or presentable. 
In modern Western societies it is largely taken for granted that the function 
of the school curriculum is to represent real world environments - to 
3 
`preface' them - such that school-goers know something about these 
`real' 
world environments before they are faced with them in their `reality. ' It is 
assumed that by the time those being educated leave the academic 
institution, they will, through the `prefacing' of these real worlds in schools, 
have acquired knowledge of these `real' worlds and so be `prepared' for 
them. This assumption about schooling (and prefacing) relies on 
representational theories of knowledge, which hold that knowledge is 
always knowledge of something that exists outside knowledge itself. The 
challenges to this representational epistemology have come from fields as 
diverse theoretical physics, ' analytic philosophy, ' philosophy of science, ' 
history of science, ' sociology of sciences and postmodern' and poststructural 
philosophy, to name but a few, which have argued again and again that the 
idea of a faithful correspondence between the world and our knowledge of 
it is insupportable and should be put to rest once and for all. The point is, 
despite these moves, a representational understanding of knowledge in its 
I E. g., Heisenberg's work in quantum mechanics and in particular his formulation of the 
`uncertainty principle'. 
2 E. g., Frege's analysis of the referent. Wittgenstein's later work on `language games'. 
3 E. g., Popper's conclusions about the logic of scientific discovery. 
4 E. g., Kuhn's critique of scientific `progress: 
5 E. g., Latour and Woolgar's work on the social construction of scientific facts. 
6 E. g., Lyotard's analysis of knowledge in contemporary`postmodern' society. 
7 E. g., Demda's deconstruction of the `metaphysics of presence! 
4 
relation with `reality' still underpins modern Western education. 
Knowledge is still conceived as representing that which is present. 
In the last few decades an additional challenge to representation has been 
posed by `complexity theory' and it is complexity's challenge to 
representation that is taken up in this thesis. More specifically, the purpose 
of the thesis is to explore the implications, for modern Western schooling, 
of complexity's challenge to representation. 
This research therefore takes place on the margins of three research fields: 
curriculum studies, complexity science, and epistemology. I say `on the 
margins' of these research fields (rather than within them) because, to a 
certain extent, the work transgresses accepted thinking in these fields. In 
this sense the work can probably be described as `transdisciplinary'8 (see 
Klein 2004). It is `transdisciplinary' in that it not only transits disciplinary 
boundaries moving, for example, between disciplines lodged in the `hard' 
sciences (complexity), the humanities (education) and the arts 
(epistemology) but it also transgresses the disciplines from which it draws. 
8 See Appendix 1 for the Charter of the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity held at the 
Convento da An4bida in Portugal on November 2-7,1994. 
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1.1.3 A note on transdisciplinarity 
Nicolescu suggests that transdisciplinarity `concerns that which is at once 
between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all 
discipline. ' Using a transdisciplinary approach - so Nicolescu argues - 
therefore propels us beyond `either/or' thinking into the space that lies 
beyond (Nicolescu 2001, p. 44). But what lies beyond `disciplinarity'? What 
does it mean to `transgress' disciplinarity? Let me first try to delineate the 
concept of `disciplinarity. ' 
Klein holds that standard models of disciplinarity connote stability and 
normality and this is portrayed by images of foundations and structure `and 
even an autonomous territorial regime. ' But she is quick to point out that 
disciplinarity is not as simple as this. There are also other models which 
focus on the dynamism, heterogeneity, and `the sheer complexity of 
disciplinarity. ' Here the images are of `networks and systems and webs, not 
foundations and structures' (Klein 2004, pp. 4-5). To this she adds 
But a discipline is not just a functional differentiation that 
produces a world view. A discipline is also system of power... 
Disciplines control not only accounts of their histories but the 
kinds of questions we ask and the kinds of answers that will be 
believed and accepted (Klein 2004, pp. 3-4). 
6 
To transgress disciplinarity is therefore not simply to cross `old' disciplinary 
boundaries in order to create new, or more encompassing boundaries. 
Disciplines are already in the form of complex webs and networks with 
overlapping and/or indistinct boundaries. To transgress disciplinarity is to 
challenge the systems of control which dictate the kind of questions we can 
ask. According to Klein, transdisciplinarity `contributes theoretical 
structures, research methods, and modes of practice that are not located on 
current disciplinary or interdisciplinary maps' (Klein 1994, p. 2, my 
emphasis). 
The need for transdisciplinarity, according to Klein, arises from 
developments in knowledge and culture that are characterised by 
`complexity, hybridity, non-linearity, and heterogeneity' (Klein 1994, p. 1). 
In Klein's words 
... transdisciplinarity, transculturalism, transnationalism 
have 
blurred and reordered older binary cultural, social, political, and 
epistemological distinctions and categories. As older borders and 
identities have weakened, the need for transdisciplinarity has 
become greater... (Klein 1994, pp. 3-4). 
Drawing on Gibbons et al. (1994), Klein argues that the transdisciplinary 
approach operates by continuous linking and relinking of influences across 
a dense communication network such that new configurations of 
7 
knowledge are continuously generated. Interacting knowledge bodies keep 
changing the very structure of knowledge itself. Such processes, according 
to Klein (1994), are ongoing. As such, transdisciplinarity necessarily rejects 
all globalising projects, all closed systems of thought, utopian ideas, any 
enslavement to an ideology, religion or philosophical system. A `genuinely 
transdisciplinary attitude, ' according to Klein `must therefore not establish 
from the very start, self-imposed borders' (Klein 1994, p. 5, my emphasis). 
Having outlined the `transdisciplinary' impetus of the research, let me now 
describe the three main `disciplines' or `fields' around which the current 
research is located. 
1.2 THE RESEARCH `FIEl, DS' 
As mentioned, the research occurs on the margins the fields of curriculum 
studies, complexity science and epistemology. None of these `fields' can be 
described as a stable `discipline' with a clear structure and foundation and an 
`autonomous territorial regime' (Klein 2004, p. 4). Rather, each consists of a 
dynamic, complex, heterogenous network of ideas and knowledge which 
can in no sense be unified in terms of a common `logic, ' historical 
trajectory, or even purpose. Nevertheless, as `disciplines, ' they manage to 
structure the kinds of questions we can ask and the kinds of answers that 
are considered acceptable. In what follows, and as background to my own 
8 
research, I provide a brief account of each of the conflicted `fields' which 
my research works around. 
1.2.1 The field' of curriculum studies 
According to Ian Westbury (2000), the idea of `curriculum' as a `field' of 
study that endeavours to develop `curriculum theories' is taken up in rather 
different ways in different geographical areas in the `West'. The North 
American tradition, which goes by the name of `curriculum studies, ' has 
grown out of a practice of `curriculum development' which has drawn 
heavily on John Dewey's progressivism and more recently also on 
psychology and other social sciences to justify its aims and methods 
(Kalantzis and Cope 1993). In this regard it focussed instrumentally on the 
needs of the individual learner and on how to achieve given goals. The 
European counterpart to `curriculum studies, ' known as 'Didaktik" in 
Germany and other north European (Scandinavian) countries (see for 
example Gundem and Hopmann 1998), on the other hand, adopted a more 
normative approach that sought to create an overall attitude or approach to 
teaching, a set of norms that prescribe how professional teachers should 
conduct themselves rather than prescribing the content and method of 
9I use the German spelling - Didaktik - to differentiate this word from the English word 
`didactic' which has a different collection of meanings. 
9 
teaching. In short, Didaktik is a teacher-focused, philosophically and 
historically grounded activity while its (traditional) American counterpart 
was a student focused (individualistic), and scientifically grounded activity 
(Westbury 2000). 
Interestingly, although there is currently some dialogue between the 
American and European curriculum traditions (see for example Gundem 
and Hopmann 1998; Westbury, Hopmann and Riquarts 2000) neither of 
these theoretical traditions, as Reid (1997) points out, has ever exercised any 
significant influence in England. Reid argues that England has not even 
adopted a `third' tradition. 
For a curricular tradition England has substituted a multiplicity of 
traditions of subject teaching, under the banner of Method, which 
for the most part have been only marginally and incidentally 
concerned with purposes or principles fundamental to the overall 
enterprise of education.... Method is knowledge about subjects, 
and, within its purview, broadly curricular arguments about purpose 
or practice tend to fall on stony ground (Reid 1997, p. 679, emphasis 
added). 
In England the emphasis on subject matter is at the expense of the more 
theoretical curriculum questions to the extent that the diversity of work 
that could be called curriculum work is seldom classified under the label of 
`curriculum studies' nor is it explicitly delineated as a university 
10 
programme, or `special interest group' or division in the annual conference 
of the British Educational Research Association (BERA). Instead, when 
such work is carried out it is under a different banner (e. g., philosophy of 
education, sociology of education). In the US and Canada the situation is 
quite different, with `curriculum studies' being considered a distinct, if 
broad, field of research. As a legitimate `field of study' it is conspicuous in 
many North American university programmes and also has a division of its 
own in the annual research conference of the American Educational 
Research Association (AERA). However, despite the seeming `coherence' of 
the North American field, it is also described as `fragmented. ' In their 
comprehensive thousand-page analysis of the contemporary field, Pinar, 
Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1995) describe it as comprising 
phenomenological, feminist, psychoanalytic, poststructural, postmodern, 
hermeneutic, historical, action and advocacy-orientated, aesthetic and 
institutional perspectives, among others, which resist any unification. More 
recently Miller has remarked that 
any singular prescription for what counts as curriculum studies, 
what counts as the field, what counts as the relationship and 
location of theory to practice, founders on the situated diversity of 
our work and lives. It is obvious that there is no one field, no one 
fixed, coherent, and shared version of what our work in 
curriculum studies should be (Miller 2000, p. 259). 
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It is mainly the curriculum discourses within the `institutional perspective' 
of the North American curriculum field that the current research addresses. 
This area of curriculum research is concerned with what actually goes on 
or, at least with what `should' go on in schools. In contrast some of the 
other North American curriculum discourses, according to Pinar et al., are 
moving away from school concerns `towards exploration of concepts 
indigenous to curriculum, independent of institutional agendas' (Pinar et al. 
1995, p. 853, emphasis added). 
Within the `institutional perspective' there is fierce curricular debate around 
the notion of `school reform. ' Again and again curricularists have expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the failure of various school reform movements to 
improve the quality of teaching or learning in public education (for two 
opposing perspectives on this, see Ravitch 2000, and Kohn 1999). The 
debate is generally framed as a choice between 
(i) desiccated `teacher-centred' schooling practices where children are 
forced to imbibe decontextualised facts, OR `mindless' child-centred 
practices where both the position of the teacher and the content of 
the curriculum are marginalised (see Kohn 1999) or 
(ii) elitist `liberal' curricular practices which are focused on the Western 
canon - i. e., the `academic curriculum' - and aim to pass it down as a 
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`received truth' OR democratic `progressive' curricular practices 
which `set aside' the canon as antiquated or oppressive, the remnant 
of outmoded aristocratic values and beliefs (see Ravitch 2000, 
Silberman 2002). 
The entire debate, so Gibbony (1994) suggests, is structured around a 
rhetoric of `mastery learning' which is underpinned by technocratic, 
behaviorist, and reductionistic premises. My work touches on (and 
ultimately brings into question) this debate through an exploration of the 
representational foundations of its logic. 
1.2.2 The field' of epistemology 
According to most general or introductory texts on the topic (e. g., Greco 
1998, Newman 2000, Ross 1998), epistemology as a separate discipline 
within philosophy is said to have emerged with Descartes' Meditations on 
First Philosophy. Prior to Descartes, and ever since the ancient Greeks, `first 
philosophy' was metaphysics. Thus the first question for philosophy to 
answer was about what is real. That decided, everything else could be done. 
With Descartes, however, questions about knowledge become prioritised. If 
there are problems about what we can know, then we may not even be able 
to know what is real. But if questions about knowledge must be settled first, 
then this establishes epistemological priority for philosophy. Indeed, this 
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leads to the creation of the Theory of Knowledge, Epistemology, as a 
separate discipline within philosophy for the first time. Modern philosophy 
has therefore been driven by questions about knowledge and so 
epistemology has therefore been thought of as the `first philosophy' (i. e., 
before metaphysics). 
Modern epistemology is almost wholly dominated by Descartes' mind- 
world scheme (which separates knowledge in our minds from the objects of 
our knowledge) and is largely concerned with questions about the 
relationship between knowledge and the objects of our knowledge 
(Newman 2000). Epistemological questions are therefore premised on the 
assumption that knowledge `stands for' something that is not itself. 
Knowledge, in other words, is representational. The central importance of 
the notion of representation in modem epistemology should not be 
underestimated. The `field' is concerned with every conceivable question 
about whether, why or how knowledge can represent something else and 
with the accuracy of the representation (Rorty 1979). This means it is `only 
with a justified sense of artificiality' (Dancy 1992, p. xiv) that modem 
epistemology can be separated from other philosophical fields like the 
philosophy of mind (mental representations), the philosophy of science 
(scientific representations) and metaphysics (the object of representation). 
Because representation is the guiding logic behind all modern 
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epistemological theorising, modern epistemologies, can all be understood as 
representational epistemologies. They are all guided by the idea that 
knowledge `stands for' or corresponds to (i. e., represents) something that is 
not itself. 
In the last century, however, Cartesian epistemology has been faced with a 
challenge. A critique of representation emanating from linguistics (e. g., de 
Saussure 1916), pragmatism (e. g., Dewey 1981/1925) and the philosophy of 
language (e. g., Wittgenstein 1953) which takes issue with the dualistic logic 
of representation, has put into question the dualistic (Cartesian) logic upon 
which modern epistemologies rely. If epistemology can no longer be driven 
by (dualistic) representational logic, such that we can have knowledge of 
that which exists outside knowledge, then what constitutes epistemology? 
What is its `object'? Does the notion of an `object' of epistemology even 
make sense? In this regard there have been, in the last three decades, 
pronouncements about the `death of epistemology' (see in particular Rorty 
1979). What these pronouncements seem to be suggesting is not the end of 
epistemology as such, but the end of modern epistemology, the end of 
representational (Cartesian) epistemology in all its forms (and perhaps the 
birth of a `postmodern epistemology'). It is here that my own work can be 
located, i. e., it is concerned with the `death' of representational 
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epistemology and so transgresses the boundaries of traditional (Cartesian) 
epistemology. 
1.2.3 The held' of complexityscience 
In the last two decades a multidisciplinary area of investigation has emerged 
that has come to be known as `complexity science' or even more broadly 
`complexity studies. ' In trying to describe the `field', a useful way forward is 
provided by Richardson and Cilliers (2001). In their editorial to a special 
issue of Emergence, focussing on the question `What is complexity science? ' 
they respond by providing `a view from different directions, ' suggesting 
that one (simple) way of thinking about the field is in terms of three broad 
`schools of thought', these being 
0 `hard' or `reductionistic' complexity science - an approach that is 
concerned with understanding the mechanics of complexity. In other 
words it is concerned with the nature of reality. 
0 `soft' complexity science - an approach that uses insights from hard 
complexity science as metaphors to describe, explain10 or understand 
10 A distinction between descriptive and explanative causality is made in Chapter 5. It is argued 
that a description is not an explanation, in the sense that reductive explanations are 
explanations. 
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complex social interactions. One could say this approach uses 
complexity as a way of seeing the world. 
" `complexity thinking' - an approach that is concerned with the 
epistemological or `philosophical' implications of assuming a complex 
universe. It represents a way of thinking and acting. 
Richardson and Cilliers do, however, admit this classification `conveys a 
neatness that is really rather illusory' (ibid., p. 8) as these three `schools of 
thought' are highly intertwined. Changes in perspective always come with 
different ways of acting, thinking, seeing, relating and working and so any 
attempt to define the `boundaries' of these `schools of thought' creates 
caricatures that cannot do justice to the `school of thought' in question. 
Moreover, even `within' each of these schools of thought there are deep 
conflicts and disagreements about what constitutes the nature of 
complexity. In what follows I provide a very brief review of the above three 
`schools' of thought, making mention of their internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies. 
First, let me deal with the `hard' approach. This area of research now spans 
almost all areas of science, to the extent that the idea of a `complexity 
science' that is something different from what is going on in science itself is a 
misnomer. Although there is a research institute - the Santa Fe Institute - 
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which is devoted to the study of `complexity science' as a discipline in and 
of itself, many scientists now work within this paradigm and were doing so 
long before the advent of `complexity science' itself. Quantum mechanics, 
for example, which originated in the first half of the twentieth century, 
operates by means of what could be called a complex systems approach. 
Complexity is a way of scientific thinking which has moved beyond 
traditional `reductionist' or `mechanistic' understandings of the universe. 
What seems to be emerging in science is a new `organic' (as opposed to 
`mechanistic') worldview (Dent 1999). Nevertheless, despite the seeming 
coherence of a `new worldview' there is no agreement in the `scientific 
community' over what constitutes complexity and whether the organic 
metaphor constitutes a shift in scientific thinking. 
The `soft' or metaphorical approach in complexity science is used largely to 
`understand' social interaction. In most cases, the language and insights of 
`hard' complexity science are used as analogies or metaphors to draw 
attention to certain features of complex social phenomena that were not 
visible before. Thus, behaviours, such as nonlinearity, recursiveness, self- 
organisation, emergence and a host of others, are brought into focus and 
given meaning in many different areas of investigation. Since the metaphors 
are largely organic (rather than mechanistic), these provide a conceptual 
framework that enables researchers to deal with themes such as 
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connectedness, participation, uncertainty, diversity and instability, all issues 
which linear (mechanistic) conceptions of the world were less able to deal 
with. 
The steadily increasing number of serious academic studies that draw links 
between complexity and broad topics such as social science (Byrne 1998, 
Kiel and Elliot 1997, Vallacher and Nowak 1994), sociology (Eve, Horsfall 
and Lee 1997), social psychology (Vallacher and Nowak 1997) and 
education (Badenhorst 1998, Davis, Sumara and Luce-Kapler 2000, Doll 
1993) attests to the utility and/or thought-provoking potential of this 
approach. However, useful as the metaphorical approach may be in 
`broadening vision, ' it is also criticised for being both limited and limiting. 
There are those who contend the approach is limited because the generic 
features of physical, chemical and biological complex systems, so they 
claim, are also features of complex social systems. Maguire and McKelvey 
(1999), for example, argue that social phenomena are complex systems in 
their own right and can therefore be studied in the same way as any other 
complex systems. They would therefore like to see the metaphorical 
approach moved to a more `rigorous' (i. e., mathematical or computational) 
base (Maguire and McKelvey 1999, McKelvey 1999). In this regard 
Goldspink (2000,2002) suggests that the application of computer simulation 
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to social research can result in the development of a social theory consistent 
with a complexity perspective, following which a research programme can 
then be implemented to explore its validity. Such arguments suggest the 
complexity metaphor can be used not simply to describe complex social 
systems but also to explain them. Complexity is then seen as the new 
`paradigm' by means of which the social sciences can (at last) be brought 
under the umbrella of the `rigorous' (hard) sciences. Everything is now 
explainable in terms of the logic of complex dynamic systems (for this kind 
of view see, in particular, Kelly 1995 and Capra 1996). 
Although complexity science does offer a new and exciting lens for engaging 
with social complexity, it has also been argued that applying complexity to 
social systems is deeply limiting. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, for 
example, have argued that applying the organic metaphors of complexity to 
social systems is `exceedingly risky, for one can easily lose sight of the 
enormous differences between biological and social systems' (Best and 
Kellner 1999, p. 153). Most importantly we lose sight of the fact that the 
social world is constituted through language and meaning and is therefore a 
political world. When the language of complexity is used to `see' the world 
this doesn't simply `enhance' our understanding of the world, but forces us 
to see the world in a particular way and can therefore be used to reinforce 
and validate a particular way of thinking. Best and Kellner therefore argue 
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that complexity `like any scientific theory... can be deployed for different 
political purposes' (ibid., p. 154, my emphasis) and that `the totalising 
application of systems theory and complexity theory... is epidemic in the 
genre' (ibid., p. 155). 1 believe however that Best and Kellner's critique of 
complexity in the social sciences is possible only because of something that 
it has in common with both the metaphorical and the `hard' approach to 
complexity. The assumption that complexity science is inevitably 
quantitative in disposition (see also Van Uden, Richardson and Cilliers, 
2001). 
Those seeking to use complexity in a purely metaphorical sense are 
specifically concerned with not applying it in its quantitative mathematical 
sense, while proponents of the harder approach, such as McKelvey, want to 
see `a systematic agenda linking theory development with mathematical... 
model development' (McKelvey 1999, p. 24). Best and Kellner assume that 
complexity is `like any scientific theory... ' i. e., it is quantitative in nature. It 
is precisely this quality of scientific theories that enables their `deploy[ment] 
for different political purposes' (Best and Kellner 1999, p. 154). 
The assumption that complexity theory is inevitably quantitative in 
disposition is incorrect, however. Granted, the quantitative approach is the 
one used by the majority of `hard' complexity scientists who are trying to 
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understand the `nature' of a wide variety of seemingly 
dissimilar complex 
systems. However, in spite of this focus on quantitative approaches to 
understanding complex systems, it must be stressed that even within `hard' 
complexity science it is acknowledged that complex systems resist precise 
mathematical formulation (Auyang 1998, Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette and 
Belitz 1994, Prigogine 1997, Prigogine and Nicolis 1977). This aspect of 
complexity is acknowledged by some researchers working with complexity 
in the social sciences. Byrne (1998) for example, in his book Complexity 
Theory and the Social Sciences, comments 
It is worth noting that in a handbook written for doctoral students 
in physics and chemistry, Nicolis remarks on the impossibility of 
a full quantitative understanding of complex phenomena and the 
consequent requirement to turn to qualitative approaches (Byrne 
1998, p. 7). 
Interestingly, however, although this aspect of complexity is acknowledged, 
what seems to have been largely ignored is the fact that the irreducibility of 
complex systems to a precise quantitative description means it cannot be 
used `like any scientific theory' (Best and Kellner 1999, p. 154). It is here 
that `complexity thinking' - the third approach in Richardson and Cilliers's 
classification of the `field' of complexity science (Richardson and Cilliers 
2001) - makes an entry. 
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Using as a base the understandings of complex systems that have been 
developed by the `hard' complexity science approach, Richardson and 
Cilliers, together and independently, have begun working out the 
epistemological implications of complexity and developed an epistemology 
which they call `complexity thinking. ' This epistemology is largely inspired 
by the idea that complex systems are `relational' systems which means the 
information which `characterises' them is in the relationships between the 
parts not the parts themselves. This means complex systems cannot be 
understood by taking them apart. They cannot be reduced, and therefore 
they cannot be represented (representation being a means of reduction). This 
conclusion, of course, brings into question much of the work carried out at 
the Santa Fe Institute which, for the most part, is explicitly concerned with 
modelling or representing complexity. Understandably this has generated a 
considerable amount of polemic around the status of scientific knowledge of 
complex systems (see for example Cilliers 2000a, 2000b, 2002, Horgan 
1995). It is on the edges of this debate about the epistemological status of 
models of complex systems - i. e. the domain of `complexity thinking' that 
my own work takes place. 
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1.2.4 Positioning the research 
In this section I have shown that my research takes place on the edges of 
three debates that are located in the fields of curriculum studies, 
epistemology and complexity science. The first debate is about curriculum 
reform. The question driving this debate is what kind of knowledge should 
be represented in the curriculum and how. The second debate is about the 
status of representational knowledge. This debate is driven by the question 
of how to make sense of the notion of knowledge when representational 
logic is brought into question. The third debate is about the epistemological 
status of complexity. Here the central question is what the 
unrepresentability of complexity means for epistemology. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH Focus 
1.3.1 The argument and the research questions 
From a position on the edge of three broad fields of study - as outlined in 
the previous section -I argue, in this research, that the endless curricular 
debate about what to present in the curriculum and how to present it relies 
on assumptions about knowledge that are driven by representational logic. 
It is assumed that knowledge stands for `something' that exists in and of 
itself, somewhere `outside' of knowledge and that the purpose of the 
curriculum is to ensure that the student acquires knowledge of this 
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`something. ' But if representational epistemology is brought into question - 
which means the idea that we can have knowledge of something that exists 
in and of itself is brought into question - then the whole debate about what 
students should have knowledge of and how best to facilitate their getting to 
know it, is unfounded. This, in turn, suggests there is a need to `rethink' the 
epistemology of schooling. Three broad questions that arise from this 
suggestion are: 
(i) What might take the place of the representational epistemology of 
schooling? 
(ii) What would be the `shape' or `geography' of a schooling practice 
that is not premised on representational epistemology? 
(iii) Is complexity helpful for addressing either of these questions? 
1.3.2 Significance of the research 
My research shows that complexity is helpful for addressing questions (i) 
and (ii) above, because it provides a way of understanding the relationship 
between the world and knowledge which is not a representational 
relationship. For this reason the `epistemology' of complexity has far 
reaching implications for practices of schooling that, for the main part, are 
based on conventional representational epistemology. 
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1.3.3 Contributions to the literature 
There are at least five areas of this research which make an original 
contribution to the literature. 
The first contribution lies in the way in which I have theorised the 
`epistemology of complexity. ' Those working in the area of `complexity 
thinking' - who are concerned with the epistemological implications of 
complexity - have focussed mainly on the relationality of complex systems. 
In treating complex systems as `relational entities' I believe the 
epistemologies they outline are structuralist" epistemologies (and therefore 
still underpinned by representational or Cartesian epistemology). I have 
taken this further and focussed also on the temporality of complexity. In 
doing this it has been possible to show that complexity cannot be 
understood as an `entity' (even a relational one). This leads to a 
poststructuralist `epistemology' (which is not an `epistemology' in the 
Cartesian sense of the word). In this sense my work moves the `complexity 
thinking' approach from the structuralist to the poststructuralist mode. 
A second contribution lies in the way I have translated Prigogine's 
`microscopic theory of irreversibility' (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 310) 
into a theory of `strong' emergence. This entirely novel approach to 
11 1 discuss the difference between `structuralist' and `poststructuralist' positions in Section 1.4. 
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Prigogine's work brings out the radically antifoundational logic that is 
evident in his work. By outlining the logic of `strong' emergence, my work 
opens the possibility to explore the links between an `emergentist 
epistemology' on the one hand and a `deconstructionist epistemology' on 
the other. It also opens the possibility to explore links between an 
`emergentist/deconstructionist epistemology' and the `science of the 
infinitely small' (as the quantum universe is) which also cannot rely on a 
logic of `presence. ' The logic of `strong' emergence is therefore an extremely 
useful link between `science' and `deconstruction. ' 
Third, my work makes an original contribution in linking two big debates 
in curriculum and educational theory. The debate about the implications 
for schooling of the loss of representational theories of knowledge and 
signification on the one hand and the loss of representational theories of the 
human subject on the other. My work shows that the obdurate problem of 
representation in modern Western schooling is not directly linked to 
representational understandings of knowledge and signification (although 
these, of course, are important), but to an understanding of human 
subjectivity that is driven by this logic. It is only once our understanding of 
human subjectivity is dissociated from this logic, that it becomes possible to 
no longer understand the school as reproducing in the student something 
(some form of knowledge) that is already present. 
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Fourth, my work makes clear that (and how) complexity science offers a 
`way out' of the current impasse between traditional and progressive 
conceptions of schooling. It shows how complexity provides an alternative 
which takes place outside the logic that drives this long standing debate. 
Finally, from the broad description of my research provided in Section 
1.3.2, I hope to have made it clear that at no time is this work concerned 
with the `soft' or metaphorical approach in complexity science which uses 
the insights generated by the hard approach to describe, explain or 
understand complex social interactions (such as those which take place in 
education). I am not concerned, in other words, with schooling as a 
`complex' object which is `there' to be observed, described, explained, 
understood in itself. I am using complexity, rather, to theorise education 
from a different epistemological and semiotic base, one inspired by 
complexity. To put this more plainly, I use complexity (actually `strong' 
emergence) as a metaphor for knowledge rather than using it as a metaphor 
for the objects of knowledge. The resultant `epistemology' cannot entertain 
the idea of a `thing' that exists `in itself' and so cannot `understand' 
education (or any other complex social processes) as an `object' of 
knowledge. When applied to knowledge the complexity metaphor suggests 
that there cannot be `objects' of `knowledge: With this distinction my 
work introduces a radical shift in focus for research that is concerned with 
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the implications of complexity for educational theory. To my knowledge, 
this genre of research (complexity and educational research) remains in the 
structuralist mode where the objective of the research is to describe, explain 
or understand the `complexity' of the complex social systems that constitute 
education and schooling (Davis, Sumara and Thomas 1996, Davis and 
Sumara 1997,2001,2004, Davis, Sumara and Luce-Kapler 2000, Doll 1993, 
Fullan 1999,2001, Sumara and Davis 1997). 
1.4 THE RESEARCH `METHODOLOGY' 
The term `methodology' usually refers to the general approach to research, 
while method refers to more precise techniques for gathering data (Harding 
1987, p. 2) but there is no universal agreement as to what researchers mean by 
methodology. Noel Gough offers the following etymology and explanation of 
the term: 
The word `methodology' is derived from the Greek words meta' 
(with, after). Hödos (the way) - sometimes combined as methodos 
(a following after) - and logos (reason, account, reckoning). Thus, 
etymologically speaking, research methodology is the reasoning 
that informs particular ways of doing research, or the principles 
that inform its organisation. Some researchers refer to their 
methodology as a conceptual framework or the assumptions that 
guide their research (Gough 2002, p. 4, italics original). 
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Therefore methodology can be loosely understood as the rationale for the way 
the research has proceeded. Of course the reasons one does what one does in 
one's research also depend upon and determine the type of research one does 
which in turn depends upon what one believes qualifies as `research. ' 
According to Gough, research includes `any means by which a discipline or art 
develops, tests, and renews itself (Gough 2002, p. 2). In this regard Gough 
suggests that `research' is `anything that people who call themselves researchers 
actually do that is recognised by their peers as research' (ibid. ). One of the 
problems with such a statement is that it assumes that a particular `body of 
research' has a `peer group. ' This is not always the case, particularly with 
transdisciplinary research - such as this research - where the boundaries of the 
research are not just `poorly' defined but transgressed. There is a lack of 
available criteria to assess transdisciplinary research on its own terms. It is not 
only that it cannot be judged by particular disciplinary standards, but that it 
cannot be judged by disciplinary standards per se (Klein 1996, p. 210). It is not 
disciplinary. This poses a problem for examiners which I cannot erase but 
which I can attempt to ease by providing as clear an account as possible as to 
why I did what I did. 
1.4.1 The methodological approach 
Gathering material for this exploration has meant casting my net wide, into 
the arena of poststructuralist scholarship, complexity science, epistemology, 
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curriculum and educational theory as well as talking to a range of people 
whose lives in some way intersected with my research. My `methodology' 
(if one exists) has emerged from my engagement with these people and 
discourses and was not in place before the research began. It was not `there' 
in its totality, to guide my actions from the beginning. Nevertheless this 
does not mean this research is not methodologically organised. In what 
follows I describe a `methodological' basis for my work (which, strictly 
speaking, is a `nonmethodological' basis, and in this sense perhaps not a 
`basis' at all) and situate it amongst other methodological approaches. 
As the research proceeded a `methodology' emerged (together with the 
research `focus' which also became more clear as the research proceeded). 
This `methodology' fits into a category which Patti Lather calls `post- 
paradigmatic diaspora'12 (Lather 1991, p. 7) With this name she aims to 
unsettle the whole idea of a `paradigm' as a system of methodological rules 
which structure the kinds of research that can (legitimately) be done. As 
such, the name also unsettles the Kuhnian notion of a `paradigm shift. ' 
12 Lather attributes this term to John Caputo (Lather 1991, p. 7,108). 
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Kuhnian frameworks de-emphasize the political content of 
theories and methodologies and deny the dissolving of the world 
as structured by referential notions of language. They also 
diminish the play of multiple emergent knowledges vying for 
legitimacy. Caught up in a representational logic, they search for 
codifications and standards instead of asking if something more 
fundamental than a `paradigm shift' in the academy might be 
going on (Lather 1991, p. 107). 
The `post paradigmatic diaspora' are not unitary, guided by a `paradigmatic' 
system of methodological rules, but have been `scattered, ' drawing on many 
influences and speaking in many `voices' (methodologies). Although it is 
not possible to describe the `post paradigmatic diaspora, ' by combining the 
work of Lather (1991) and Guba and Lincoln (1998) it is possible to shed 
light on its `dispossessed' nature of by relating it to other methodological 
and paradigmatic approaches. 
Broadly speaking, methodological approaches can be separated into three 
categories: empirical, interpretive and critical. The first is guided by a 
`positivist' paradigm, 13 while the latter two are `postpositivist. i14 However, 
in relation to the `post paradigmatic diaspora, ' all three methodologies can 
be categorised as `structuralist' by virtue of the fact that they rely on a 
13 Grounded in empirical certainty. 
14 Pertaining to the fal bilistic epistemological assumptions. 
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system of methodological rules, a structure. The `post paradigmatic 
diaspora, ' because they are not guided by a system of methodological rules - 
a legitimating structure or paradigm - can be called `poststructuralist' (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1 
A classification of different methodologies and paradigms 
Methodology Research aims Paradigm 
Empirical Predict, explain, uncover `truths' Positivist 
Structuralist Interpretive Understand, describe 
I 
Critical Emancipate, empower 
Postpositivist 
`Post- 
Poststructuralist paradigmatic Deconstruct `truths, ' open up thought 
diaspora' 
(Adapted from Lather 1991, p. 7, Guba and Lincoln 1998, p. 203) 
The structuralist methodologies (in the unshaded part of Table 1) all have 
well defined principles (a self-contained `structure') and, as such, adhere to 
fairly precise methods for `gathering data' (e. g., the scientific method, 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, grounded theory, critical theory, discourse 
analysis, etc). These methods for `gathering data' may be either quantitative 
(i. e., empirical) or qualitative (i. e., historical, descriptive, interpretive etc. ) 
strategies, but whatever the case, structuralist methodologies aim to improve 
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on already existing understandings. In this sense structuralist approaches use 
`methods' and `methodologies' to guide understanding to a point of closure. 
In contrast, the poststructuralist `approach' (in the shaded portion of Table 
1) is fundamentally different from all the others in that it does not seek to 
improve on already existing understandings (structures) but seeks, rather, to 
unsettle pre-existing understandings (structures), and thereby open new ways 
of thinking and being (i. e., open new `structures' of thought). The idea of 
`opening up' new ways of thinking presents a real challenge to the idea of 
`research methodology' for it is an approach which wants to challenge pre. 
existing standards of thinking. It wants to challenge the idea of 
methodology as guidance for thought. The idea of `poststructuralist 
methodology' is therefore a contradiction in terms. This, no doubt, 
contributes to the fact that the `poststructuralist style' is often ignored or 
given cursory mention by methodological theorists (see, for example, Keeves 
1997; Walker and Evers 1997; Lincoln and Guba 1984, Denzin and Lincoln 
1998). Perhaps one could go so far as to say the postructural approach is a 
`non-methodological' or `post-methodological' approach. Lather's 
methodological treatment of poststructuralism is one of the few exceptions that 
include poststructuralism into discussions about research methodology. For 
Lather, the one thing that seems to give this approach a substance of Sorts - 
not as something in its own right but as something which counters other 
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methodological approaches - is its aim to move thought to some place else, 
to unsettle and `rethink' pre-existing structures of thinking, i. e., to 
deconstruct. Since all thought is structured in some way Lather describes the 
poststructuralist style of research as `thinking and doing otherwise' (Lather 
2003, p. 267). Britzman calls this mode of thinking an `impertinent 
performance: an interest in thinking against the thought of one's conceptual 
foundations' (Britzman 1995, p. 55). 
In the current research I have tried to `rethink' the idea of schooling 
without the one notion that seems absolutely central to schooling: the idea 
that schooling disseminates (cognitive and/or bodily) knowledge about (pre- 
existing) structures. Because it is attempting to `think schooling differently' 
the style of this research could be called poststructural (at least by Lather's 
standard). I would like to stress, however, that the aim of thinking 
schooling differently did not pre-exist (and therefore guide) the research 
itself. It emerged together with the research content itself. If anything, this 
simultaneous emergence of aim, `methodology' and content is what 
`characterises' the `road' or `way' (hödos) that was `taken' (methodos) in this 
research endeavour. By this I mean the road that was taken was not there in 
advance, it was not something to be followed, and also, it is not something 
which has now been made or `layed down in walking' (Varela 1997) and 
which therefore now `exists' as some concrete entity which can be traced 
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backwards to explain what `really' happened. As such, the `road taken' is 
not a road in any ordinary sense of the word. It is an `appearing and 
disappearing road' or perhaps a `space' which continually opens up at the 
same time as closing behind itself. In this sense I would like to suggest the 
research itself `emerged' (and is continuing to emerge) and, as such, can only 
be described from the logic of the temporary `space' in which it now exists. 
My understanding of it's structure, its rationale, its methodology, is an 
understanding which is appropriate only to this current and very temporary 
space and is always already moving into another space of logic. 
For the purposes of convention, I have attempted, below, to freeze this 
logic as it appears to me now, as if the road taken can be retraced. In what 
follows I provide a reconstruction of the progression of the research, as it 
would appear if the path taken could be fixed, as in a sequence of snapshots 
taken over a period of time, and from this sequence a pattern `worked out' 
which would be the `real' story about what happened. The `real' story 
about an immutable past. While I believe such stories are possible, and 
perhaps even helpful to examiners of Ph. D dissertations, I do not believe 
they should be announced as `accurate' descriptions of what really 
happened, nor even subjective (biased) renderings of what really happened 
(which someone else could prove were more or less `accurate'). To assume a 
story can be judged more or less `accurate' assumes an immutable past -a 
36 
`real' past - which the story can be measured against for its accuracy. I do 
not wish my `story' to be judged according to measures of accuracy against 
what `really' happened. I present it only as a reconstruction of the past from 
the perspective of the present by means of which the logic of my argument, as 
it currently stands, can be understood. My reconstruction of the history of 
this research, from the perspective of the present, is shown in Figures 1.1- 
1.5. 
1.4.2 The road taken 
The project `began' with questions about `creativity' and `invention. ' In 
particular, it opened with the proposal that creative and inventive 
individuals are, for the most part, `autodidacts, ' these being people `who 
wish to learn for and by themselves' (Solomon 2003, p. 4). An initial one- 
day seminar on `Autodidactism and Creativity in Learning' - hosted by 
`The Epistemology Group"5 at the Royal Society of Arts in London on 31' 
October 2000 - served as a guide as to the kind of research questions that 
might be asked. These questions were framed in terms of `self-teaching' and 
`self-learning. ' 
15 `The Epistemology Group' also provided generous sponsorship for the current project. 
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A preliminary exploration into the concept of `autodidactism' revealed a 
paradox and this led quickly to my `discovery' of poststructural critiques of 
`autonomy' and other conceptual schemes in which themes of relatedness 
(as opposed to isolation and autonomy) were emphasised. These alternative 
`relational' schemes seemed somehow to `dissolve' the whole idea of 
`autodidactism. ' At this early stage my interest in exploring `autodidactism' 
as such was replaced with an interest in exploring the kinds of conceptual 
schemes which made a notion like autodidactism seem possible -or 
impossible. Poststructuralism therefore suggested itself as a possible 
conceptual framework for the research at an early stage, as did other 
`network' approaches such as complexity science and Actor-Network 
theory. Under pressure to `begin the research' and in line with the 
positioning of this research in a Faculty of Science I chose a science-based 
network approach for my theoretical framework - complexity science - 
and proceeded to explore its potential as Stage 1 of my research `proper' 
(see Figure 1.1). 
This deep engagement with a network approach (Stage 1 of the research) 
opened big questions about the (im)possibility of representing (and 
therefore having knowledge o! structures which are highly interconnected. 
This `discovery' brought into view my previous assumptions about 
knowledge and strongly challenged them. It became evident that before 
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proceeding with any exploration into teaching and learning (which is very 
much about knowledge) it was first necessary for me to address my 
epistemological assumptions in a more rigorous way and work out where I 
stood, epistemologically speaking, having engaged with a network approach 
like complexity. In particular I felt it necessary to `understand' and then 
explore alternatives to `representational epistemology. ' This initiated 
Stage 2 of the research: a deeper exploration into the logic of 
representational epistemology. 
My engagement with the epistemological issues surrounding the notion of 
representation (Stage 2) led, of course, to a deeper understanding of the 
semiotic issues around the notion of representation and a sharpening of my 
own epistemological position. However it also led me to the realisation that 
my prior exploration of complexity (Stage 1) had facilitated a different 
understanding of representation and knowledge which could be further 
developed. This suggested that instead of moving back to educational issues 
at this point the next logical step would be to first make use of my work on 
complexity, representation and epistemology to develop more sharply the 
idea of an `epistemology of complexity' which could then be used in my 
analysis of educational issues. The development of the `epistemology of 
complexity' therefore became Stage 3 of the research. 
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In deciding to go forward with developing an `epistemology of complexity, ' 
the possible structure and purpose of the research also suggested itself. It 
became evident, at this point, that once an `epistemology of complexity' 
had been formulated, the research would be well positioned to address 
issues about the epistemology of education and schooling. The decision to 
develop an epistemology of complexity therefore also - at the same time - 
prompted a decision to focus the research on `rethinking the epistemology 
of schooling' and this eventually became the subtitle of the thesis (see Figure 
1.2). In developing an `epistemology of complexity' (Stage 3) it became clear 
that complexity challenged more than mere `representational logic. ' It also 
challenged the logic of presence and, as such, this positioned the research 
quite closely to deconstruction. The `epistemology of complexity' turns out 
to rely on a logic of emergence which in many ways can be equated with the 
logic of deconstruction. This logic is fundamentally different from a logic of 
`representation' or `reproduction. ' It offers in place of reproductive logic, a 
logic which is fundamentally `inventionalist' and `creative. ' In a roundabout 
way, this also brought the research back to the original question of 
`invention' and `creativity' although the notion of `autodidactism, ' by this 
point, had long since been dropped. 
Having realised the extent of the schism between the `epistemology of 
complexity' and other (representational) epistemologies, it became evident 
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that the `epistemology of complexity' posed a serious challenge to modem 
Western schooling, which is largely underpinned by the logic of 
representation. This necessitated a thorough exploration of the 
representational foundations of modern Western schooling, and hence 
Stage 4 was embarked upon, which is largely an historical account of the 
emergence of representational schooling practices. 
Having outlined the representational foundations of schooling it then 
became possible to begin Stage 5 of the research, the purpose of which was 
to show how the `epistemology of complexity' - or more accurately the 
`logic of emergence/deconstruction' - fundamentally challenges the 
representational `foundations' of modern Western schooling and in 
particular the notion of curriculum as a predetermined course to be 
followed. 
With the completion of Stage 5 all the material required for the argument 
had been `collected. ' These pieces of writing were, however, not linked in 
the form of an argument. This was initiated in Stage 6 of the research. Here 
the individual `stories' in each of the chapters were woven together in the 
overall argument during which time the introductory and concluding 
chapters were also added. This produced an overall `logic' which had not 
been present during the initial writing stages. The emergent order in which 
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each of the themes explored in Stages 1-6 expanded on each other 
is depicted 
in Figure 1.1. 
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The logic of the argument: `Linearising' the emergent structure 
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1.4.3 The structure of the argument 
In Figure 1.2 1 show how, if the sequence of emergence of these themes is 
arranged on a spiral, the linear sequence of the five chapters emerges. What 
the spiral makes clear is the way in which the conceptual framework - 
complexity (Chapter 4) - revealed the epistemological questions (Chapter 3) 
which necessitated the introduction of the conceptual framework itself. It 
also shows how the articulation of these questions necessitated their 
`resolution' in terms of the conceptual framework (Chapter 5) which in turn 
suggested the `argument' upon which the whole thesis could be pinned 
(Chapter 2) and the final `resolution' to this argument (Chapter 6). On the 
left of the centre of the spiral we therefore have `questions' and on the right 
of the centre we have `answers. ' Figure 1.3 illustrates this structure in more 
conventional terms. The chapters on the left of the centre pose the research 
questions and frame the argument. As such, the content therein is not 
`original' but draws on pre-existing conceptual schemes to outline a 
`problem. ' In contrast the chapters to the right of the centre constitute the 
research `proper. ' Here the conceptual framework (centre of the spiral) is 
utilised to address the questions posed on the left of the centre. Chapter 5, 
in particular, is the crux of the research `proper. ' Here I develop an 
epistemological framework which I then use in Chapter 6, in combination 
with other theoretical frames, to conclude the argument. 
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The logic of the argument in conventional terms 
The whole process of the research is therefore shown to be recursive. The 
questions (and their answers) increase in scope with distance from the 
centre, where it all `began'. The linear sequence of the chapters (which is 
different from their emergent order) can therefore be understood as a 
product of the emerging research process itself, and not an arrangement 
which can simply be imposed on the structure from a position outside of it. 
The linear arrangement of the chapters is neither arbitrary (based on the 
whim of the author or supervisor) nor predetermined. It is part of the 
emergent structure of the research `itself. ' 
44 
In Figure 1.4,1 show how, once Stages 1-5 of the research had been 
completed and the linear structure of the argument had emerged, I then 
reworked the material in a particular sequence to develop the argument and 
tighten the links between chapters. Once this was done, I then described the 
overall structure of the argument and this produced the introductory 
chapter (see Figure 1.5). 













Stage 6: Developing the argument by rewriting the chapters 
a second time in the sequence shown 
Having everything present in the correct sequence, I then (again) reworked 
all the chapters, this time in a `linear' fashion (although this still included 
considerable back-and-forth movement between chapters), from start to 
finish, to refine and develop the argument further, using insights that had 
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been brought to the fore in the writing of the introductory chapter. 
Following this the concluding chapter was written and the %ý cork submitted 
for examination shortly thereafter. 
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Stage 6: Refining the argument by rewriting the chapters 
a third time in the sequence shown by the solid black line 
(with considerable back-and-forth movement between 




1.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
In the previous section I explained the rationale behind the choice of 
content and the arrangement of the five chapters making up the body of 
this thesis. Here I describe each of these five chapters in more detail, 
drawing attention to the argument and to why and where the material 
presented is new. 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: The epistemology of schooling 
Chapter 2 provides an `overview' of modern curricular thought to show 
how it is guided by two fundamental questions of what to present in the 
curriculum and how to present it. These questions are founded on the 
assumption that what is presented in schools already exists - i. e., it exists 
before it is presented in the curriculum - and so whatever is presented in the 
curriculum is always also a representation. It is the function of the 
curriculum to re-present some original `presence' in order that the student 
can acquire knowledge of it. In this way modern curricular thought 
necessarily relies on a representational logic. Moreover it relies on a 
representational epistemology for it assumes that the knowledge acquired in 
schools somehow represents this original presence which lies outside the 
school. 
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I then examine schooling from an historical perspective, to show how it 
became possible for this representational logic to emerge in modern 
curricular thought. By combining insights from the work of Aries (1962), 
Mollenhauer (1983), and Foucault (2002/1970b), I show that two important 
contributing factors seem to have been (i) the increasing isolation of young 
people in schools, away from `real' life, such that what was present outside 
of the school had to be re-presented inside the school (this is Mollenhauer's 
point), and (ii) the emergence of a representational world view which 
Foucault suggests is linked with the emergence of a dualistic understanding 
of the sign. What I try to make clear - and this is where my work differs 
from Mollenhauer's - is that Aries's work on the history of `childhood' 
(Aries 1962) to a certain extent contradicts Mollenhauer's claim that the 
isolation of children from the `real' world initiated a representational 
curricular approach. Aries account, however, also does not explain the 
emergence of representational logic in curricular thinking. I argue that 
while important, the separation of young people from the `real' world was 
not sufficient to initiate modern (i. e., representational) curricular thought. 
Using Foucault's historical analysis of knowledge (Foucault 2002/1970b) I 
argue that a representational view of curriculum became possible only with 
the emergence of a dualistic or representational understanding of the sign in 
the seventeenth century. In this regard, the separation of children from the 
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`real' world, which had begun a few centuries earlier, meant schools were 
`pre-adapted' for representational logic, i. e., for presenting in schools a 
`reality' that existed outside schools. Representational epistemology, which 
clearly splits knowledge from that which it represents, is highly compatible 
with the idea of a schooling system which separates young people from the 
`reality' which they must acquire knowledge `of in order for them to acquire 
knowledge of it. 
Last I show how the underlying representational logic of modern curricular 
thought is played out in modern pedagogical practices. In particular I point 
out how pedagogical approaches which claim to oppose representational 
schooling practices are themselves reliant on representational theory of 
knowledge in that they still rely on the idea that what exists outside the 
school can somehow be replicated as knowledge in the mind/body of the 
student. In other words modern pedagogical approaches still rely on the 
assumption that knowledge is separate from its object which is some 
original `presence' outside of knowledge itself, and that knowledge in some 
way represents this original `presence. ' 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: The crisis of representation 
The point of Chapter 3 is to show that the representational epistemology 
upon which modern schooling is founded is itself highly problematic and 
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particularly in the last few decades critiques of representational logic seem 
to have ushered in what has popularly become known as the `crisis of 
representation. ' In this chapter I review only three aspects of the extensive 
critique of representation. I review the critique first in relation to personal 
knowledge, then in relation to scientific or `public' knowledge and finally 
in relation to language and writing. The first two lines of argument are 
framed in terms of `Cartesian dualism' (Descartes' mind-world scheme) 
which splits the `real' world from our knowledge of it (Cottingham 1992). 
It is only when there is a split between world and knowledge that the idea 
of knowledge standing for or representing something more `real' than itself 
makes sense. Within this dualist or `representational' framing, the `crisis of 
representation' appears as a crisis of indeterminism. The question arises as 
to which theory of knowledge-representation is the best. Competing 
epistemologies include `subjectivist, ' `objectivist' and `relativist' versions 
amongst others. With this discussion it is not the logic of representation 
(something standing for something else) that is put into question but the 
operationalisation of the logic. In this sense it has been argued that the 
`crisis of representation' is not a crisis of representation as such, not a crisis 
of the `phenomenon' but a crisis of `the representation of representation' 
and therefore `a discussion of representation is mainly a discussion of 
knowledge' (jorna and van Heusden 2003, p. 125). 
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The third line of argument begins within the Cartesian framework but then 
puts this framework into question, i. e., it questions the logic whereby 
knowledge can `stand for' something more real than itself. A different logic 
is developed - the logic of deconstruction - which challenges the idea that 
something can be `present' and therefore renders incoherent the idea that 
something can be `re-presented' (that which is itself not present cannot be 
re-presented). This deeper `crisis of representation' therefore opens a way of 
theorising which is fundamentally different from anything which has come 
before, the implications of which are only just starting to be explored in a 
systematic way in educational discourse (see Biests and Egea-Kuehne 2001, 
. 
Pinar and Reynolds 1992, and Trifonas and Peters 2004 for three collections 
of works on deconstruction and education). 
Having outlined the problems with representational epistemology, and 
having pointed to the potential value of deconstruction in `re-thinking' 
education, I then suggest that although deconstruction presents an 
interesting and important way forward for theorising education along non- 
representational epistemological lines, deconstructionist conceptual schemes 
are notoriously difficult to negotiate. It is precisely at this point that 
complexity science - which has sparked considerable interest in the last two 
decades as a new `worldview' (Dent 1999) and which has also been charged 
with providing a critique of representation (see for example Cilliers 1998) - 
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enters the discussion. While a number of authors have already explicitly 
drawn connections between complexity and poststructuralism (Cilliers 
1998, Dillon 2000, Popolo 2003) the question of whether complexity can 
help with the task of `re-thinking' the epistemology of schooling has, as yet, 
not been addressed. It is to this task that the remainder of the thesis is 
devoted. 
1.5.3 Chapter 4: Introducing complexity 
In Chapter 4,1 introduce some of the conceptual structures of `complexity 
science' in order to build a `platform' of understanding from which to 
launch the epistemological and educational issues taken up in Chapters 5 
and 6. In this regard I focus solely on those theories of complexity that are 
generally considered the established orthodoxy. These originate in the 
`hard' sciences, in particular the domains of computer modelling and 
theoretical physics/chemistry. Nevertheless, I do not try to represent 
complexity as a unified field. I present it, rather, in terms of two opposing 
understandings, which attempt to explain the world in terms of its 
interconnectivity or relationality. One style of theorising (which includes 
all save one theory of complexity) supports a deterministic theory of 
complexity while the other (which includes only Prigogine's theory of 
complexity) brings the notion of determinism into question. 
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The difference between these two styles of theorising complexity, I would 
contend, has been largely overlooked by those working on the 
epistemological implications of complexity, who have focussed largely on 
the `relationality' of complex systems and the implications of `relationality' 
for our understanding of what we can know' (Cilliers 1998,2000a, 2002, 
Richardson 2004, Richardson, Mathieson and Cilliers 2000). While the 
relationality of complexity has many important epistemological 
implications, the bringing into question of determinism, so I argue in 
Chapter 5, has even more profound epistemological implications, and aligns 
complexity with radically antifoundationalist stances such as 
deconstruction. 
1.5.4 Chapter 5: The epistemology of complexity 
In Chapter 5,1 draw on the background presented in Chapter 4 to outline 
what I believe to be the epistemological implications of complexity. While 
much work has already been done on the `epistemology of complexity' 
(Cilliers 1998,2000a, 2002, Richardson 2004, Richardson, Mathieson and 
Cilliers 2000) 1 show in this chapter that the insights generated by 
complexity science lead to a far more radical epistemological stance than has 
previously been suggested. 
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In developing the `epistemology of complexity' I first outline Cilliers' 
reading of complexity, which suggests that all attempts to fully or perfectly 
understand, model or `represent' complexity, miss the point of complexity. 
Cilliers therefore proposes a `relational' rather than a representational 
conception of complexity, but concedes that such a conception of 
complexity is also a representation of sorts. I then take the argument further 
by reframing Cilliers' argument in terms of the `rule-based' logic he brings 
into question and in so doing show that the logical difficulties that arise in 
representing complexity suggest at least two alternatives to representational 
epistemology. An interpretivist (or `relativist) alternative which can be 
aligned with many `postmodern' philosophical positions and a pragmatist 
alternative which can be aligned with Dewey's `transactional realism. ' 
However, while this provides complexity with clear epistemological 
alternatives, it still does not take things far enough for this argument is 
based only on the relationality of complex systems and does not consider 
complexity's challenge to determinism which is connected to the role of 
time as an `operator' in complex processes. 
I then show that when time is taken into account as an operator in complex 
processes - and here I draw on Prigogine - we can no longer take for 
granted the idea that the world is `there' for us (as a presence which exists in 
and of itselO. This means we can also no longer understand knowledge as 
54 
`standing for' a `presence' that exists `in itself somewhere outside of 
knowledge. 
Drawing on George Herbert Mead (1932) and Henri Bergson (1911) 1 then 
show that we can use insights from complexity to think of knowledge not 
as the acquisition of something already present, but as a response which `calls 
forth' something radically new. With this understanding knowledge does 
not `pin down' the meaning of something already there. Knowledge can no 
longer be brought to a close. Rather, knowledge must be understood as an 
`opening' or `invention' of meaning. It is in this regard that a complexity- 
inspired epistemology shows an affinity with deconstruction. 
1.5.5 Chapter 6: Curriculum and emergence 
In Chapter 6,1 explore the implications of a complexity inspired 
epistemology for a practice of schooling that, for the main part, is based on 
a conventional, representational epistemology. In doing this I first address 
the question of opening or `inventing' meaning in the school setting. This is 
a question about whether the practice of `inventing' meaning in schools in 
fact escapes representational epistemology. 
In this regard I provide three examples of `pedagogies of invention' each of 
which attempts to facilitate (or has been accused of facilitating) the 
55 
`invention' of meaning in the classroom. In doing this I show that none of 
these `pedagogies of invention' succeeds in doing away with the underlying 
representational logic of schooling. Even a pedagogy designed around an 
`emergentist' conception of meaning making fails in this regard. I show that 
if we bear in mind that it is not only meaning that emerges from a 
pedagogical intervention but also the subjectivity of the one being educated 
then we have to concede that education always shapes the subjectivity of the 
one being educated. In this regard I point out that education is vulnerable to 
the representational problem of `discipleship' which Ulmer describes as 
`reproduction of the master's style' (Ulmer 1985, pp. 162-173). The 
knowledge that is being `reproduced' in the student is knowledge of the 
master's style, and therefore knowledge of some pre-existing presence. Since 
the knowledge `gained' is still knowledge about something which is outside 
itself (i. e., the master's style) education can still be found to rely on a 
representational epistemology 
Next, I argue that `the pedagogical effect of discipleship' (Ulmer 1985, p. 
173) is produced only in curricula that are designed with an idea already in 
mind of what a human subject is. To avoid this pedagogical effect, and 
facilitate a form of education not premised on representational 
epistemology, it is therefore necessary to develop a curriculum around an 
understanding of human subjectivity that leaves open the question of what it 
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means to be a human subject. Here an understanding of subjectivity that is 
inspired by `strong' emergence proves useful. This `emergentist' 
understanding of subjectivity destroys the representational foundation upon 
which modern Western schooling is built and offers in its place a `space of 
emergence' which cannot be understood in any foundational sense. 
However, since the `space of emergence' is a curricular space it is still 
possible to theorise education. 
Finally, I explain that when we theorise education in a non-representational 
mode, i. e., using the notion of an emergent `curricular space' (which is a 
space of radical contingency) we see that the educator's responsibility is first 
of all not a responsibility to see to it that a certain form of knowledge is 
acquired by the one being educated. The educator's first responsibility, in 
other words, is not an epistemological or representational responsibility. 
Rather, the educator's first responsibility is to keep open a space in which 
the student can continue to emerge as a singular and unique being. This 
involves the educator in what Derrida has called a `double duty' (Derrida 




TIE EPIS EMOLOGY OF SCHOOLING 
Modern curricular thought and its representational foundations 
2.1 PREAMBLE 
In many ways, modern Western schooling can be understood as a practice of 
representation. The child - the subject of schooling - is, as Hannah Arendt 
has put it `new in a world that is strange to him' (Arendt 1954a, p. 185). 
Insofar as the child is not yet acquainted with the world, he must 
be gradually introduced to it; insofar as he is new, care must be 
taken that this new thing comes to fruition in relation to the 
world as it is. In any case, however, the educators here stand in 
relation to the young as representatives of a world for which they 
must assume responsibility although they themselves did not 
make it, and even though they may, secretly or openly, wish it 
were other than it is (Arendt 1954a, p. 189). 
For Arendt, and many others, the task of Western schooling is, above all, to 
teach children `what the world is like' (ibid., p. 195). The teacher's 
qualification consists in knowing the world and being able to instruct others 
about it... pointing out the details and saying to the child: This is our world' 
(ibid., p. 189). What is `pointed out' in schools is always something that is 
`present' in and of itself, which pre-exists the curriculum, and which the 
curriculum must then `re-present. ' But the curriculum cannot re-present 
everything, so it must select what to represent. Furthermore it must re- 
present it in a way that it actually gets transferred into the child. In other 
words the curriculum must ensure (or at least attempt to ensure) that the 
knowledge acquired by the child accurately reflects its object. It must be a 
good representation of the `outside' world. In this way modern curricular 
thought is representational in a double sense. The curriculum itself `stands 
for' or represents (signifies) the `outside' world and moreover it does this in 
order to generate accurate representations (knowledge) of the outside world 
in the mind of the learner. Schooling is therefore a representational practice, 
which relies on a representational epistemology. 
In this chapter I examine this double representationalism in modern 
Western schooling in some depth in order to see how it controls the kinds 
of questions curricularists can ask. I start with a general `overview' of the 
representational logic of modern curricular thought to show how it is 
guided by two fundamental questions of what to present in the curriculum 
and how to present it. The first question is concerned with the curriculum 
itself as a representation (signifier). The content of the curriculum represents 
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(signifies) inside the classroom that which lies outside of it. The second 
question is concerned with knowledge as a representation (signifier). The 
method of the curriculum must ensure that the knowledge acquired by the 
learner accurately represents (signifies) its object. These questions therefore 
epitomise the `double representationalism' in modern Western schooling 
practices. In doing this I also provide a brief overview of representational 
epistemology (the understanding that knowledge represents or signifies 
something that exists outside itself) showing how this epistemology is not 
primary (i. e., not `first philosophy') but underpinned by a dualistic 
understanding of signification. 
Following this I examine the concept of schooling from an historical 
perspective, to show how it was only after a dualistic understanding of the 
sign had emerged in Western culture that it became possible for the doubly 
representational logic of schooling to emerge in modern curricular thought. 
Last I show how, with a dualistic understanding of the sign, curricular 
debate gets caught in a loop, with consecutive solutions to curricular 
problems eventually leading back to the original problem. The only way 
out of this loop is to unsettle the dualistic logic of signification upon which 
the various arguments are founded. 
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2.2 CURRICULUM AND REPRESENTATION 
In this section I examine the representational logic that underpins modern 
curricular thought. This includes a discussion about the different ways in 
which the term `curriculum' has been used (some more `representational' 
than others), as well as the guiding questions and assumptions driving 
modern curricular thought and the theories of knowledge and signification 
that in turn drive these questions and assumptions. 
2.2.1 Different uses of the term `curriculum' 
The term `curriculum' has a variety of meanings and has been used 
differently in different times. Originally a Latin term for `a course for a 
racing chariot' (OED), it had nothing to do with the idea of representation. 
Its more representational meaning only emerged in the seventeenth century 
when it started being used to designate a planned course of study at a school 
or university. " The content of the curriculum represented those aspects of 
life that were to be studied. But this representational understanding of the 
term was then blurred in the twentieth century when it started being used 
to include out-of-school experiences, planned and unplanned experiences 
within schools, as well as experiences leading to `unwanted outcomes of 
16 The first recorded usage of the term as a `course of stud}' dates back to 1633 where it was used 
in Latin texts of Scottish universities (06v Etjnr z Dictrormy available at 
bitty: //www. et, vmonline. com/) 
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schooling' (Jackson 1992, p. 8). These sorts of experiences could be 
understood as comprising the `hidden curriculum' this being the ideological 
and subliminal message presented within the overt curriculum and the 
`unstudied' or 'null curriculum' which emphasises those topics not included 
in the overt curriculum. With such understandings of curriculum it 
becomes difficult to distinguish between the content of the planned course 
of study itself (i. e., the structure traditionally thought of as the curriculum 
in the seventeenth century use of the word) and the method of presenting 
this planned course of study (the way it is experienced by learners). What is 
taught and how it is taught are therefore equally caught up in the notion of 
curriculum. In short, the term curriculum can now be understood as 
embodying those experiences that are necessary to learn the things one is 
learning about. To some extent this increased focus on experience (as 
opposed to content) blurs the representational logic of curriculum, and this 
is something I want to `unblur' to bring out more clearly the way in which 
the representational logic of schooling guides modern curricular questions. 
2.2.2 Modern curricular assumptions and questions 
There are three important assumptions connected to the idea that the 
curriculum embodies those experiences that are necessary to learn the things 
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one is learning. One is about learning, the second about education and the 
third about knowledge. 
First, there is the assumption that we learn about whatever it is we are 
presented with. Since we are always being presented with something, 
learning therefore takes place all the time. In this way the curriculum - 
since it presents us with the experiences necessary to learn what we learn - 
shapes what we learn. Our learning therefore follows or represents what is 
presented in the curriculum. 
Second there is the assumption that education (as opposed to `mere' 
learning) is about selectively acquiring knowledge (only that which is 
`worth' learning). Without this selection education would not be 
educational. The curriculum is educational precisely because it directs the 
learning of those being educated. In this way the curriculum shapes students 
in a particular way. Its educational end is teleological. 
Third - and this is the epistemological point - there is the assumption that 
what is `worth' learning already exists independently of those who would learn 
about it. After all, selection is only possible from a pre-existing range of 
possibilities. Moreover it is assumed that what is worth learning can 
somehow be transmitted (via the curriculum) to the one doing the learning. 
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In other words the curriculum is necessary to achieve a certain educational 
end. 
When these three assumptions are put together this leads to the conclusion 
that in order to become educated one must engage with a curriculum. The 
idea of a curriculum -a course of experiences that leads to a particular 
educational outcome - is therefore absolutely central to the project of 
modern education. It is the vehicle by means of which education, in its 
modern form, is made possible. Questions about 
(i) what to present in the curriculum and 
(ii) how to present it 
are therefore critically important educational questions and much (if not all) 
theorising about modern education is structured around these two 
questions. 
The first question is a political question since it asks `whose knowledge is of 
most worth, and what constitutes official knowledge' (Apple 1993, p. 316). 
To select one must, of course, have criteria about what counts as valuable or 
`worthy' knowledge and what falls outside of this category. This has created 
deep rifts amongst curriculum theorists (Kliebard 2004) about how the 
world should be represented (signified) by the curriculum. The second 
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question is an epistemological and pedagogical question, which concerns 
issues of presentation. How should the curriculum present what it presents 
in order that accurate knowledge is generated in the learner? Different views 
on this have created another set of rifts amongst curriculum theorists. While 
the centrality of both these questions for modern curriculum theorising is 
unquestionable, in this thesis I am more concerned with the epistemological 
question about how to get what is presented into the learner. The methods 
chosen for getting knowledge into the learner will obviously vary 
depending on one's epistemological assumptions. But the very idea of 
getting knowledge into the learner, so I wish to argue, relies on a particular 
understanding of knowledge which holds that knowledge signifies or `stands 
for' something which lies outside itself. This can therefore be called a 
representational theory of knowledge. 
2.2.3 Two representational theories of knowledge 
The idea that knowledge is representational in character implies that it 
embodies some sort of `information' about the external world. To `have 
knowledge' therefore usually means to `have information' that something is 
the case and to know that something is the case implies there are grounds 
for believing this to be the case, i. e., believing it to be true. Knowledge, in 
this sense can be defined as justified true belief (Moser 1992b). The standard 
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analysis is that if one has justified true belief that p, then one knows that p 
(see Moser 1992a). " Ryle (1945), however, disrupted this logic when he 
distinguished between knowing that (propositional or declarative 
knowledge) and knowing how (procedural knowledge). He argued that not 
all forms of knowing can be reduced to propositions. For example we can 
develop the skill of riding a bicycle (i. e., we can know how to ride a bicycle) 
without necessarily being able to describe exactly how we do it. Much of 
knowing how is unconscious knowing or practical skill, which could 
perhaps be called knowing with the body. This is in contrast to knowing 
that, which is about conscious knowing and theorising, about rational 
reflection and knowing with the mind. If Ryle's distinction is not given 
much attention, knowing that can be privileged over knowing how and all 
knowledge, including skills can be assumed to be reducible to propositions. 
Lehrer, for example, claims that having knowledge of the world is 
`fundamental to human cognition and required both for theoretical 
speculation and practical sagacity' (Lehrer 1990, p. 4, emphasis added). 
However, when Ryle's distinction is taken seriously, knowing how must be 
privileged over knowing that because, as Ryle argued, it is only through our 
actions in the world that we are able to form conceptions about it, i. e., 
17 Although the `Gettier Problem' poses counter examples to this standard formulation. (see 
Moser 1992). 
67 
know that it is a certain way. We are therefore left with the idea that all 
knowledge is caught up with the activity and situations in which it is 
produced, which means any knowledge acquired by the learner cannot be 
an undiluted or `true' representation of an objective or universal reality. 
This reversal leads away from a `picture' theory of knowledge and towards 
a `use' theory of knowledge (Dewey and Bentley 1949), which of course has 
implications for how knowledge is to be brought across the divide between 
the mind and the world. Educators holding a `picture' theory of knowledge 
maintain that the child can learn simply through observation. Educators 
holding a `use' theory of knowledge maintain that it is only through 
childrens' actions in the word that knowledge is brought across this divide. 
But here it is important to note that the distinction between knowing how 
and knowing that, and regardless of which is privileged over which, does 
not have an impact on the idea that knowledge (including facts and skills, 
and regardless of which comes first) is located in the knower. Even with 
such a distinction, it is still possible to maintain a Cartesian split between 
knowledge (which is in the knower) and the `outside' world which is 
associated with the cause of our knowing. In this sense all `knowing' can 
still have a dualistic relationship with the `outside' world. It still `stands for' 
the outside world, is still about something that exists outside of knowledge 
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itself. For this reason `use' theories and `picture' theories of knowledge are 
both representational theories of knowledge. 
2.2.4 A representational theory of signification 
Representational theories of knowledge can themselves be understood in 
terms of a representational theory of signification. This theory of 
signification holds that signs represent or stand for something which is 
present in and of itself. The very simplistic diagram below (Figure 2.1) 
illustrates this point. 
A `presence' or A representation 
`something' that exists. of the presence. 
(i. e., the signified) 







A dualistic or representational understanding of the sign 
But the term `sign' is not identical with the term `representation. ' For 
example lightning can be a sign of rain, but this does not mean that 
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lightning is a representation of rain. A representation is a special case of the 
sign. What is special about these sorts of signs is that they have no content in 
and of themselves. The content or `meaning' of a representation comes 
entirely from a `presence' which always exists prior to the representation 
itself and the representation simply `stands for' this presence. A 
representation is always a sign that `stands for' something else. 
Since the task of representation is to re-present something that is already 
present without adding anything of its own, this means that (i) the quality of 
a representation can be assessed in terms of the accuracy with which it 
represents a presence and (ii) the idea of representation is entirely dependent 
on the idea of presence. This dualistic or representational understanding of 
the sign is the basis of what Charles Taylor calls `modern representational 
epistemology' (Taylor 1995, p. 5) which he sums up as an understanding 
that knowledge is a `correct representation of an independent reality' (ibid., 
p. 3). In other words knowledge is supposed to signify something that is 
present and this something is `independent reality. ' Taylor calls this 
epistemology `modern' because the Western philosophical tradition has not 
always understood knowledge in this dualistic or representational way. It 
was only at the end of the sixteenth century, that knowledge became 
understood in the dualistic sense, i. e., as standing for something present in 
itself, something `real'. Foucault (2002/1970b) discusses this change in 
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understanding of the notion of knowledge in relation to changes in 
understanding of the notion of the sign. Prior to the seventeenth century, 
he argues, `signs' were understood to be `similitudes' between things. A sign 
was that which made it possible to see in one thing the mark of a second 
thing (e. g., lightning is a sign of rain). Foucault calls such signs ternaryf8 
(rather than binary)(see Figure 2.2). The task of knowledge was to interpret 
the meaning of these signs, i. e., if it was possible to see in one thing the 
mark of a second, then this was understood to be meaningful (rather than 
simply coincidental) and this meaning then required interpretation. Signs, 
in other words, were understood to be already imbued with meaning. It was 
only in the seventeenth century, in Foucault's diagnosis, that the sign 
became completely empty of meaning and therefore became simply a 
representation. Foucault puts it like this: 
18 Foucault describes these three distinct elements of the ternary sign as `that which was marked, 
that which did the marking and that which made it possible to see in the first the mark of the 
second. ' He adds that `this last element [i. e., that which makes it possible to see in the first the 
mark of the second] was, of course, resemblance: the sign provided a mark exactly in so far as it 
was "almost the same thing" as that which it designated' (Foucault 2002, p. 70). 
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In fact, [the property of signs most fundamental to this period is 
that] the signifying element has no content, no function, and no 
determination other than what it represents: it is entirely ordered 
upon and transparent to it.... The binary arrangement of the sign, 
as it appears in the seventeenth century, replaces an organisation 
which, in different modes, had been ternary ever since the time of 
the Stoics, and even since the first Greek grammarians (Foucault 
2002/1970b, p. 71). 
The idea that signs are not ternary but dual or representational in character 
(see Figure 2.3) - i. e., reflecting simply what exists or what is `real' in the 
world rather than having a meaning of their own, which requires 
interpretation - shifts the task of knowledge from the interpretative mode 
to the descriptive mode. Knowledge is about re-presenting something that is 
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Figure 2.2 
The ternary sign: A sign 
which makes it possible 
to see in one thing (e. g., a 
fingertip) the mark of a 
second thing (e. g., an 
astrological principle). 
image from The Complete Works of 
Jean Baptiste Belot, 1(x40 
(http: //www. fulltable. com/VTS/flfo 
r! tior. ht n) 
Figure 2.3 
The binary or dualistic sign 
is a representation or 
reflection of what exists, as is 
the case in this biological 
drawing representing the 
bones in the hand. 
linage from Henry Gray (1821- 1865). 
Anntomv o/ the Human Bo(fv. 1918 
(http: //www. bartleby. com/ 107/iIIus220. 
html) 
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2.3 THE ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIONAL CURRICULAR THOUGHT 
It can be argued that the emergence of a dualistic or representational 
understanding of the sign radically changed the way 
in which education was 
understood and organised, since it allowed 
for asking questions about how 
the `real' world, the world present beyond our representations, could be 
presented to the student. This development can therefore be understood to 
mark the birth of modern Western schooling. It is possible to claim that 
since all modern forms of schooling aim to generate accurate knowledge of 
`real' life, they are, in this sense, all reliant on a representational 
epistemology which itself is reliant on a dualistic understanding of the sign. 
What I shall do in this section is introduce two accounts of the origin of 
modern schooling which I believe are particularly useful first, for showing 
how schooling has not always been inspired by representational logic, and 
second, for enriching our understanding of the centrality of representational 
logic in modern Western schooling. These two accounts are provided by 
the French cultural historian Philippe Aries (Aries 1962) and the German 
educational theorist Klaus Mollenhauer (Mollenhauer 1983). 
2.3.1 Aries's account of the origin of modern schooling 
Aries (1962) couches his discussion of the emergence of modern schooling 
in terms of the social history of childhood. While he does not examine the 
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epistemological roots of education, his discussion is useful in that it makes 
clear that the idea of schooling young people ermerged initially for quite 
different reasons than to introduce young people to the world around them. 
Quite the contrary in fact. Aries argument makes it clear that schooling was 
initially to shield young people from the world around them. 
Aries argues that prior to the fifteenth century, young people were not 
visible as a special group and were treated simply as `undersized adults' and 
were subject to the same laws. However, from the fifteenth century 
onwards, according to Aries, young people were increasingly perceived as a 
special group, in need of specialised treatment. One can think of this in 
terms of the social construction of childhood as a phase distinct from 
adulthood, and which required particular care and attention. According to 
Aries, this re-description of young people and their categorisation as 
`children' resulted in this group being increasingly separated from adults, 
and closeted in schools. According to Aries this confinement of young 
people to schools was, for the most part, to exclude undesirable forms of 
learning from their world. The most avid proponents of education for 
`children, ' according to Aries, were the `early reformers' whose writings 
(which extended from Gerson to Port-Royal) became increasingly frequent 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Aries 1962, p. 412). In their 
desire to reform society these `early reformers, ' so Aries reports, 
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disseminated a form of propaganda which encouraged parents to send their 
children to school by suggesting that parents were individually responsible 
for giving their children `not only life but a good and holy life' (ibid., p. 
413) and by suggesting that those who send their children to school `are 
more worthy of respect than those who just bring them into the world' 
(ibid, p. 413). Aries claims that the `extraordinary development of the 
school in the seventeenth century' (ibid., p. 413) was a consequence of the 
new interest taken by parents in their children's education, which in turn 
was strongly influenced by the `propaganda' spread by the reformers of the 
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Aries does not discuss the epistemological changes that took place in the 
seventeenth century, but other educational historians have commented that 
it was only with the advent of `realism'" in the seventeenth century that 
`educational theorists ... began to introduce science and a 
knowledge of real 
things into the curriculum' (Graves 1914, p. 262). This can be linked with 
the emergence, in the seventeenth century, of a dualistic understanding of 
the sign and the idea of knowledge as a representation of the `real' world. I 
wish to suggest that it was only once a dualistic understanding of the sign 
was in place that the attention of educators could become focused on the 
19 Graves defines the `realist movement' of the seventeenth century as `a search for a method by 
which md dlip maybe known (Graves 1914, p. 240). 
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idea of teaching young people about the `real' world. Prior to this - and 
Aries account supports this conclusion - educators had been concerned 
mostly with the moral welfare of children. This switch in focus presented 
educators with a completely different set of pedagogical questions. After 
this time, educators became increasingly concerned with the question of 
how to get the student acquainted with the `real' world that existed outside 
the boundaries of the school. It is here that Mollenhauer's work is useful 
(but also problematic). Mollenhauer discusses this new set of pedagogical 
questions in terms of presentation and representation. 
2.3.2 Mollenhauer's account of the origin of modern schooling 
Mollenhauer (1983) argues that historically educational practices were 
initially practices of presentation, where the next generation or newcomers 
learned about existing ways of life consciously or unconsciously, willingly 
or unwillingly (Mollenhauer 1983, p. 20) by being immersed in those ways 
of life, by mingling, competing and working in the `real' world. Using 
Wittgenstein, Mollenhauer argues that this presentation is a presentation of 
structures, i. e., in Wittgensteinian terms: a presentation of `forms of life' 
(ibid., p. 28). Although Mollenhauer does not use this term, this can be 
thought of as a process of enculturation or socialisation, this being a practice 
which is largely uncritical. The vast majority of young people learned about 
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the world first hand through their participation in, and experience of, the 
world and from the adults they interacted with on a daily basis. In other 
words, they learned about `forms of life' through direct and immediate 
participation in the existing ways of life and knew no other way. Any 
intentional education carried out by adults was simply a `pointing out' of 
structures rooted in specific ways of life (and it should perhaps be added 
that there are still countries where `enculturation' is still the only way in 
which the next generation learns about life). 
Mollenhauer argues, however, that starting in the fifteenth century, as the 
position of young people in Western society started to change, what 
gradually disappeared was the situation in which young people were direct 
participants in `real' life. What emerged instead was an educational sphere 
or `realm' (ibid., p. 68), that is, a separate world for young people. 
Mollenhauer's main claim is that this confinement of young people in 
schools brought about a switch in focus from a presentational mode of 
education to a representational mode. After all, so Mollenhauer argues, once 
we take young people out of `real' life but still want to teach them about 
`real' life we need to somehow represent `real' life within the confines of the 
world of the school. This, so he claims, necessitates decisions about which of 
all the things in life that there are to learn, are the ones that are truly 
important (the political curricular question) and decisions about how the 
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important matters can be conveyed with the requisite clarity (the 
epistemological curricular question). These questions, of course, are 
precisely the curricular questions with which modern education is 
concerned. 
I would like to suggest, however, that while the construction of a separate 
educational sphere was certainly necessary to provoke modern curricular 
questions it was, in itself, not sufficient to provoke such questions. After all, 
the idea that schools should say anything at all about a world that lies 
outside their boundaries, it would seem, is entirely dependent on the idea 
that the `outside' world is worth knowing about. And this was certainly not 
the sentiment of the educators Aries was talking about. Aries makes clear 
that young people were initially confined in schools to prevent them from 
learning about the world outside the school. In this sense, while I agree with 
Mollenhauer that the representational approach inaugurated modern 
curricular thought, I believe the confinement of young people in schools 
was not instrumental in bringing about the representational approach to 
schooling. Rather, the confinement of young people in schools meant that 
schools were `pre-adapted' or `ready' for representational logic, ready for 
the idea that it was possible to re-present inside the school the world that lay 
outside the school. 
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I would contend that it was only possible to ask modern curricular 
questions about how to represent the `real' world in the school because of 
the emergence of a dualistic understanding of the sign and the ensuing 
popularity of `realism' which sought `a method by which "real" things may 
be known' (Graves 1914, p. 240). Such a world view had been `brewing' for 
many centuries. Graves (1914) for example, suggests 
[It] was not until the latter half of the fourteenth century that... 
[t]here appeared a general intellectual and cultural progress that 
began to free men from their bondage to ecclesiasticism and induce 
them to look at the world about them. The absolute adherence to an 
`otherworldly' ideal that was characteristic of early Christianity 
and monasticism... [was] by this time rapidly disappearing. Such 
tendencies were clearly being replaced by a genuine joy in the life 
of this world, a broader field of knowledge and thought (Graves 
1914, pp. 106-107, my emphasis). 
The appearance of `realism' in the seventeenth century (which, from 
Foucault's account, appears to be connected with the emergence of a 
dualistic understanding of the sign) could therefore have provided 
considerable impetus to `the extraordinary development of the school in the 
seventeenth century' (Aries 1962, p. 413). As Mollenhauer himself makes 
clear, it was only in the seventeenth century, two centuries after the idea of 
schooling young people emerged that representational curricular thinking 
(with its underlying questions of which aspects of the `real' world to include 
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in the curriculum and how) began to emerge. Mollenhauer suggests that 
Comenius's Orbis sensualium pictus (The Visible World in Pictures) a text 
book for children published in the seventeenth century which makes 
extensive use of `images and representations which are not "the thing itself' 
but instead "point out" things and phenomena (Mollenhauer 1983, pp. 52- 
53) exemplifies representational curricular thought because it was precisely 
concerned with the questions of how to represent the world to young 
people most adequately (See Figure 2.4). 
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(source: http: //www. uned. es/manesvirtual/Historia/Conienius/Ol ictus/OPictusAA. ht, n). 
Figure 2.4 
A lesson from Comenius's Orbis sensualium pictus. The book 
simplified the `real world' in such a way that children could gain 
an `adequate' understanding of it 
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Having linked the `start point' of representational curricular thought to the 
emergence of a dualistic understanding of the sign and the opening of the 
question of how to acquaint the student with `real' life, I would now like to 
open the discussion further and examine the methods that have been 
designed to ensure that children actually acquire knowledge of the `real' 
world. 
2.4 REPRESENTATIONAL VS. PRESENTATIONAL PEDAGOGIES 
With representational epistemology the primary responsibility of modern 
educators is to ensure that their students acquire knowledge of the `outside' 
world. Modern schooling has therefore grown around the idea that the job 
of educators is to develop methods of getting knowledge (knowing how and 
knowing that) which is initially outside the learner (i. e., in the world) into 
the learner. Learners are therefore always understood to be in the position 
of being in need of knowledge about something which already exists in the 
world. This assumption - that there is initially a knowledge deficit in the 
learner which must somehow be bridged by schooling - has played a crucial 
role in the development of modern schooling and inspired a number of 
educational techniques which are designed to bridge this gap most 
effectively and efficiently. 
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In this section what I hope to make clear is that pedagogical methods of 
getting knowledge of the world into the minds and bodies of children seem 
to be based on only two strategies: representational (or `traditional') 
pedagogy which is premised on a `picture' theory of knowledge and 
presentational (or `progressive) pedagogy which is premised on a `use' 
theory of knowledge. Both strategies rely upon the idea that it is possible to 
have knowledge of a world or way of life that is present in and of itself. In 
this respect, both these pedagogical strategies are informed by a set of 
epistemological assumptions that draws on a dualistic understanding of the 
sign. Let me start with Comenius. 
2.4.1 Comenius and representational pedagogy 
Comenius was adamant that schooling was an absolute necessity and that all 
young people had the right to be educated in schools. This was because he 
believed that life itself was too complex for young people to learn from and 
that the only way in which young people could adequately be taught about 
`real' life was if a realm of schooling were `created' for the younger 
generation, in which they could be presented with life in simplified form, 
through carefully selected and ordered instructional materials, which were 
designed specifically to appeal to the young person. Without such 
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educational intervention, Comenius expected the young person would 
acquire a `chaotic' understanding of 
life (Mollenhauer 1983, p. 67). 
Comenius regarded both pictorial representations of the world and the 
sequencing of these representations as indispensable. His approach thus 
marks a break with other forms of education because he emphasised the 
importance of drawing on images of worldly objects rather than pointing to 
the objects themselves. `For Comenius, the image was a pivotal didactic tool 
because it bridged the gap between direct sense impressions (perceptions) 
and the classification system from which these perceptions initially derive 
their meaning' (Mollenhauer 1983, p. 59). His pedagogy, in other words, is 
representational. Children learn from representations of the world rather 
than from the world itself. 
While Comenius presented important reasons for using a representational 
approach for educating children, representational pedagogy has been 
strongly criticised in the last century for relying on a `picture' theory of 
knowledge as inert, decontextualised, formal concepts - that is, `static 
representations of an independent reality' - that can simply be transmitted, 
transferred or otherwise reproduced in the minds of learners who are 
assumed to have no educational intentions of their own. Up until the end of 
the nineteenth century children, for the most part, were understood as 
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`blank-slates' waiting to be inscribed with knowledge, or `empty vessels' 
that needed to be filled (Cuban 1984). The most effective way of getting 
knowledge into the learner was therefore to make sure there was as little 
interference as possible during the `transfer' of knowledge. Children were 
required to passively absorb the knowledge that was being verbally and 
visually transmitted to them by the teacher (Cuban 1984). For the past 
century, at least, this representational pedagogical style has been strongly 
criticised, the most well known of these critics being John Dewey. 
Dewey, whose work in education has been highly influential, developed a 
form of `progressive' education - which drew on a `use' theory of 
knowledge rather than a `picture' theory of knowledge - in direct 
opposition to the `traditional' pedagogical methods that were practiced in 
his time. 
2.4.2 Dewey -s progressivism. A presentational' pedagogy 
Like Comenius, Dewey also believed that schools are needed to simplify 
existing life or `reduce it to an embryonic form' because, `[e]xisting life is so 
complex that the young person cannot be brought into contact with it 
without either confusion or distraction' (Dewey 1897, p. 80). Unlike 
Comenius, however, he did not believe that the only route to simplifying 
existing life was to represent it. Dewey argued that the representations 
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young people were presented with in schools had no basis of `reality' in 
their experience. Such abstract and decontextualised representations, he 
argued are `condemned to be hieroglyphs' which `remain an idle curiosity, - 
to fret and obstruct the mind, a dead weight to burden it' (Dewey 
1990/1902, p. 203). 
Furthermore, Dewey argued that prescriptive curricula with set `start-to- 
finish' sequences of instruction leave no room for children to exercise their 
natural curiosity and hence deprive children of the pleasure learning 
(Dewey 1990/1956). Instead learning becomes a tiresome or even hated 
chore imposed from without. Further, the lessons taught have `only an 
abstract and remote reference to some possible living to be done in the 
future' (ibid., p. 18) and so have no basis in the actual experience of the 
child. Lessons that are devoid of any real significant meaning to the child 
cannot appeal. In order to get children to acquire such `dead and barren' 
subject matter - so Dewey argued - schools had to resort to `adventitious 
leverage to push it in, to factitious drill to drive it in, to artificial bribe to 
lure it in' (ibid., p. 205). This, according to Dewey, was a `waste of human 
life' (ibid., p. 64). It wasted the lives of the children while they were at 
school and it was also a waste afterwards because of `inadequate and 
perverted preparation' (ibid., p. 64). 
86 
The way out, according to Dewey was not so much to improve the link 
between representation and `reality, ' but rather to do away with the `re' and 
make schools into places where the world itself was presented. In this regard, 
Dewey proposed a curriculum in which the child was put directly in touch 
with the `real' world. His solution was to bring the world into the school, 
i. e., to make schools into places where children could learn directly by 
experiment and discovery. He insisted that to learn, young people need to 
actively participate in something that is `real' for them. Schools were 
therefore `to become the child's habitat, where he learns through directed 
living, instead of being only a place to learn lessons [abstracted from] living' 
(Dewey 1990/1956, p. 18). With such schools, he argued, the job of the 
curriculum was to provide the conditions under which children, by their 
own activities, come to their own `discovery of truth' (ibid., p. 202). With 
this model, the teacher, rather than being a transmitter of `dead and barren' 
representations instead guides learning through `real life' experiences that 
are educative. This, of course, necessitates the child having certain kinds of 
experiences. 
Dewey was therefore very much concerned with the same representational 
questions that concerned Comenius. Which aspects of the world need to be 
addressed in the curriculum and how this can be done most adequately (i. e., 
in a way that connects to the child's experience). While acknowledging that 
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knowledge is intimately connected with what people do - which relies on a 
`use' rather than a `picture' theory of knowledge - Dewey's progressive 
pedagogical approach still relies on the idea that the child must develop 
knowledge of a world that exists in and of itself, somewhere outside of the 
child. 
2.4.3 Situated Learning and `presentational'pedagogy 
The progressivist notion of an `experience based' education ties in with 
`participatory' learning theory (see for example Brown, Collins and Duguid 
1989, Lave and Wenger 1991, and Rogoff 1990) which emphasises that the 
only way in which people can learn about the world is when they have the 
opportunity to participate in `real' world practices, and so the idea of young 
people passively absorbing decontextualised representations of the world in 
order to use this knowledge in their later activities makes no sense. Young 
people need to be directly presented with `real' world practices because `all 
knowledge is ... 
inextricably a product of the activity and situations in 
which [it] is produced' (Brown, Collins and Duguid 1989, p. 33). According 
to Lave and Wenger (1991), all learning is situated in `communities of 
practice' and cannot be analysed in isolation from either the practice or the 
community. 
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While situated learning theory has similarities with Dewey's progressive 
ideas, situated learning theorists argue that the idea of bringing `real' life 
into the school is problematic when the purpose of this is to teach the 
young person about `real' world practices or ways of life (which it often is, 
e. g., young people are taught about scientific practice, i. e., what it means to 
`do' science). This is because many of the activities that young people 
undertake in schools are simply not the activities of practitioners in the 
`real' world. Situated learning theorists (e. g., Brown, Collins and Duguid 
1989, Lave 1991) have argued that when authentic activities of practitioners 
are transferred to the classroom, their context is altered to the extent that 
they `would not make sense or be endorsed by the cultures to which they 
are attributed. ' (Brown, Collins and Duguid 1989, p. 33). Lave suggests that 
schools engage in the `narrowing, trivialization, and decomposition of full 
participation', and `decomposition of activity to the point of 
meaninglessness' (Lave 1991, p. 77-78). Classroom tasks, in other words, can 
completely fail to provide the contextual features that allow `authentic 
activity. ' To learn how to use knowledge like a practitioner Brown et al. 
argue that `a student, like an apprentice, must enter that ['real' life] 
community and its culture' (ibid., p. 33). 
Situated learning theory suggests that, like apprentices in the `real' world, 
when young people enter a school culture, they learn that culture i. e., they 
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learn `school culture'. Schools are communities of practice with their own 
formal and informal codes of behavior. As Brown et al. point out, 
learning 
`school culture' can be very effective within the practices of schooling, 
but 
outside of schools, `where problems do not come in textbooks, a 
dependency on such school-based cues makes the learning extremely fragile' 
(Brown, Collins and Duguid 1989, p. 36). 
Thus for situated learning theorists, `authentic activity' is a central 
component of learning. If this is the case, and if we further assume that the 
purpose of education is prepare young people for `real' world practices 
(ways of life) by teaching them about these practices or ways of life then 
participatory learning theory must be read as suggesting that young people 
would be better off being encultured into `real' world communities of 
practice right from the start rather than learning about these practices or 
ways of life in schools (which are communities of practice in their own 
right, with their own unique social structure). Unlike Dewey, whose 
solution to representational curricula was to bring `real' life into the school, 
contemporary participatory learning theories - when understood in the 
context of schooling as preparation for later life - seem to be suggesting that 
the solution to representational curricula is to place the young person 
directly back into the `real' world, i. e., back into `real' life, and hence do away 
with formal schooling altogether. 
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The `participatory' understanding of learning has been contrasted with the 
idea of learning as `acquisition' (Sfard 1998). According to Sfard, the 
`acquisition metaphor' - which implies gaining ownership over some kind 
of self-sustained entity (i. e., knowledge or concepts) which may be acquired 
through passive reception or active construction - is usually more 
prominent in older writings on learning while more recent studies on the 
topic are often dominated by the `participation metaphor' which, rather 
than focussing on the individual mind and the knowledge objects that go 
into it, shifts the focus to the process of `taking part' or `being a part' of a 
greater whole (Sfard 1998, p. 6). From the situative perspective, successful 
`transfer' of knowledge means improved participation. However, it can still 
be argued that participation is necessary for the very purpose of acquiring 
knowledge in order to participate more fully. As such, participation cannot 
be opposed to acquisition in the sense Sfard suggests. Participatory learning 
theories, like the other pedagogies discussed in this chapter, still rely on the 
idea that people acquire knowledge of something that initially exists 
`outside' of themselves and which can somehow be brought `within' 
through observation, experience, or participation. As such, participatory 
theories are still reliant on a representational epistemology. 
The situated approach is also highly problematic for pedagogical reasons. It 
has been argued first, from a conservative viewpoint, that a `decent' 
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education is not merely an apprenticeship -a 
form of vocational training - 
but one in which children get access to all the great works of a particular 
cultural tradition (see Silberman 2002). Second, 
from a humanistic 
perspective, it is argued that children who become apprenticed at an early 
age will not be exposed to a variety of different subjects and so in this sense 
their choice of vocation is, at best, severely restricted, at worst, entirely 
predetermined by others. Third, from a more critical perspective, it is 
argued that participatory or presentational forms of learning end up in 
socialisation and adaptation and therefore result in one-dimensional ways of 
learning. 
2.4.4 The representational presentational binary 
The argument so far is that with the emergence of a dualistic understanding 
of the sign in the seventeenth century the objective of schooling became 
how to familiarise the young person with the `real' world. It was thought 
that since the `real' world was too complex for the young person to 
understand, it had to be presented in simplified form. This necessitated 
teaching young people about `real' life in schools. The first way in which 
`real' life was simplified in schools was to present it in the form of carefully 
ordered representations of things rather than the things themselves. This 
representational pedagogy proved problematic, however, because the 
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representations had no basis of `reality' in the experience of the young 
person. The solution to this was to bring `real' life into the school, i. e., to 
present life directly rather than representing it. But this is also problematic 
because `real' life cannot be transferred into the school without altering the 
context of `real' life to the extent that what is brought into the school no 
longer bears any resemblance to the `real' life practice it is supposed to 
simulate. The solution to this is to place the young person directly back 
into the world, i. e., to learn from the world itself, rather than in schools. 
This however, is also problematic, as it means the young person can only 
learn about the local world, i. e., the world they are immersed in. Although 
their knowledge may be robust, such `local' knowledge is also uncritical and 
narrow. Furthermore, by doing away with the `educational realm' - as a 
special realm for children - we are returned to the medieval situation in 
which children are treated in the same way as everyone else. It would 
appear therefore that since the emergence of mass schooling which, 
according to Aries, started in the fifteenth century, schooling practices have 
come full circle. 
Within this circle both presentational and representational pedagogies are 
seen to be problematic although they are still the two main approaches to 
education and becoming increasingly intertwined. To a certain extent they 
can be used to offset each other's deficiencies. Nevertheless, because they 
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rely on different theories of knowledge (a `use' theory and a `picture' theory 
of knowledge) this `co-existence' is an uneasy one. On the one hand, while 
representational practices produce a critical distance, the `picture' theory of 
knowledge upon which it depends is now mostly regarded as obsolete. On 
the other hand, while the presentational practices rely on a more 
contemporary `use' theory of knowledge, the pedagogical practices which 
result from this theory of knowledge must sacrifice critical distance. The 
question therefore arises as to whether there is another way forward for 
education. 
I would like to suggest that there is and it lies with tackling representation 
not at the epistemological level, but at the level of the sign. While both 
representational and presentational pedagogies use different epistemologies 
to answer the question of how to familiarise the young person with the 
world, they are both concerned with closing a gap in knowledge between 
the young person's understanding of the world and the world itself. One 
pedagogy attempts to close this gap by presenting the young person with 
representations of the world, the other attempts to close the gap by 
presenting the world itself for children to `reconstruct' or `participate' in. 
My point is that regardless of whether this is done through providing 
accurate representations or by presenting the student with the world `itself 
the underlying assumption that there is a world `out there' which can either 
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be represented or presented and which the student needs to learn about. 
Both `representational' and `presentational' pedagogies still rely on the idea 
of a world that the learner somehow has to be brought in touch with. This 
understanding, ultimately, rests on a dualistic understanding of the sign. As 
such, presentational and representational perspectives on curriculum are 
polarised on a binary made possible by a dualistic understanding of the sign. 
This amounts to a representational worldview, the idea that there is a `real' 
world which can be represented in knowledge, language, art and so on. 
Representations always refer to something that is more `real' than the 
representation itself, something that pre-exists the representation. In this 
regard presentational curricula do not challenge the representational 
foundation of modern schooling. Rather they are themselves a product of 
the same dualistic logic that drives `traditional' representational pedagogies. 
As long as a dualistic understanding of the sign structures curricular 
thinking educators are stuck with understandings of knowledge -a range of 
epistemologies - that are fundamentally representational. To escape the 
presentational-representational binary, and thus put an end to the circling of 
representational epistemologies around each other in the pedagogical arena, 
it is necessary to address the problem of representation at the level of the 
sign. Before `rethinking' the epistemology of schooling it is therefore 
necessary to `rethink' the logic of signification. 
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2.5 SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have argued that the pedagogical practices that characterise 
modern Western schooling are, for the most part, underpinned 
by 
representational theories of knowledge which in turn are underpinned by a 
representational or dualistic understanding of the sign. The emergence of 
modern schooling practices can be linked to the emergence of the binary 
sign in the seventeenth century. This notion structures the kinds of 
curricular questions that can be asked. I also discussed some of the ways in 
which problems with `traditional' representational schooling practices have 
been addressed. In this regard I argued that problems with representation 
have been tackled at the level of epistemology, rather than at the more 
foundational level of the sign. Since a dualistic or representational 
understanding of the sign facilitated the emergence of modern schooling in 
the first place all curricular arguments are underpinned by this dualistic 
logic. This has resulted in a trajectory of curricular theorising which returns 
to the place it started. To escape this loop, I suggest it is necessary to address 
representation at the level of the sign. This is particularly pertinent for 
contemporary educational theorising as dualistic or representational 
understandings of the sign have themselves been brought into question in 
the last century, a move which has initiated what is popularly labelled the 
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THE GRLSIS OF REPRESENTATION 
Representation, semiology, Cartesian epistemology and beyond 
3.1 PREI LE 
In the last few decades there has been a steadily increasing interest in, and 
debate about, what has become known as the `crisis of representation'. To 
give an idea of the complexity and extent of the debate about 
representation, it is worth quoting at length the pre-announcement for the 
`Crisis of Representation' semiotic colloquium that was held at the 
University of Kassel in Germany on the 18-19 February 2000 (reproduced 
in a special issue of Semiotica). 
At the transition from the second to the third millennium, 
postmodern philosophers, cultural critics, media theorists and 
poststructuralist semioticians are discussing the crisis of 
representation [... ]. The crisis of representation is the 
apprehension of a world in which the signs have lost their power 
to represent anything. Words become deprived of their referent, 
images are no longer anchored in reality, the media become more 
and more self-referential, and the result is a world of virtual or 
hyperrealities. Texts begin to lose their structural autonomy and 
ramify in a network of hypertextualities. Closely related to these 
semiotic processes is the debate about the 'decentering' of the 
semiotic subject [... ]. At the same time, however, the idea of a 
crisis of representation is gaining support from research in the 
'exact' sciences: In physics, quantum theory has demonstrated the 
impossibility of an unbiased, 'objective' observation and hence 
representative of the world. In mathematics, catastrophe theory 
has drawn our attention to ruptures in dynamical and apparently 
continuous processes. Finally, chaos theory has testified to the 
existence of identities and self-similarities in apparently chaotic 
processes and has thus given further evidence to support the idea 
of self-referentiality in nature (Noth and Ljungberg 2003, pp. 3-4). 
In this chapter I shall review only three aspects of the extensive critique of 
representation. I review the critique (i) in relation to personal knowledge, 
(ii) in relation to scientific or `public' knowledge and (iii) in relation to 
language and writing (semiotics). 
The first two lines of argument take place at the epistemological level. They 
are framed in terms in terms of `Cartesian dualism' (Descartes' mind-world 
scheme) which splits the `real' world from our knowledge of it (Cottingham 
1992) and therefore take place within the logical framework of Cartesian or 
representational epistemology. Within the Cartesian epistemological 
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framework the `crisis of representation' appears as a crisis of indeterminism. 
The question arises as to which theory of knowledge/representation is the 
best. Competing epistemologies (which are all representational 
epistemologies of one sort or another) include `subjectivist, ' `objectivist' and 
`relativist' versions amongst others. In this sense the `crisis of 
representation' is not a crisis of the logic of representation as such but a crisis 
of the `representation of representation' (Jorna and van Heusden 2003, p. 
125). The idea that significations `stand for' something else is taken for 
granted, treated as a given `phenomenon'. What is questioned is the 
epistemological status of the representation/signification. For this reason 
this particular `crisis of representation' takes place at the epistemological 
level. 
The third line of argument takes place at the level of signification itself. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, the idea of a sign as something which stands 
for something else is implicit in Cartesian epistemology. This means a 
critique of representation at the level of the sign takes place at a more 
foundational level than the critique of representation that takes place at the 
epistemological level. This line of argument questions the so called 
`phenomenon' of representation, i. e., it puts into question the whole idea 
that a signification `stands for' some entity that exists or is `present' before 
the signification. Here a different logic is developed - the logic of 
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deconstruction - which challenges the idea that something can be `present' 
and therefore also challenges the idea that something can be `re-presented' 
(that which is itself not present it cannot be re-presented). Because this 
critique of representation takes place at the more foundational level of the 
sign, it puts into question all epistemological arguments framed in terms of 
a Cartesian or representational epistemological style. This deeper `crisis of 
representation, ' because it puts into question the foundations of Cartesian 
epistemology (`first philosophy') therefore opens a way of theorising which 
is fundamentally different from the thinking styles that Cartesianism has 
spawned. It suggests the need for a different kind of understanding of 
knowledge, which is not representational in either the `use' or `picture' 
sense. 
While the crisis of representation that takes place at the epistemological 
level has received a great deal of attention by educational theorists (as 
attested to by the debate amongst curricularists about how and whether 
pedagogy can be rearranged around a `use' theory of knowledge, as 
explicated in the previous chapter) the implications of the deeper `crisis of 
representation' are only just starting to be explored in a systematic way in 
educational discourse (see Biesta and Egea-Kuehne 2001, Pinar and Reynolds 
1992, and Trifonas and Peters 2004 for three collections of works on 
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deconstruction and education). Let me start by examining the crisis as it 
applies to the notion of personal knowledge. 
3.2 REPRESENTATION AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
The epistemological critique of representation as it applies to personal 
knowledge generally goes by the names of `subjectivism, ' `constructivism' 
or, more broadly, `idealism. ' Historically this is an extremely long-standing 
argument with versions going back to Plato (Slezak 2000) but all 
contemporary versions are concerned with the idea that the concept of an 
`external world' is a creation of the mind and as such personal knowledge 
cannot accurately or `absolutely' represent `reality' as it `really' is. Mental 
representations, in other words, do not have a correspondence with `reality' 
`out there. ' The idea that knowledge accurately or `absolutely' represents 
the facts as they are is sometimes referred to as `absolutism. ' Knowledge is 
`absolute, ' in the sense that it is impossible for a person to have better, or to 
have worse, knowledge of a fact (Hetherington 2001, p. 3). 
In this section I shall provide a brief account of one contemporary 
epistemological argument against representationalism that is framed in 
subjectivist terms, this being the `radical constructivism' of Ernst von 
Glasersfeld (1984,1995,1999). This argument captures many of the features 
of the subjectivist argument as well as being quite well known amongst 
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educationalists, having been influential in the field of learning theory. For 
von Glasersfeld, mental `representations' are not passive reflections of an 
outer `reality, ' but actively built, subjective constructions. 
3.2.1 Von Glasersfeld's `radical constructivism' 
According to von Glasersfeld (1999) the intuitively obvious view that 
mental representations represent or `correspond' to real things in the 
external world is insupportable because there is no way of checking any 
such relation to `real' things. He suggests that this has been a central 
problem that has occupied philosophers for many centuries and expresses 
incredulity at the fact that correspondence theories of cognition are still 
entertained in any form by anyone. In his words 
The main argument... is simple and irrefutable. To know whether 
anything we derive from experience corresponds to or `represents' 
an aspect of an external world, we should have to be able to 
compare it to the real thing. But this we cannot do, because we 
can compare experiences only to more experiences (von 
Glasersfeld 1999, p. 284). 
Von Glasersfeld's main point is that there is an unbridgeable gap between 
the objective and subjective worlds. When we try to compare our 
experience with the `real' world, we find the `real' world is not available to 
us. All that is available is our experience of it and so it is therefore illicit to 
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claim a one-to-one representational relationship between our experience of 
the world and any independent external reality. It is important to note, 
however, that von Glasersfeld is not suggesting that an exernal `reality' does 
not exist - in fact his arguments presuppose its existence and in this sense he 
is a realist - just that we can know nothing about it. For von Glasersfeld, the 
subjective world is the primary production and paramount and any 
ontological assumptions about an observer-independent `reality' are `simply 
irrelevant"' (von Glasersfeld 1999). 
To make sense of the notion of representation without invoking a mental 
mirroring of external `reality, ' von Glasersfeld distinguishes quite sharply 
between what he calls `re-presentations' (with a hyphen) and `experiences' 
believing `re-presentation' to be `reflection upon experience' which is not at 
all the same thing as `having an experience' (von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 90). 
For von Glasersfeld, `re-presentations' are not `pieces of external reality', 
but rather 
pieces of experience that we have combined in order to form more 
and less complex structures, in our attempt to order and 
systematise the world in which we find ourselves living. It is the 
only world we know - and it's a world that only we ourselves 
perceive and conceive (von Glasersveld 1999, p. 285, italics added). 
20 Although I would argue that such an ontological assumption is far firm mount because it 
facilitates his schema. 
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The first sentence of the above quote makes it clear that von Glasersfeld 
understands `re-presentation' as active construction. In this way he departs 
radically from the idea that mental representations can passively correspond 
to the external world. Cognition, for von Glasersfeld, does not have 
anything to do with reflecting an external world. Rather, it serves the 
subject's active organisation of the experiential world and this organisation 
(or `re-presenting') of the experiential world has an adaptive (not mirroring 
function - it enables the organism to survive (von Glasersfeld 1989, p. 162). 
Von Glasersfeld calls the organisation we construct for ourselves an 
`experiential reality' or `web of beliefs' (von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 116). This 
`web of beliefs' is developed as we figure out which of the meanings we 
attribute to our concepts fit in with the constraints of our experiential 
`reality' (von Glasersfeld 1999, p. 287), i. e., any new additions to our web of 
beliefs have to cohere with our -already existing web of beliefs. In this way 
re-presentation (the active construction of a web of beliefs) is entirely self- 
referential, i. e., it is based on the web of beliefs already in existence and not 
on an external reality. The constraints of our already existing `web of 
beliefs, ' so von Glasersfeld argues, prevents our webs of belief from growing 
in ways that are completely arbitrary. The `web of beliefs' is thus self 
correcting, it does not have to rely on the concept of an external truth to 
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legitimate itself. All that any new addition to our web of beliefs requires to 
legitimate itself is coherence with other already existing beliefs. 
According to von Glasersfeld (1999), this sort of `self-correcting' position is 
often interpreted as adaptation bringing our mental constructions closer to 
an observer-independent ontological `reality, ' i. e., it is thought that our re- 
presentations reflect something of the structure of an observer-independent 
reality. This, however, is not how von Glasersfeld wishes his position to be 
understood. He insists that our `webs of belief say nothing about the external 
world because they are not passive reflections of it, but active constructions. 
There is no reason to think that the world sets limits on the ways in which 
it might be understood. `Reality, ' for von Glasersfeld, is always `bigger' 
than any idea or re-presentation of it that we can possibly construct. 
[V]iability [of a web of beliefs] entails neither `information' about 
the environment nor correspondence with it. The fact that certain 
[actively constructed] concepts and certain theories `work' for us, 
in that they do what we expect them to do, means no more than 
that they are compatible with the constraints we experience. In 
other words, `reality' leaves sufficient room for them to work in 
our experiential world. This has the important corollary that our 
successful concepts and theories can never be claimed to be the 
only ones that work and therefore they cannot be claimed to be 
ontologically `true' (von Glasersfeld 1999, p. 286). 
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Because von Glasersfeld sets up a relationship between subjective experiences 
and reflections upon these experiences his position is sometimes referred to as a 
`monist' position. However, calling this position `monist, ' implies that von 
Glasersfeld has somehow avoided the Cartesian mind-world dualism. I 
would argue that this is not the case. The fact that von Glasersfeld reduces 
the meaning of the world to a projection or byproduct of an individual 
observer does not free him from dualism for it is the Cartesian world view, 
in which a strong distinction is made between the knowing subject and the 
knowable world that enables his epistemology in the first place. The very 
concept of subjectivity already grants the distinction. 
3.2.2 Difficulties with the subjectivist position 
An insurmountable difficulty with von Glasersfeld's position (and other 
forms of subjectivism) is that if one starts with mind, one finds one cannot 
get outside of it. In effect, the `real' world disappears and the account lapses 
into solipsism. If we cannot `get outside' our subjectively constructed set of 
beliefs and compare our experiences to an objective `reality, ' then any 
model constructed by a subject is as good as any other and there is no way 
to distinguish adequate or `true' knowledge from inadequate or `false' 
knowledge. Although von Glasersfeld argues that individually constructed 
knowledge is not arbitrary for the individual concerned (for any additions to 
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a `web of beliefs' must cohere with what is already there) it is difficult to see 
how, without any reference to an external `reality, ' this web of beliefs could 
cohere with the webs of belief of other individuals. Furthermore, there is 
no way of accounting for the existence of shared realities. 
Influential as von Glasersfeld's work has been in challenging understandings 
of mental representation as the passive mirroring of an external world, 
subjectivism must ultimately be found to be lacking as an epistemology due 
a number of problems which Kenneth Gergen lists as including, solipsism, 
mind-material separation, individualism, political conservatism and moral 
flaccidity amongst others (Gergen 1994, pp. 117-142). As Bernstein has 
remarked, subjectivism, in all its forms is `no longer a live option' 
(Bernstein 1983, p. 12). Even if it was a `live option, ' von Glasersfeld still 
understands knowledge as `standing for' something outside of itself (i. e., 
`experience') and, for this reason, his epistemology is still representational in 
the Cartesian sense. I turn now to another epistemological debate which has 
taken place around the idea of scientific or `public' knowledge. Here what 
has been brought into question is not only the accuracy of scientific 
representations of an objective `reality' but also the objectivity of these 
representations. 
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3.3 REPRESENTATION AND SCIENTIRC (PUBLIC) KNOWLEDGE 
In this section I wish to show how epistemological arguments taking place 
mostly in the philosophy of science have opened a debate about how, if we 
cannot have `true' knowledge of the world, we can have any knowledge at 
all. What is not questioned is the idea of representation itself, the idea that a 
representation (such as knowledge) can stand for something outside of itself. 
The debate takes for granted that knowledge stands for something else, and 
questions, rather, the epistemological status of the knowledge- 
representation. However, before exploring this argument, it is perhaps 
useful to present a view of the epistemological background from which this 
critique of representation emerged. Although a detailed analysis of this 
background can be found in any text covering the history of science or 
contemporary analytic philosophy (see for example Munitz 1981) 1 include 
a brief introduction to these developments in this chapter including only 
sufficient detail to show how the problematic nature of representation came 
into view. Two alternative theories of knowledge - objectivism and 
relativism - that emerged from this epistemological climate are then dealt 
with more comprehensively. I conclude the section with the observation 
that while both objectivism and relativism offer different theories of 
knowledge both perspectives nevertheless assume the Cartesian prespective 
that knowledge must `stand for' something which is not itself. The 
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postempiricist critique therefore does not pose any direct challenge to the 
logic of representation as such. 
3.3.1 From positivism' to post-empiricism. ' 
As I have already mentioned in Chapter 2, the dualistic logic of 
representational epistemology is said to have emerged in the seventeenth 
century (Foucault 2002/1970b). For empiricists (or `realists') of this time, 
the object of science was to get accurate knowledge of the `real' world by 
describing and measuring it. By concentrating attention on the empirically 
determinable aspects of nature, early empiricists hoped to achieve the 
elimination of the subjective (i. e., interpretive) elements of knowledge, 
thereby achieving true knowledge. Because these early empiricists held that 
the sole `reality' was `positive data' obtained through the senses (i. e., `sense 
data') they became known as `positivists, ' a term popularised by Comte 
(1798-1857). In contrast to early forms, later forms of empiricism recognised 
that the object of science was not simply to describe and measure the 
universe but also to establish connections between the regularities of nature - 
i. e., develop universal laws - which are analysable, well founded and 
constant and which hold at all times and places (Salmon 1992) in order to 
make predictions. With the addition of a strong logical or `rational' 
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component to scientific knowledge building endeavours, later versions of 
empiricism came to be known as logical positivism (Munitz 1981). 
The logical positivists insisted that to make scientific predictions, experiences 
must be formulated into hypotheses or `knowledge claims' which can be 
empirically tested or `verified' to determine their truth status - i. e., every 
knowledge claim must be capable of undergoing some sort of empirical 
analysis which proves it true or false with absolute certainty. This 
verification procedure was generally understood as the scientific method. 
However, the principle of verification - the key to the scientific method - 
depended wholly on inductive inference (the general is inferred from the 
particular). This was extremely problematic for logical positivists, for 
Hume (1711-1776) had long since shown that there is no justification for 
believing that what we have not experienced will be the same as what we 
have experienced (Stroud 1992). This problem with the principle of 
verification presented an insurmountable difficulty for logical positivism for 
it meant scientific knowledge could not be grounded in empirical certainty. 
Whatever scientific knowledge was, it was not an accurate or `absolute' 
representation of `reality' as it really is. And so - at least according to 
Bernstein - `absolutism' is now also (i. e., together with subjectivism) `no 
longer a live option' for epistemology (Bernstein 1983, p. 12). 
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The philosophy of science, by most accounts, has entered a `post-empiricist' 
or `fallibilist' phase and it is this which appears to have ushered in a `crisis' 
or `anxiety' (Bernstein 1983) around the nature of scientific knowledge. 
This is because the post-empiricist movement is divided over the issue of 
what kind of representational structure scientific knowledge is if it is not 
absolutely true. On the one hand there are those who claim scientific 
knowledge is grounded in a universal `rational' conceptual scheme that 
stands outside of and above all other conceptual schemes (the 
`objectivists')(e. g., Popper 1959, Lakatos 1970). On the other hand there are 
those who claim that scientific knowledge is relative to specific conceptual 
schemes, `forms of life, ' or culture (the `relativists')(e. g., Kuhn 1962; Quine 
1953 1960). The objectivists have a methodological theory of scientific 
knowledge (the scientific method is the universal overarching framework 
against which all knowledge claims are assessed), while the relativists have a 
social theory of scientific knowledge such that all knowledge claims are seen 
as particular to the social and historical contexts from which the emerge. 
To give an idea of the flavour of these two versions of post-empiricist 
thought I have, in the following two sections, provided an account of the 
methodologically orientated `objectivist' views of Popper (1959) sometimes 
referred to as `evolutionary epistemology' (see Stein 1992) and the socially 
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orientated `relativist' views of Duhem 
(1953), Quine (1953) and Kuhn (1962) 
sometimes also referred to as `social epistemology' 
(see Goldman 2001). 
3.3.2 The objectivist view (Popper's 'evolutionary-theory of knowledge) 
In his best known work The Logic of Scientific Discovery, first published in 
German in 1934 and only translated into English in 1959, Popper `solved' 
the verificationist's problem of the irrationality of inductive logic by 
exploiting the fact that a universal statement can be refuted by a single 
negative instance. Using this logic, Popper claimed that while it is rational 
to reject beliefs, there is no rational way we can accept any belief. In the light 
of this, he suggested that the only theories that count as `scientific' are those 
that are falsifiable, and the aim of scientific research should be to `falsify' (or 
refute) truth claims not find reasons to accept (verify) them. He proposed a 
methodology of `falsificationism' or `critical rationalism' whereby all truth 
claims are to be rigorously tested in an attempt to falsify them. Those that 
survive falsification are tentatively, accepted, while those that do not are 
rejected. This seems to imply that truth claims that fail this test (i. e., truth 
claims that can be falsified) can be permanently eliminated and knowledge 
can therefore progress towards `truth' in a straightforward manner. This 
understanding of falsificationism has been called naive falsificationism (see 
Lakatos 1970). But Popper's scheme was far more sophisticated than this. 
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Popper (1959) was well aware that a logic which insists that it is irrational to 
accept truth claims also undermines itself. If it is irrational to accept truth 
claims this means it is also irrational to accept as conclusive the (truth) claim 
that a particular theory is false. Everything (including the apparent 
`falsification' of a theory) must be subject, again and again, to the logic of 
refutation, ad infinitum. Thus, for Popper, it is the logic of falsification (i. e., 
the method) not its conclusiveness that is of consequence for scientific 
knowledge. This is extremely important in Popper's philosophy. This 
`falsificationist' credo leads to the inevitable conclusion that we can never 
find out what is true. Indeed we cannot even know what is `truly' false. 
Nevertheless, although Popper firmly maintained that we can never 
conclusively discover what is true (or false) he did not succumb to the 
conclusion that scientific knowledge is unable to progress. Quite the 
contrary. To explain the progression of scientific knowledge Popper (1972, 
1980) evokes the notion of `conjecture' (an opinion without proof). He 
maintains that in order for knowledge to grow, the logic of falsification 
must be applied to `conjectures' which are tentative hypotheses (Popper 
1962). For Popper scientific knowledge grows by means of `conjectures and 
refutations. ' (Popper 1962, p. 46). 
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On this account, the logic of falsification is analagous to biological natural 
selection (survival of the fittest) and in this sense the growth of scientific 
knowledge is `evolutionary' (Stein 1992). New conjectures (opinions 
without proof) confront selective pressures, they meet the competition of 
alternative theories, critical arguments and experimental testing, and only 
the `fittest' (given the empirical tools and understandings of the time) 
`survive. ' In this interpretation the most sophisticated scientific theories are 
simply the end products of `epistemic natural selection' (Popper 1980). 
What Popper has done is impose a set of `universal' methodological rules 
that embody the choices or decisions scientists can make, and furthermore 
he sees only one set of rules (the logic of falsification applied to conjectures), 
against which all systems of thought are to be judged. It is, for Popper, the 
existence of a privileged or `universal' method for science that supposedly 
guarantees the objectivity of the product. However, Popper's claim that 
scientific knowledge is `objective knowledge' (i. e., uncontaminated by 
subjective social bias) holds only if one assumes that the growth of scientific 
knowledge is in fact free of social bias. In the next section I will show that 
this assumption has itself been brought into question. 
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3.3.3 The relativist view (social theories of knowledge) 
The work of Duhem (1953), Quine (1953) and Kuhn (1962) has contributed 
greatly to the idea that methodology does not furnish a transcendent or 
context-free standard that lies somehow outside of and above competing 
alternatives. These authors have all shown that historical and social 
influences cannot be ignored or excluded from any theory of knowledge. 
This move towards a social theory of knowledge in fact starts with Popper 
himself, with his view that that neither verification nor falsification is 
unequivocal (Popper 1959). Elaborating on this view of falsificationism 
Duhem (1953) drew attention to the complex interconnectivity of scientific 
practice and showed that any empirical outcome can be protected 
indefinitely by ad hoc modifications that alter the background assumptions. 
More specifically, he showed how a knowledge claim can never be 
conclusively refuted for there could always be something else in the test 
situation that caused the result. However Duhem's more explicit 
formulation of the problem with falsification still does not help us to see 
that Popper's falsificationist methodology leads straight to a social theory of 
knowledge. This was achieved by Quine (1953), who developed Duhem's 
ideas into what is generally referred to as the `Quine-Duhem thesis'. 
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Using a metaphor, Quine (1953) suggested that scientific beliefs could be 
understood as a fabric stretched taught, like the skin of a drum. As new 
scientific observations are added to the system, the fabric adjusts to 
accommodate this. In this way theoretical developments can be understood 
as a reorganisation of the whole fabric. The point of the metaphor is to 
show that no single scientific observation will have a determinate effect on 
the web or `fabric' of beliefs. Observations will have an impact, but are 
moderated by the state of the fabric as a whole. Thus, in practice, an 
empirical observation cannot be separated from the framework of activities, 
practices and beliefs in which it is embedded. Since it is moderated by all the 
other elements in the web it can only be evaluated in terms of this whole web 
of issues, or fabric of beliefs. 
The crucial point here is that the Quine-Duhem thesis makes it clear that 
individual theories or observations cannot be individually assessed against 
an objective state of affairs in the `real' world but can only be assessed in the 
light of the theoretical climate of the day - i. e., the particular beliefs, values, 
standards, methods and aims of its practitioners. The truth or falsity of a 
theory is judged according to whether it makes sense within a particular 
framework. Even though we may use the logic of falsification to assess our 
scientific theories, to judge a theory to be `false' is a `theory-laden' 
undertaking, i. e., to say that `x is false' requires an extensive knowledge 
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about factors which would make x false. These factors themselves are 
contingent on other knowledges making up the web of beliefs. In the light 
of this it is difficult to escape the conclusion that scientific theories are 
contextually embedded. This means they are socially and historically 
located. Fully extended, the Quine-Duhem thesis suggests that all 
knowledge is an expression of social relations. By showing that scientific 
knowledge is not free of social bias and in this sense it is not objective the 
Quine-Duhem thesis seriously compromises Popper's claim to the 
`objectivity' of scientific knowledge. Closely related to this critique is the 
historical work of Thomas Kuhn (1996/1962). 
Kuhn (1996/1962) argued that the actual history of scientific progress is 
rarely in agreement with Popperian assumptions. He claimed that the 
historical record shows that most major scientific theories have advanced or 
been maintained for long periods in spite of apparent refutations by empirical 
data. This conclusion suggests that Popper's falsificationist methodology is 
therefore not the only device for adjudicating among competing scientific 
accounts. Other rules are also at play. 
According to Kuhn, `real' scientific progress occurs only when there is a 
`paradigm shift' or `scientific revolution' (which is a comparatively rare 
occurrence). For Kuhn, a `paradigm shift' is not the gradual, cumulative 
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result of falsifications, but more like a gestalt shift in perception, resulting 
from the accumulation of `anomalies', until a new theory (or paradigm) 
emerges which can account for them. According to Kuhn, the switch to a 
new paradigm is not a rational undertaking, but a `leap of faith'. It is a leap 
of faith because paradigms separated by a scientific revolution are 
incommensurable with one another, the new intelligibility cannot be 
understood in terms of the old. Kuhn suggests that for a new paradigm to 
be accepted (on faith) by some members of the scientific community it has 
to meet only two important requirements, (i) it must resolve a recognised 
problem that can be resolved in no other way, and (ii) it must preserve a 
concrete part of past problem-solving achievements, although many old 
problems will have to be banished (Kuhn 1996/1962, p. 169). Once the new 
paradigm has been accepted by some members of the scientific community, 
the paradigm is strengthened and entrenched and it is only a matter of time 
before it becomes the dominant paradigm. 
In view of these critiques of the objectivist view of scientific knowledge 
there are those who claim that a `relativist' view of knowledge is in fact the 
only logical alternative (see, for example, Feyerabend 1975). That all 
knowledge can only be grounded in the conceptual framework from which 
it emerges and that there is no overarching framework or `meta-logic' that 
can be used to adjudicate between competing conceptual schemes. However 
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despite the intractable problems with objectivism that the relativist view 
exposes, the relativist view is itself highly problematic. The main argument 
that is brought to bear against the relativist view of knowledge is that 
[R]elativism, whenever it is clearly stated, is self-referentially 
inconsistent and paradoxical. For implicitly or explicitly, the 
relativist claims that his or her position is true, yet the relativist 
also insists that since truth is relative, what is taken as true may 
also be false. Consequently, relativism itself may be true and false. 
One cannot consistently state the case for relativism without 
undermining it (Bernstein 1983, p. 9). 
The relativist framework puts forward a view of what is `really' going on. 
In this sense it seeks to represent the situation - and in doing this it takes up 
the very stance it attacks. In view of problems with both objectivism and 
relativism, Richard Bernstein argues that the objectivist-relativist argument 
about the status of scientific knowledge has reached an impasse of 
indeterminacy. 
3.3.4 Beyond objectivism and relativism 
In his book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism Bernstein draws attention to 
the fact that the opposition between objectivism and relativism is only 
possible `if we implicitly accept some version of Cartesianism' (Bernstein 
1983, p. 19). According to Bernstein, the dualistic scheme, which splits 
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knowledge from `reality' facilitates only one kind of epistemological debate: 
the debate about the nature of the relationship between knowledge and 
what it stands for. Largely, this is a debate about how closely (or not) our 
knowledge corresponds with reality. In this regard, so Bernstein argues, we 
appear to be faced with only one choice, a choice between objectivism and 
relativism (because subjectivism is already ruled out). Furthermore, there is 
a good deal of anxiety associated with this choice - which he calls the 
`Cartesian Anxiety' (ibid., p. 16) - because of the fear that if we give up 
objectivism we are left with incoherence. As Bernstein puts it, there is a fear 
that 
Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for 
knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that 
envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos 
(Bernstein 1983, p. 18, emphasis original). 
This `Cartesian Anxiety' can be equated with the `crisis of representation' at 
the epistemological level. The idea of a crisis of representation suggests the 
anxiety associated with impasse now reached between objectivism and 
relativism. The realisation that neither truth values nor criteria of rationality 
exist outside of time and place - i. e., outside of social relations - ushers in a 
crisis around the fear that the loss of the possibility of true representation, 
leads ultimately to chaos. Bernstein suggests, however, that there is another 
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way of looking at this debate. Rather than getting caught up in assessing the 
various strengths and weaknesses of objectivism and relativism, it is possible 
to look at the impasse between objectivism and relativism as putting into 
question the whole framework of thinking which facilitates the impasse, 
i. e., the framework of Cartesian dualism, in which knowledge and the 
world are split from each other. 
Using Bernstein's argument it is possible to say that both sides of the 
objectivism-relativism debate are concerned with the accuracy of our 
knowledge. Both assume that knowledge is a representation of something 
that lies outside of itself and so both sides of the debate argue over the 
nature of these representations. On the one hand the objectivists argue that 
scientific representations are grounded in `universal' criteria of rationality 
which exist `in themselves' (i. e., as `truth'). On the other hand the relativists 
argue that the standards of rationality of scientific knowledge are culturally 
and contextually situated (such that there is no ultimate truth, no ultimate 
standard against which everything can be judged). Nevertheless, while they 
argue over whether the standard against which knowledge is judged is 
universally or contextually based, both assume that knowledge represents 
or stands for something that is not itself. The idea of representation is 
therefore implicit in the assumptions on both sides of the debate. This 
suggests that the way out of the objectivist-relativist impasse, which is also a 
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way out of the epistemological `crisis of representation' is to make use of an 
alternative form of logic, one not premised on the idea of representing the 
world. But what could take the place of representational epistemologies in 
all their variants? To address this question it is necessary to address the 
critique of representation at the level of the sign. It is necessary to go 
deeper, into semiology2l and the philosophy of language for no Cartesian 
theory of knowledge is independent of a representational theory of 
signification as described in Section 2.2.4. 
3.4 REPRESENTATION, SEMIOLOGY AND WRTITNG 
In this section I am concerned with arguments against the idea that the signs 
we use to communicate have a simple representational relationship with 
reality. Although there are a number of perspectives that bring into 
question the idea that the signs we use in language have a `straightforward' 
representational character (e. g., the work of Frege, Peirce, and Wittgenstein) 
I will, in this section, draw only on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and 
Jacques Derrida as I believe it only in Derrida's work that there is a 
fundamental break with a dualistic conception of representation. De 
Saussure is included because Derrida's logic follows de Saussure's logic 
exceptionally closely and therefore to understand Derrida's perspective on 
21 The word `semiology' comes from de Saussure, but it is more commonly known as 
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this issue is also to understand de Saussure's perspective. In what follows I 
shall provide a brief account of de Saussure's semiology to present the basic 
semiological framework. Following this I present Derrida's critique of de 
Saussure's semiology and in so doing introduce the logic of deconstruction. 
3.4.1 De Saussure's `semiology' 
To understand de Saussure's linguistics, which he calls `semiology', it is 
necessary to understand his terminology, and in particular his 
understanding of the terms `sign, ' `signified, ' `signifier, ' `meaning' and 
`value'. It is also necessary to understand that his system is based on the 
privileging of speech - `the social product stored in the brain, the language 
itself (de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 24) - over writing, and this is primarily 
what Derrida takes issue with. De Saussure insisted that 
A language and its written form constitute two separate systems of 
signs. The sole reason for the existence of the latter is to represent 
the former. The object of study in linguistics is not a combination 
of the written word and the spoken word. The spoken word alone 
constitutes that object (de Saussure 1983/1916, pp. 24-25). 
For de Saussure, a linguistic sign is not a link between a word and a thing in 
the external world (i. e., a `referent') but rather a link between a 
psychological concept and a `sound-pattern, ' which `is the hearer's 
`semiotics' in English-speaking countries. 
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psychological impression of the sound' (de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 66). In 
his words, a sign is `a two-sided psychological entity' (ibid. ) and the `two 
sides' of this entity are as inseparable as two sides of a sheet of paper. `Just as 
it is impossible to take a pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at 
the same time cutting the other, so it is impossible in a language to isolate 
sound from thought, or thought from sound' (ibid., p. 111). De Saussure 
also calls these two psychological aspects of the sign - concept and sound- 
pattern - the `signified' and the `signifier' respectively 
(de Saussure 
1983/1916)22 although the word `signifier' is also used more generally to 
refer to any material symbol (sound, written word, image) to which a 
concept is linked. Figure 3.1 shows how de Saussure represents his `sign. ' 
Furthermore, de Saussure stresses the arbitrary nature of this inseparable 
link between the two components of the sign. This can be understood in 
terms of the way in which a sign comes into being, or emerges from 
thought and sound. In this regard, de Saussure speaks of thought and sound 
as, initially, being `two amorphous masses' in which `no shape is 
intrinsically determined', as shown by `A' and `B' in Figure 3.2. Signs 
emerge from these two `amorphous masses' by a process of `segmentation' 
u Actually in this (more recent) translation of de Saussure, the terms `signification' and `signal' are 
used to denote `signified' and `signifier' respectively. Wherever these terms have occurred in the 




de Saussure's diagrammatic representation of the `sign' as a two-sided 
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Figure 3.2 
de Saussure's illustration of the shifting `nothingness' of (A) thought and 
(B) sound (reproduced from de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 111, with 
permission of Duckworth Publishers, London). 
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in which segments of thought become associated with segments of sound 
(ibid., pp. 110-111). 
According to de Saussure, neither thought nor sound are able to offer ready- 
made moulds for each other (ibid., p. 110). Because there are no ready-made 
moulds, `with shapes that thought must inevitably conform to' (ibid., p. 
110), a thought arbitrarily becomes linked with a `segment' of sound, and 
this arbitrary linkage is what produces his two-sided psychological entity or 
unit: the sign. De Saussure explains this as follows: 
What takes place, is a somewhat mysterious process by which 
`thought-sound' evolves divisions, and a language takes shape with 
its linguistic units between those two amorphous masses.... Every 
linguistic sign is a part or member, an articulus, where an idea is 
fixed in a sound, and a sound becomes the sign of an idea (de 
Saussure 1983/1916, pp. 110-111, emphasis original). 
A sign can therefore be described as a correlation between a signifier which 
is an arbitrary material symbol (e. g., a sound-pattern) and a concept or 
thought - the `signified. ' Were it not for this process of segmentation, 
where signs differentiate from the `nebulous world of thought' (ibid., p. 
110) 
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we should be incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear 
and constant way. In itself, thought is like a swirling cloud, where 
no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are established in 
advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of 
linguistic structure ... 
Thought, chaotic by nature, is made precise 
by this process of segmentation (de Saussure 1916, p. 110). 
Unsegmented, given no acoustic difference between the signifiers of two 
ideas, de Saussure argues that the ideas themselves will not be differentiated. 
However, although the arbitrary linking of thought with segments of sound 
to form `signs' explains how ideas may become differentiated `in a clear and 
constant way' (ibid., p. 110), the question still remains as to how these self- 
contained units - signs - acquire their meanings, because, for de Saussure, a 
`thought-sound unit' cannot be understood as the counterpart of an 
independently existing referent, already in the world. To explain how a sign 
(or word) acquires its meaning in the absence of a direct reference to a 
`reality' outside of itself, de Saussure draws on the notion of `value'. 
Using as an example the `value' of a five-franc coin (see ibid., p. 113), de 
Saussure distinguishes two elements comprising the term `value'. First, he 
suggests the value of a thing (even in non-linguistic cases) can be understood 
in terms of dissimilar things that it can be exchanged for. For example a 
five-franc coin could be exchanged for a loaf of bread - this can be called its 
`exchangeable value. ' Second, he suggests value can be understood in terms of 
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similar things that can be compared. For example the value of a 
five-franc 
coin is ascertained by comparing it to a one-franc coin, or a twenty-franc 
coin, or a coins of a similar value belonging to another system, such as an 
English penny. This can be called its `comparable value. ' It is the latter 
meaning of the term `value' that is of the most importance to de Saussure, 
for he claims that although words have exchangeable value, their meaning 
can never be determined only by this exchangeable value. 
Its value is ... not 
determined merely by the concept or meaning 
for which it is a token. It must also be assessed against comparable 
values, by contrast with other words. The content of a word is 
determined in the final analysis not by what it contains but by 
what exists outside it. As an element in a system, the word has not 
only meaning but also - above all -a value. And that is something 
quite different (de Saussure 1916, p. 114). 
For de Saussure, while the linkage of concept and sound creates an 
exchangeable value (i. e., the sound and concept are exchangeable), this value 
is dependent for its meaning on the surrounding signs making up the 
system. Put differently, the exchangeable value of the sign can only be 
understood in terms of what exists around it, i. e., it can only be evaluated in 
terms of that which it is not but against which it can be compared and 
which will restrict its meaning. It can only emerge `from relations with 
other values of a similar kind. If those other values disappeared, this 
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meaning too would vanish' (de Saussure 1916, pp. 115-116). In the end it is 
only through the values created by the differences between signs that it is 
possible to ascertain their meaning (see Figure 3.3). The sign, in other 
words, has a negative value - there are no positive ideas. In de Saussure own 
words `in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms' (de 
Saussure 1916, p. 118). 
Signified Signified Signified 
Signifier Signifier Signifier 
Figure 3.3 
The individual meaning of the signified emerges from 
the play of difference between signifiers 
(illustration adapted from, de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 113) 
What de Saussure's semiotics makes evident is that the meaning of a sign 
does not lie in some independently existing `reality' that exists somewhere 
outside of language itself. Rather meaning is instead the product of a vast 
web of interdependencies and usages - it is the result of relational action. 
This is a radical shift in thinking and de Saussure was not unaware of the 
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importance of these ideas which he predicted would form the basis of a new 
science. 
We shall call it semiology (from the Greek semeion, `sign'). It 
would investigate the nature of signs and the laws governing them. 
Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will 
exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready for it in advance (de 
Saussure 1983/1916, pp. 15-16). 
While `semiology' - the science of signs - did in fact develop exactly as de 
Saussure predicted it would, Culler (1986) suggests that de Saussure's 
`relational approach' is in itself is not something radically new. He claims it 
embraces a world view which has generally been labeled `process 
philosophy' - as articulated by Alfred North Whitehead (1985) and his 
followers (Culler 1986, p. 128). This view has been around at least since the 
ancient Greeks (Rescher 2002) although Western metaphysics has mostly 
been biased in favour of things or substances - what Whitehead calls the 
`materialism' which grants ontological primacy to objects. However, as 
Culler comments, in the twentieth century there have been shifts in 
techniques in various fields and disciplines - including art, philosophy and 
science - which have led to a concentration on systems of relation rather 
than independently existing objects and things. With this focus it is relations 
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and systems of relations that are given ontological primacy, relationships 
create and define objects not the other way around. 
According to Culler, de Saussure's work articulates the themes of process 
philosophy particularly clearly `not as aspects of some diffuse world view 
but as methodological postulates' (Culler 1986, p. 129). However, there is a 
problem in equating de Saussure's work with a process philosophy, in that 
he specifically downplayed diachronic or temporal aspects which, according 
to Rescher (2002) are fundamental to process philosophy. With regard to 
linguistics, de Saussure maintained that `if [one] takes a diachronic point of 
view, [one] is no longer examining the language, but a series of events which 
modify it' (de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 89). The clear separation of 
synchronic and diachronic studies of language, de Saussure maintained, was 
entirely necessary to understand the actual structure of language for 
no synchronic phenomenon has anything in common with any 
diachronic phenomenon. One is a relationship between 
simultaneous elements, the other a substitution of one element for 
another in time, that is to say an event (de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 
90). 
Furthermore, de Saussure insisted that the diachronic aspects of a language 
were secondary to synchronic aspects `for a language is a system of pure 




constituent elements' (ibid., p. 80). What is evident here is that de Saussure 
wanted to pin down the structure of language as a system, and his focus on 
the synchronic aspects of language - on the state of a language at a particular 
moment in time - makes it hard to reconcile de Saussure's semiology with a 
process philosophy. Even though the state of a language at a particular 
moment in time may be the result of the relationality of the system of signs 
at a particular moment, this leaves no room for movement within the 
system. In other words, there is only one possibility for the system at a 
particular moment in time, one possible way in which the system may be 
coordinated. In effect, de Saussure is looking at language as an object not a 
process. 
One does not need to look too closely at de Saussure's argument to see that 
he provides a representation of language (i. e., he tries to describe the way 
language `really' is) which suggests that language cannot produce such 
representations (signs, for de Saussure, exist primarily in relation to each other 
before they exist in relation to a concept, they are therefore not 
representational). In other words de Saussure assumes a perspective outside 
language to describe language and in this sense he makes use of the very 
representational logic that his theory of language undermines. 
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It is here that Derrida's work becomes important. Derrida provides an 
alternative reading of de Saussure, emphasising the diachronic aspects which 
de Saussure deliberately excluded or made secondary, showing also that 
these very aspects of language are in fact the general mechanisms of language. 
They are the mechanisms which make language possible, and without 
which we could not have/use language. In doing this Derrida takes de 
Saussure's scheme beyond representational logic, into the logic of 
deconstruction. 
3.4.2 Derrida's `deconstruction' 
Derrida does not simply replace de Saussure's logic with an alternative. 
Rather he follows de Saussure's logic through to a different conclusion, or, 
more accurately a different `non-conclusion. ' The alternative 
`(non) conclusion' - which is deconstruction - takes issue with the notion of 
presence, and hence with the idea that knowledge can `re-present' that 
which is already there. 
To recap, de Saussure's main thesis was that the `value' or `meaning' of a 
particular sign could only be determined by comparison with the values of 
other signs that surrounded it in acts of speech. In other words, the terms 
internal to a linguistic system define each other uniquely, by contrast and 





system. However, as mentioned, de Saussure focusses on the synchronic state 
of the system (de Saussure 1987, p. 99) as if it can be frozen. This can be 
likened to a snapshot of the structure of the linguistic system as it is in a 
moment in time. Harland describes this as a `simultaneous system. ' It is 
`simultaneous in that the system only balances if words push against each 
other at exactly the same time' (Harland 1987, p. 136). To do this 
everything in the system must be present at once, everything must be 
`there' at a particular moment in time. De Saussure insists that it is only 
through the study of synchronic linguistics that we are able to `establish the 
fundamental principles of any idiosyncratic system, the facts which 
constitute any linguistic state' (de Saussure 1983/1916, p. 99). Diachronic 
linguistics, he claims, is not helpful in this regard since it is `concerned with 
connections between sequences of items... which replace one another 
without themselves constituting a system' (de Saussure 1983/1916 p. 98, my 
emphasis). It is this point that Derrida picks up on (he suggests that 
diachronic elements do constitute the system) and I will return to this later. 
But let me first explain what happens to meaning when the synchronic 
aspects of language are priviledged. 
With de Saussure's synchronic scheme meaning can be understood to be 
contingent on the state of the linguistic system at a particular moment in 
time. Because meaning, at any moment, is determined by the state of the 
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system in its totality and because the system is constantly changing, the 
meaning of a concept is not static but can nevertheless be fully present to a 
speaker at a particular moment in time. To put this differently, when the 
whole system is `frozen' in a moment in time, meaning can be understood 
to be fully present to a speaker. It is this idea - that meaning can be fully 
present to a speaker - that Derrida takes objection to in his critique of de 
Saussure (Derrida, 1976). He makes this argument in two main steps. 
First he shows that contrary to de Saussure's claim that writing is only a 
`sign of a sign' while speech is a `real' sign, that as a system of signs writing 
is no different f rý om speech. This means that if writing is a `sign of a sign' then 
so is speech. In other words all signs are a form of writing. He then closely 
follows the `logic of writing' - which he calls `grammatology' in contrast to 
de Saussure's `semiology' - and in doing so shows that at no point in time 
are all the elements of a grammatological system `there' at the same time. 
For this reason meaning can never be `fully' present. Further, it is this very 
`non-presence' of meaning that makes communication possible. In what 
follows I trace this argument in more detail. 
For Derrida, the `presentationalism' (my word) in de Saussure's thought 
begins with his (mistaken) claim that the sign is an `articulated unity of 
sound and sense' (Derrida 1976, p. 29, my emphasis). This articulated unity 
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(i. e., the signifier-signified, in its relation with other signifier-signifieds) is, 
for de Saussure, the `real' sign while writing is secondary, being merely a 
`sign of a sign' or a `pure signifier' (see ibid., p. 43). For Derrida, de 
Saussure's claims about the `unity' of sound and sense are incoherent for the 
very reason that the link between the signified and the signifier is always 
arbitrary. If the bond between signified and signifier is `arbitrary' - as de 
Saussure claims it is - this means it can only be an unmotivated or instituted 
bond, i. e., a bond that must be formally established, having no `natural 
attachment' to the signified within reality. To say this differently, if the 
relationship between signifier and signified is instituted, this means the 
signifier can never be understood to naturally mirror the signified - `the 
property of the sign is not to be an image' (ibid., p. 45) - there is no natural 
connection, rather the signifier must be something that is put in place as a 
mark or inscription: i. e., a form of writing. In fact, as Derrida points out, de 
Saussure himself uses writing as an example to explain the arbitrariness of 
the link between signifier and signified of the `real' sign. He suggests that 
an identical state of affairs is to be found in that other system of 
signs, writing. Writing offers a useful comparison, which throws 
light upon the whole question... The letter t for instance has no 
natural connection with the sound it signifies... (de Saussure 1983, 
pp. 117-118). 
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What Derrida makes clear is that all signifiers, even phonic ones (i. e., `sound 
images') are `written' (graphic) in the narrow sense of being instituted rather 
than `naturally' mirroring something. The very idea of the arbitrariness of 
the sign, for Derrida, is therefore `unthinkable before the possibility of 
writing' (Derrida 1976, p. 44). Derrida gives the name `arche-writing' to this 
generalised writing (ibid., p. 60) and maintains that `writing in general covers 
the entire field of linguistic signs' (ibid., p. 44). If this is the case then there is 
no reason to make a distinction between a `real' sign (i. e., de Saussure's 
`unity' of sound-image and concept) and a `sign of a sign' (i. e., writing, 
which de Saussure demotes to being a `pure' signifier). For Derrida `writing 
is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs, which would be more 
profoundly true' (ibid., p. 43). As Derrida puts it, 
... the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign ... must 
forbid a radical 
distinction between the linguistic and graphic sign... [F]rom the 
moment one considers the totality of determined signs, spoken, 
and a fortiori written, as unmotivated institutions, one must 
exclude any relationship of natural subordination, any natural 
hierarchy among signifiers or orders of signifiers (Derrida 1976, p. 
44, italics added). 
Derrida's next step is to show that the arbitrary or `instituted' connection 
between the two elements of the sign means signified and signifier must 
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necessarily always remain totally different or `other' from each other. This 
means the sign, for Derrida, is a place 
where the completely other is announced as such - without any 
simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity - in that 
which is not it (Derrida 1976, p. 47). 
Thus, while de Saussure makes of the heterogeneous sign a unity inseparable 
as `two sides of a sheet of paper' such that the signifier simply `brings out' 
the signified which is already present (but unable to present itself without 
the help of the signifier), Derrida maintains that nothing is `brought forth' 
by the signifier, it simply marks a space `where difference appears as such' 
(Derrida 1976, pp. 46-47, original emphasis). Let me put this another way. 
While de Saussure thinks of the unity of `sound-image' and concept as 
revealing a presence and hence bringing about the closing of the play of 
difference between signs (ibid., p. 57), for Derrida there is only the play of 
difference between signifiers. The signifier marks a space where difference 
appears as difference. It does not `reveal' a self contained presence. One of 
the terms Derrida uses for this space where difference appears is 'trace. $23 
Because the trace is not a self contained presence, Derrida goes so far as to 
say that `no concept of metaphysics can describe it' (ibid., p. 65). It is 
23 Another better known term that Derrida uses for this is `differance. ' 
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necessary, nevertheless, to attempt a description of Derrida's `trace, ' even if 
only a temporary one, in order to show how this `(non)concept' presents a 
radical challenge to the idea of presence for, as Derrida puts it, `difference 
cannot be thought without the trace' (Derrida 1976, p. 57, italics original). 
Derrida uses the word `trace' to refer to an absence. But this is not a `pure' 
or `simple' absence. It is an absence which is marked by something that is 
not present. It is imprinted by something which is itself not there. But that 
which is not there has not left the scene, having been present at some time 
in the past. The trace is an absence marked by that which was never there, 
which was always already absent, not the result of some presence or 
originary non-trace. In Derrida's words: 
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin.., it means that 
the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted 
except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which thus becomes 
the origin of the origin (Derrida 1976, p. 61). 
Derrida suggests that to think the notion of the trace it is necessary to speak 
of an `originary trace' or `arche-trace' while knowing 
that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the 
trace, there is above all no originary trace (Derrida 1976, p. 61). 
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The significance of the concept of the trace is that any meaning that is said 
to be `present' is caught up with something that is not present. Meaning 
cannot present itself `by itself, in its own words, in its own voice, in its 
logos' (Derrida 1981, p. 31). It is present only in so far as it is also absent. 
The trace is therefore neither present nor absent. And at the same time it is 
both present and absent, or perhaps one could speak of its `presence-as- 
absence' as Michael Dillon does (Dillon 2000, p. 15). Meaning cannot be 
captured in a `snapshot' in time, not even a snapshot which is the always 
`now. ' The trace entails that all thought is in fact inhabited and constituted 
by the `non-now, ' by that which is not present `now. ' Derrida remarks that 
`in the last analysis, what is at stake is... the privilege of the actual present, 
the now' (Derrida 1973, pp. 62-63). Derrida strategically utilises a 
conception of time that emphasises deferral. 
What Derrida has done is follow de Saussure's argument extremely closely 
to the point where the representational logic de Saussure was using to 
understand his own argument fails and replaces itself with (or 
metamorphoses into) an alternative to itself. Against de Saussure's insistence 
that language can only be understood synchronically, as a frozen moment 
in time, Derrida shows that de Saussure's scheme follows a logic of radical 
temporality. It is not temporal in the `simple' sense that one event follows 
another, as in a sequence of snapshots in time, laid out one after the other. 
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Such a `temporalisation' would amount to little more than the linear 
arrangement of a series of synchronic schemes in an order called `the past, ' 
`the present' and `the future. ' The temporalisation Derrida offers is radical 
in that it insists on the inclusion of elements which cannot ever be brought 
within the framework of presence. They are radically outside presence and 
at the same time constitutive of what `presents' itself. In this sense Derrida's 
temporalisation disrupts linear notions of temporality. What presents itself 
is radically contingent on what is not there, what is not present and so it 
relates no less to what is called `the future' than to what is called `the past' 
and `the future' and `the past' can no longer be thought as separated from the 
present. If what presents itself is `present, ' it is a `presence' which is always 
deferred and can therefore no longer be considered present in the usual 
sense of the word. It is not absent either. Derrida explicitly highlights the 
trace as being `originary' (Derrida 1976, p. 61) but at the same time 
`unpresent' (my word) and therefore `unrepresentable. ' It is with Derrida's 
challenge to the `metaphysics of presence' - the classical notion of an 
absolute and self-contained presence - that we enter a different `non- 
representational' form of logic. If meaning is not present then it cannot be 
represented. 
Derrida's critique of de Saussure challenges representation in an entirely 
different way than the critiques mentioned previously. As I pointed out in 
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previous sections, other crtitiques of representation have argued that our 
representations cannot be perfect, or cannot be objective, or can only be 
contextual, or that we can never know whether our knowledge corresponds 
to `reality, ' all of which take for granted that knowledge is split from a 
`reality' which is `there' and which we therefore can have knowledge of. If 
something is present, this raises questions about whether it can be 
represented as knowledge. Derrida's argument is a quite different for he is 
not concerned with whether what is present can or cannot be represented as 
knowledge. For Derrida representation is questionable not because we 
cannot get everything that is present into the frame at the same time, which 
is the relativist point of view, and not because we can never know whether 
what presents itself to our subjectivity corresponds to what is present in the 
real world, which is the subjectivist argument. He is not concerned with 
such representational questions for he questions instead the notion of 
presence. For Derrida we cannot have knowledge of something that is 
`there' because, as Krell has put it, `there never was any there there for us' 
(Krell 2000, p. 18). Derrida questions the idea that `reality' is ever `present. ' 
This negates all questions concerning whether or not `reality' can be re- 
presented. 
With this sort of critique of representation, the `crisis of representation' is 
something entirely other than a crisis of indeterminacy about which theory 
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of knowledge is the best. The idea of which theory is best assumes there is 
some measure against which the various theories can be tested. It assumes in 
other words a real `reality' that exists independently of knowledge. When 
we consider the `crisis of representation' at the level of the sign - from the 
perspective of deconstruction - we see that the bringing into question of the 
notion of presence opens a different world of theorising which has nothing 
to do with Cartesian questions about what constitutes knowledge of 
`reality, ' knowledge of what is present. Deconstruction suggests that it is 
possible to think with the logic of `deferred presence. ' When we begin to 
speak and think in this way, with this logic, we find ourselves in a different 
theoretical space entirely. We enter a space which is incomprehensible from 
the perspective of a representational or Cartesian world view. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have argued that the crisis of representation takes place on 
two levels, an epistemological level and a semiotic level, with the latter 
being the more foundational level. I outlined two important critiques of 
representation that takes place at the epistemological level, these being the 
subjectivist or constructivist critique and the postempiricist critique. In 
doing this I explained that the constructivist critique, while useful for 
learning theory, is not valid as an epistemology. I then explained that while 
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it is now generally agreed that science has entered a `post-empiricist' (or 
`fallibilist') stage (Thomas 1979), those interested in the status of scientific 
knowledge are divided over the issue of relativism. At this juncture the 
semiotic critique proves useful as this is a critique of representation that 
takes place at the level of the sign, that is, at the level of representation itself. 
This critique -, deconstruction - puts in question the whole framework 
which facilitates the other critiques of representation and hence puts into 
question the whole objectivist-relativist debate/impasse. The implications of 
this deeper level critique have scarcely been touched on in educational 
theory. 
Although deconstruction presents an interesting and important way 
forward for theorising education along more contemporary epistemological 
lines, Derrida's conceptual schemes are notoriously difficult to negotiate. 
An alternative scheme which has sparked considerable interest in the last 
two decades and which has also been charged with providing a critique of 
representation at the level of the sign is that of `complexity theory' (see for 
example Cilliers 1998). In addition to this a number of authors have 
explicitly drawn connections between complexity and `poststructuralism' 
(Cilliers 1998, Dillon 2000, Popolo 2003). In view of this, a question that 
arises is whether `complexity theory' can provide any assistance with the 
task of `re-thinking' the epistemology of schooling, which, as I have shown 
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in Chapter 2, is currently driven by representational or Cartesian logic. The 
remainder of this thesis is therefore taken up with an exploration of the 
potential of complexity theory for facilitating the theorisation of education 
along non-representational lines. Because `complexity theory' emerges from 
science, whereas deconstruction emerges from philosophy and literary 
studies, complexity has the potential to offer useful alternative metaphors 
and conceptual tools for dealing with the difficult task of conceptualising 





A brief review of various attempts to represent the unrepresentable 
4.1 PREAMBLE 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the conceptual 
structures of the multidisciplinary area of investigation that has come to be 
known as `complexity studies' (Richardson and Cilliers 2001). My intention 
is to build a `platform' of understanding to use as a base from which to 
understand complexity's critique of representation which I shall then 
discuss in Chapter 5. 
In trying to describe the `field', a useful way forward is provided by 
Richardson and Cilliers (2001). In their editorial to a special issue of 
Emergence, focussing on the question `What is complexity science? ' they 
respond by providing `a view from different directions, ' suggesting that one 
(simple) way of thinking about the field is in terms of three broad `schools 
of thought', these being 
0 `hard' or `reductionistic' complexity science - an approach that is 
concerned with understanding the mechanics of complexity. In other 
words it is concerned with the nature of reality. 
0 `soft' complexity science - an approach that uses insights from hard 
complexity science as metaphors to describe complex social 
interactions. One could say this approach uses complexity as a way of 
seeing the world. 
" `complexity thinking' - an approach that is concerned with the 
epistemological implications of assuming a complex universe. It 
represents a way of thinking and acting. 
Richardson and Cilliers do, however, admit this classification `conveys a 
neatness that is really rather illusory' (ibid, p. 8) as these three `schools of 
thought' are highly intertwined. Changes in perspective always come with 
different ways of acting, thinking, seeing, relating and working and so any 
attempt to separate these into clearly separate `schools of thought' is 
unrealistic. Moreover any attempt to define the `boundaries' of these 
`schools of thought' creates caricatures that cannot do justice to the `school 
of thought' in question. Nevertheless, regardless of the shortcomings of 
such a classification, it does provide a useful device for an initial positioning 
of my own work in this chapter and the chapters that follow. 
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Since the `hard' approach is generally considered the established orthodoxy, 
and since other approaches to a large extent draw on the findings of this 
approach, this current chapter is concerned mostly with the insights 
generated by the `hard' approach. In Chapter 5,1 shall draw on the 
background presented in this current chapter to outline what I believe to be 
the semiotic and epistemological implications of complexity (and thereby 
add to the domain of `complexity thinking') and Chapter 6 will extend this 
epistemology to educational theory. From this is should be clear that at no 
time is this work concerned with the `soft' approach which `applies' the 
insights generated by the hard approach to social situations (such as 
education). Chapter 6 is concerned, not with understanding education and 
schooling as a complex system - i. e., it is not using complexity as a metaphor 
to understand education differently (see, for example Doll 1993, Davis, 
Sumara and Thomas 1996, Badenhorst 1998, Fullan 1999, Davis, Sumara 
and Luce-Kapler 2000) - but with retheorising education from a different 
epistemological and semiotic base, one inspired by complexity. This leads to 
an epistemology which does not conform to the Cartesian framework. 
With this distinction my work introduces a radical shift in focus for 
research that is concerned with the implications of complexity for 
educational theory. Until now this genre of research has been driven mostly 
by the `soft' or metaphorical approach in various modes. 
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The remainder of the chapter is divided into three main sections. The 
first is 
concerned with defining complexity, the second with 
describing it and the 
third with explaining it (explaining the logic behind it). This, I hope, will 
provide a base from which to launch the epistemological, semiotic and 
educational discussion that follows in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
4.2 DEFINING COMPLEXITY 
`Defining' complexity is a notoriously difficult task (see Waldrop 1994). 
Despite a large number of popular books on the subject which bring 
together many ideas under the popular labels of `complexity science' or 
`complexity theory' there is no `field, "theory' or `science' of complexity. 
4.2.1 Why `defining' complexity is difficult 
One of the reasons why a `definition' of complexity is elusive is because 
complexity research spans a wide diversity disciplines including theoretical 
physics, cell-biology, ecology, evolutionary biology, chemistry, non-linear 
mathematics, artificial intelligence, game theory, computer studies and 
neuroscience, amongst others, each with its own perspectives. For this 
reason, among complexity scientists, complex systems are variously known 
as `many bodied systems' (Auyang 1998), `complex adaptive systems' (Gell- 
Mann 1994, Holland 1998, Kauffman 1993), `complex dynamical systems' 
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(Mandelbrot 1982), `dissipative structures' (Goodwin 1995, Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984) and `autopoietic systems' (Maturana and Varela 1987) and so 
on. These different names reflect different foci of attention and go with 
fairly precise technical meanings in the different disciplines. This means 
there is a diverse collection of ideas associated with the notion of 
complexity, a non-uniform terminology for discussing these ideas, and 
therefore no agreement on what, exactly, constitutes `complexity. ' 
Nevertheless, this does not mean nothing can be said about complexity. For 
a start, a distinction can be drawn between chaos and complexity. 
4.2.2 The distinction between chaos and complexity 
While both complexity and chaos theory are concerned with dynamical 
systems - i. e., systems which grow and so become more complex over time 
- the former is concerned only with systems that grow in response to the 
iteration of a pattern of activity governed by a few fixed rules and the 
iterated formula remains constant. This pattern of activity invariably gives 
rise to extraordinarily intricate structure or behaviour such as that found in 
mathematical objects such as the Mandelbrot set24 and crystalline structures 
24 The Mandelbrot set, named after Benoit Mandelbrot, is said to be the most geometrically 
intricate image in all of mathematics. It is a fractal - an object that displays self-similarity at 
various scales. Magnifying a fractal reveals small-scale details similar to the large-scale 
characteristics. Although the Mandelbrot set is self-similar at magnified scales, the small-scale 
details are not idniczl to the whole. In fact, the Mandelbrot set is infinitely complex. Yet the 
process of generating it is based on an extremely simple equation. 
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such as snowflakes which are generally associated with fractal mathematics. 
In contrast to this `passive' form of complexity (Cilliers 1993, p. 7), there is 
an `active' form which cannot be described simply by the multiple 
iterations of an unchanging rule or algorithm. 
Actively complex systems evolve over time - i. e., they are historical systems 
- and this entails changing the rules, or operating according to `higher level' 
rules. Furthermore, these systems are capable of adapting to a changing 
environment. For this reason they are sometimes referred to as `complex 
adaptive systems' (CAS). The interesting thing about historical systems is 
that their history is written into their structure. Such systems cannot be 
understood simply in terms of their parts, because their parts do not 
contain all the information necessary to understand the system. Some of the 
information is in the history of the system and so the history of the system 
must always be taken into account. 
It is this active form of complexity that is the domain of complexity science 
proper. Systems that are actively complex (and so historical) include all 
manner of living systems, such as individual organisms, ant colonies, 
ecosystems, economic systems, social systems, the human mind and so forth 
and also some artificial systems, such as cellular automata (as will be 
described in Sections 4.3.2). Although the distinction between `passive' and 
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`active' types of complexity is not clear-cut (Cilliers 1993), it is only systems 
that exhibit an active type of complexity - i. e., historical systems - that are 
of concern to this particular study. This is because it is only historical 
systems that present a problem for representational epistemology, a point I 
shall return to later in the chapter and again in Chapter 5. 
4.2.3 The generic' features of complexity 
Some tentative attempts have been made to identify the `generic' features of 
active (or historical) complex systems (see for example Cilliers 1998). Such 
features are those that are deemed to persist regardless of the specific details 
of the system's construction. These have been described in terms of the 
physical properties of the system itself (e. g., Kauffman 1995, p. 17) and the 
rules or laws that generate such systems or govern their behaviour (e. g., 
Holland 1998, p. 5). Cilliers (1998) provides a useful and comprehensive list 
of ten generic features pertaining to the models of complex systems and a 
quick search of the internet yields a further rich supply. From these 
descriptions a rather sparse working definition can be distilled: 
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A complex system consists of (i) a collective of interacting agents, 
which are (ii) richly and recurrently interconnected (in a web-like, 
non-linear arrangement). The product of all the interactions 
between the agents is (iii) unpredictable (non-linear) and manifests 
as (iv) emergent features and (v) self organising behaviour. The 
self-organisation is (vi) a dynamic process, in that it is 
continuously changing (evolving or developing) which can only 
occur in (vii) a system that is open in that it is exchanging 
information with its environment. 
Although this `definition' of complexity is simplistic in the extreme it 
nevertheless manages to capture certain features that are deemed to persist 
regardless of the specific details of the system's construction. For example 
all the above mentioned features are characteristics of complex systems as 
different as human brains, economic systems, ant colonies, board games, 
cellular automata, ecosystems, climate, human language, single-celled 
organisms and the World Wide Web, to name but a few. 
4.2.4 A `sketch' of a complex system 
This sparse definition above can be fleshed out a little more by providing a 
concrete but familiar example of a complex system. The example of an 
economic system serves us well as it is familiar to most. The account below 
draws on a description provided by Paul Cilliers (Cilliers, 1998, p. 6) and 
describes each of the generic features listed in the `definition' above. 
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(i) In an economic system the economically active people in a country 
certainly comprise a collective of interacting agents. They interact 
by lending, borrowing, investing and exchanging money for goods. 
(ii) Each agent is richly interconnected in that it interacts with many 
other agents - shop and bank tellers, investment advisors, relatives, 
and so on. Furthermore the activity of each agent may be fed back 
on itself, a phenomenon known as recurrency. For example, a 
good investment can produce good returns and overspending can 
result in a shortage of money. 
(iii) The actions of a single agent are unpredictable. For example a small 
investment could produce very large returns while a large 
investment could have no significant impact. 
(iv) The actions of a single investor can cause complex ripple effects 
throughout the entire stock market, and sometimes even cause an 
emergent effect such as a stock market crash. 
(v) These non-linear interactions are self-organising in that patterns 
emerge that are not centrally controlled. The complexities of 
inflation are a good example. 
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(vi) The economic system is dynamical in that it is continually driven 
by supply and demand. It is never stable, never stands still, not 
even in a recession. 
(vii) The economic system is also an open system. It is virtually 
impossible to draw its borders. It is continuously influenced by the 
political system, agriculture (and therefore climatic conditions), 
science and technology, international relationships and so on. 
Having provided an initial `definition' of the type of complexity with 
which this chapter will be concerned (albeit a rather sketchy one), it is now 
possible to describe the `structure' of complexity in more detail. 
4.3 DESCRIBING COMPLEXITY - INSIGHTS FROM COMPUTER MODELLING 
Amongst `hard' complexity scientists, those most interested in 
understanding the `structure' of complexity are those working in the field 
of computer modelling. Insights emerging from the Santa Fe Institite -a 
research institute dedicated to complexity as a field of study in its own right 
and which has been instrumental in promoting the ideas of `complexity 
theory' to the broader public (Thrift 1999) - are particularly helpful in this 
regard. This research community is concerned with simulating complexity 
in order to work out the general laws or rules that govern complex systems. 
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The work of John Holland (Holland 1998) provides a good example of the 
type of understanding that has emerged from this research community. 
Holland attempts to model complexity by `shearing away the detail' to get 
at the `essence' of complexity (Holland 1998, p. 24). This approach has 
provided many compelling accounts of what a `complex system' could be. 
An example is provided below. 
4.3.1 A computer model of a complex system 
Cellular automata are computer models that are frequently used to mimic 
complexity. These models are also frequently used to make the point that 
There are simple sets of mathematical rules that when followed by 
a computer give rise to extremely complicated patterns. The world 
also contains many extremely complicated patterns. Conclusion: 
Simple rules underlie many extremely complicated phenomena in 
the world. With the help of powerful computers, scientists can 
root those rules out (Horgan 1995, p. 107). 
I shall therefore use a simple two-dimensional cellular automaton to 
elaborate upon the features of complex systems described in the sparse 
definition provided in the previous section in order to build up an 
understanding of complexity. Cellular automata are described in detail by 
Wolfram (1984) and what follows is based on his descriptions. 
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A two-dimensional cellular automaton is a collection of identically 
programmed `cells' (imagine a checkerboard) that interact with one another 
Figure 4.1 
(see Figure 4.1). These cells are the interacting agents. Each cell (agent) in 
the system has a `state' (e. g., black or white) and a `neighbourhood' made 
up of its eight adjacent cells (see Figure 4.2). The cells in the system interact 
with one another in that the state of any particular cell depends on the state 
of its neighbouring cells. Since each cell is affected by eight others, the 
automaton can be said to be richly and recurrently interconnected. 
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Figure 4.2 
A checkerboard A cell surrounded by its 
`neighbourhood' of eight 
adjacent cells 
The cells change their state relative to each other following a simple set of 
rules. For example if 2 neighbours are white a cell stays in its current state - 
which can be either black or white. If 3 neighbours are white, a cell will go 
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white regardless of what it was before. Under all other conditions it is black 
(see Figure 4.3). At given moments in time, the states of all the cells in the 
cellular automaton are scanned and then adjusted according to the set of 
rules. 
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must retain its current 
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If a cell has exactly three 
white neighbours, it 
must go white, 
regardless of its current 
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Rule 3 
Where there are neither 
two nor three white 
neighbours a cell must go 
black, regardless of its 
current state (black or 
white). 
Figure 4.3 
Some possible neighbourhood configurations that would lead to state 
changes of an initially black cell, in a cellular automaton operating 
according to 3 rules of interaction. 
161 
Regardless of the initial configuration, the rules quickly produce a 
characteristic pattern. Wolfram (1984) classifies these rules into four 
`Classes': 
9 Class 1 rules generate a homogeneous pattern (all cells black, or all cells 
white, or a checkerboard pattern as in Figure 4.1). 
0 Class 2 rules generate a set of simple stable or periodic structures (a 
collection of frozen or `blinking' patterns). 
0 Class 3 rules generate a chaotic pattern (one that cannot converge on a 
solution or settle into any identifiable pattern or final configuration). 
0 Class 4 rules generate complex localised structures, which move around, 
interact with each other (to form even more complex structures in some 
cases), and in some respects appear to have a life of their own, as shown 
in Figure 4.4 25 
25 John Conway's famous game of Life is a good example of a cellular automaton operating 
according to dass 4 rules. It is difficult to appreciate the nature of Class 4 rules without 
interacting with a cellular automaton such as the game of Le. Several interactive examples of 









Localised structures such as the one made of five cells in the top 
left hand corner26 of the grid above, `emerge' and `glide' across 
the grid (shown by arrows) as individual cells in the grid `blink' 
on or off (black or white) following the simple set of Class 4 
rules that guide the automaton's behaviour. 
It is cellular automata that operate according to Class 4 rules that are of 
particular interest to complexity science because, unlike cellular automata 
that operate according to Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 rules, these systems 
evolve through time as patches of pattern interact with each other according 
26 This particular structure is called a `glider' in Conways game of 'Life'. The game of `Life' also 
generates many other patterns. 
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to their own (second or higher order) rules, to form even more complex 
patterns. This can continue indefinitely or until extremely complex levels of 
organisation are reached. Indeed Conway, the inventor of the cellular 
automaton known as the game of Life `showed that the "Life" universe ... is 
not fundamentally less rich than our own' (Poundstone 1985, p. 24). 
Computer models such as these highlight two extremely important features 
of complex systems, their non-linear arrangement and the process of 
emergence. These two features are elaborated upon in Section 5.3.2 and 
5.3.3. 
4.3.2 Non-linearity and determinism 
Before discussing non-linearity it is necessary to be clear about the notion of 
linearity. Very briefly, a linear system is one where each component has a 
discrete and predictable effect on some other component, as is the case with 
a clock. If we add up all these little effects we can determine how the system 
works: the whole system is completely predictable (see Figure 4.5). This 
doesn't mean, however, that these systems are always simple. They can be 
extremely complicated (like a computer, or a jet aircraft) but a specialist can 
still understand them fully. Linear systems enable what is sometimes 
referred to as a `Newtonian' understanding of the universe, which suggests 
that since everything has a discrete and predictable effect on everything else, 
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the entire universe can be understood in terms of the effects things have on 
each other. Everything, in other words, can be understood by looking at 
the parts and their rules of interaction. We must bear in mind however that 
this logic assumes linearity. It assumes linear cause and effect relationships. 
But when relationships between things are not linear, i. e., when they are 
nonlinear, this logic fails. When we start trying to understand complex 
systems - such as human brains, and ecosystems, and ant colonies, which 
are uncompromisingly non-linear in terms of their rules of interaction, we 
can no longer understand them simply in terms of their parts and their rules 
of interaction. 
HA! 




Linear rules of interaction 
Predictable 
'resultant' d iect 
Figure 4.5 
A linear cause-and-effect sequence results in a predictable `final' 
state that is the sum of the effects of the component parts. 
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The parts making up a complex system (e. g., the cells of the automaton) are 
not connected in a linear sequence with a beginning and an end, but are 
rather interconnected in a web-like or non-linear fashion (see Figure 4.6). 
This web-like arrangement means that information can be fed back on 
itself. Any perturbation to the system therefore produces a complex ripple 
effect in the system as responses are fed back and forth through the system. 
Since no one element in the system has a discrete effect on any other 
element in the system, linear cause-and-effect type relationships between the 
individual components are masked. A response can therefore be greatly 
magnified or cancelled out altogether. 
Because responses can be magnified or cancelled out this means the total 
effect is never simply the sum of the interactions between individual 
components, as it is in linear systems. The total effect is never predictable, 
as it is with linear systems. Rather, complex systems produce non-linear or 
unpredictable behaviour. In mathematical terms, non-linearity simply 
means non-proportionality. For example a non-linear response is one which 
is disproportional to the input that produced it. A small stimulus won't 
necessarily cause a proportionally small response and vice versa. It is web- 
like interconnectivity that results in non-linear behaviour. With complex 
systems, we are unable to pre-determine what effects will be produced by 
the interacting components. 
166 





Complex, non-linearly connected systems produce unpredictable 
`emergent' effects 
4.3.3 The notion of emergence 
The idea that interacting components produce `effects' which are 
unpredictable a priori is closely connected to the concept of emergence 
which is generally defined as `the creation of new properties. ' The idea of 
emergence is, however, not unique to complexity. It has a long and 
checkered past. By most standard accounts (e. g., Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy) the term is said to have been coined by G. H. Lewes (see Lewes 
1875) to differentiate between chemical products that could be derived from 
their constituents and those that could not. He called the former `resultants' 
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and the latter `emergents'. 
Following this formulation the philosophy of 
`emergentisim' began taking shape, mostly led by the `British emergentists' 
including Lewes, Broad, Morgan and Alexander. Jaegwon Kim suggests that 
At the core of these ideas was the thought that as systems acquire 
increasingly higher degrees of organisational complexity they 
begin to exhibit novel properties that in some sense transcend the 
properties of their constituent parts, and behave in ways that 
cannot be predicted on the basis of the laws governing simpler 
systems (Kim 1999, p. 3). 
Emergence therefore came to be defined, first and foremost, as `the creation 
of new properties. ' More specifically, it came to be understood as a process 
whereby properties that have never existed before and, more importantly, 
are inconceivable from what has come before, are created or somehow come 
into being for the first time (Kim 1999). 
In the early part of the twentieth century the idea of emergence was highly 
problematic because it brought into question the idea of determinism 
during a time when scientific reductionism was on the rise (ibid. ) This, and 
an apparent link with `vitalism, ' according to Kim, contributed to the 
emergentist movement failing to become a visible part of mainstream 
philosophy of science early in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the rise 
of non-linear mathematics and complexity science in the past three decades, 
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together with the decline of reductionism, have resulted in a resurgence of 
emergentism (Kim 1999). 
Contemporary understandings of emergence, however, are unlike their 
nineteenth century counterpart. They differ from their predecessor in the 
way they understand the term `novel. ' While older versions of emergence 
stress that emergent properties are `novel' in that they are not deducible 
even in principle from the most complete and exhaustive knowledge of 
their emergence bases (ibid. ) the contemporary version understands that 
emergent features are `novel' in that they are merely unexpected given the 
principles governing the lower-level domain. Such unexpected properties 
(no matter how `inconceivable' or `unimaginable') can emerge 
deterministically from non-linear rules of interaction, as is the case with the 
evolving `patches of pattern' of a Class 4 cellular automaton. Although the 
future of these patterns cannot be predicted a priori, their emergence is 
nevertheless completely explainable in terms of the lower level. Chalmers 
(2002) therefore notes that with the rise of complexity science and non- 
linear mathematics we now have two understandings of emergence -a 
`strong' and a `weak' version - the first (older) version being incompatible 
with determinism, the second (contemporary) version being compatible 
with determinism. In introducing a `weak' version of emergence complexity 
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HH 
A hierarchical model of emergence. As non-linear interactions produce 
emergent features at new hierarchical levels, these in turn interact to 
produce yet another emergent hierarchical level of order. In this diagram, 
different shapes represent different hierarchical levels of order (i. e., `State 
1', `State 2' and `State 3'). However note that each of the three `states' can 
exist simultaneously and, although not shown in this diagram, there can 
be interactions which cut across different hierarchical levels. 
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Holland (1998) provides a useful discussion about the way in which 
constraints at lower levels determine the nature of emergences at higher 
levels while being unable to predict them. In this regard he emphasises first 
the decoupling of determinism from predictability and second the 
hierarchical and hence historical nature of the process (see Figure 4.7). 
Holland focuses largely on cellular automata and board games such as chess 
and checkers to get this point across. We can therefore return to our cellular 
automaton example to illustrate these aspects of emergence. 
First, Holland stresses that although the order that emerges in cellular 
automata is strictly determined by an initial handful of operating rules, the 
precise nature of the order that emerges from a cellular automaton 
operating according to Class 4 rules is not predictable a priori. This is 
because the non-linear interactions between the agents make for an 
infinitude of potentially different combinations. This does not mean that 
every time the programme is run a different outcome will be achieved. 
Because cellular automata are closed systems with well-defined boundaries 
when a rule is applied there is only a single trajectory the system can follow 
and it will follow this same trajectory time and again. This means, provided 
the initial conditions are the same, the system will achieve exactly the same 
end point time and again, without fail. We cannot predict this outcome 
however, without running through the programme itself. The only way to 
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determine the emergent properties is to run the programme. In this way an 
emergent process is quite unlike a more mechanical process where the 
outcome can be determined before it is achieved. 
Second, he stresses that because Class 4 automata evolve, much of the 
information about the current state of the system is caught up in its history 
of interactions not in its individual components. This is the case because the 
rules of the lower hierarchical levels of the system which emerge first, 
constrain the features that can emerge at later stages in the system's 
development (Holland 1998, pp. 126,246). With each new level of order 
new constraints are introduced. In working with each new level of 
constraint further order of a particular nature, emerges. Constraints not, 
only establish the direction that can be taken by the system in the future, 
they are also pre-requisites for the future order that emerges. Thus the 
system cannot be understood independently of its history. In this sense 
history is written into the structure of the system itself. Holland describes it 
like this 
Persistent patterns at one level of observation can become building 
blocks for persistent patterns at still more complex levels. [... ]. At 
each level of observation the persistent combinations of the 
previous level constrain what emerges at the next level. This 
[represents a] kind of interlocking hierarchy (Holland 1998, p. 7, 
my emphasis). 
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With evolving systems such as these, history or `time' is a structural 
component of complex systems, not something that is applied to the system 
from without. This, in turn, means that such emerging systems - or perhaps 
I should say emergent processes - are fundamentally historical. The system 
is an historical object in the sense that its subsequent evolution depends on 
its prior evolution. In this sense the trajectory of the system can also be 
described as `irreversible': a complex system cannot develop backwards, 
even in theory (i. e., it can only develop in one direction, the `logic' doesn't 
work in the other direction). For this reason the trajectory can be described 
as `asymmetrical'. A closed or linear system, on the other hand, can develop 
in either direction (backwards or forwards - it can be taken apart and put 
back together again, and the logic works both ways) and in this sense it is 
`symmetrical. ' Murray Gell-Mann talks about this `irreversibility' or 
asymmetry of complex systems in terms of the `arrow of time, ' which he 
describes as an effect or illusion produced by the `irreversibility' of complex 
processes (Gell-Mann 1994, p. 129, cf. Prigogine's view on this, as described 
in in Section 4.4.1). 
In this way a complex (emergent) process is unlike a more mechanical 
process which is a-historical (or `reversible' in the sense that they can be 
understood both forwards and backwards). Mechanical processes are 
permanent, static and unchanging (except in the sense of falling apart). 
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Their history is not caught up in their structure. Complex systems, on the 
other hand, are dynamic systems. They are constantly changing as their 
components interact, exchange information with each other and new order 
emerges. 
4.3.4 Problems with the computer modelling approach: boundary issues 
For a system to continually evolve or grow, there has to be an input from 
outside the system. Something has to be fed in. If nothing is fed into the 
system, it will remain static (inert) or, alternatively, will fall apart. It cannot 
grow. This means complex systems must be open systems. Which means 
their boundaries cannot be clearly defined. The issue of boundaries is not 
something that the computer modelling community models very well. 
Evolving Class 4 cellular automata, for example, are `open' only in the sense 
that they receive an input from a power supply. In all other senses they are 
closed. They have well defined boundaries, and receive specific inputs. The 
rules that drive the programme operate against a known set of initial 
(boundary) conditions. This is not the case with `real' world complex 
systems such as ecosystems and communities which do not only receive but 
also exchange information with their environment. When neither the 
boundaries nor the inputs can be defined the logic of cellular automata fails. 
While the scientific and philosophical (epistemological) prospects for the 
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insights generated by the computer modelling community are undoubtedly 
useful (see Bedau 1997 for a discussion about this), the main problem with 
this approach from the perspective of my own work, is that it attempts to 
represent open systems with ill defined boundaries and which are 
exchanging information with their `environment' with closed systems with 
well defined boundaries that are simply receiving an input. This raises the 
question as to whether such models are modelling complexity. I shall return 
to this question in Chapter 5 where I discuss the epistemological 
implications of complexity. First I wish to elaborate on the issue of 
boundaries in complex systems and the use of the term `environment. ' 
When dealing with open systems, the term `environment' must be used 
with care as it can imply the presence of a non-arbitrary physical boundary 
(i. e., between a system and its `environment'). This is problematic for open 
systems that exchange information with the environment as it is not 
possible to determine with certainty which components belong to the 
system (or are `inside') and which belong to the environment (or are 
`outside'). The closer one gets to the boundary of any complex/open 
system, the less distinct containment becomes. Even self-produced 
boundaries (such as those of cells and organisms) become fuzzy when 
approached. For example, at a molecular level it is not clear which 
molecules in the membrane bounding a cell are part of the cell and which 
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are part of the `environment'. Furthermore, the question of when a 
particular particle that has been taken in by the cell, actually becomes 
incorporated into the physical structure of that cell, also involves a fuzzy 
boundary. Specifying clearly where a boundary should be is not obvious, 
not something that can be described objectively. 
Because the boundaries of complex systems are so difficult to define, yet we 
must define boundaries in order to make sense of the world (Cilliers 2001), 
it is useful to make the conceptual distinction between (whatever it is we 
deem to be) an `entity', and its `environment' while understanding that 
there is no actual or objective, hard (physical) boundary between the two. 
This does, however, have implications for what we can say about how an 
`entity' behaves in relation to its `environment'. If an entity is not clearly 
separate from its environment, we cannot accurately speak of it responding 
or adapting to a distinct (separate) environment. Rather, we have to `zoom. 
out' to encompass a broader level of organisation. We then have to 
understand that this greater system is in turn part of an even greater one, 
and this can continue to infinity. In this regard Van Uden, Richardson and 
Cilliers (2001) suggest it makes more sense to refer to `complex systems' as 
`partial complex systems' since we are never able to extricate them from 
other interacting components. With this sort of understanding, we must 
acknowledge that a so-called `entity' and its so-called `environment' are part 
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of a greater, complex system, composed of non-linearly interacting 
components. From such a perspective each agent in this larger system acts 
on and is in turn acted upon by other agents in the larger system. Looked at 
in this way, interactions between `a system' and `its environment' can no 
longer be understood in a linear (cause and effect) sense. Since everything is 
caught up in a greater non-linearity it becomes difficult to talk about 
anything in terms of the logic of cause and effect. An entirely different logic is 
required of us. 
In this regard I now wish to discuss a line of theorising that can be 
understood to be concerned with developing a kind of logic which is 
suitable for a world in which everything is interrelated, a world in which 
boundaries are not assumed. Since this body of research takes non-linearity 
and connectedness seriously, one could say this line of work is concerned 
with explaining complexity rather than describing or modelling it (although 
obviously the two activities are closely interwoven). This line of theorising 
has been developed by Ilya Prigogine. I shall be using Prigogine's logic 
when I discuss the epistemological and semiological implications of 
complexity in Chapter 5. 
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4.4 EXPLAINING COMPLEXITY - INSIG1171S FROM THERMODYNANUCS 
In many respects Ilya Prigogine's work can be seen as incompatible with the 
theories generated by the computer modelling community of the Santa Fe 
Institute. Nevertheless the importance of his work to `complexity theory' is 
profound. In this section I shall try to introduce some of the more 
important themes of his work through the notion of emergence. 
Although the word `emergence' seldom appears in his writings, Prigogine 
was nevertheless very much concerned with those kinds of processes that 
give rise to increasingly higher levels of organisational complexity. As such, 
one could say his work has been intimately concerned with emergence. 
More specifically, one could say his work explores the notion of emergence 
through a meticulous examination of the passage between the micro and the 
macro level. In explaining the dynamics of this passage he provides a 
convincing argument for the idea that emergent phenomena are in principle 
not reducible to or calculable from the lower levels from which they 
emerged. It is for this reason that I suggest that Prigogine's work can be 
understood as being incompatible with that of the computer modelling 
community, who conclude that emergent properties, while being 
unpredictable a priori, are nevertheless completely explainable in terms of the 
lower level. Prigogine's work presents a challenge to the idea of 
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determinism, while the conclusions of the computer modelling community 
support the idea of determinism. If Prigogine's work is understood in terms 
of emergence this leads one to conclude that complexity science is not 
wholly concerned with `weak' emergence. I believe Prigogine's work in 
thermodynamics supports a theory of `strong' emergence in the sense that 
the British emergentists had in mind. 
4.4.1 Background to Prigogine's work 
It is worth mentioning before starting that what I call Prigogine's theory of 
`strong' emergence he himself refers to as his `microscopic theory of 
irreversible processes' (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 310). 1 translate his 
theory into the language of emergence because this is useful for my 
discussion in the next chapter. I mention the name he uses because it relates 
to the focus of his work, which is largely concerned with time 
irreversibility. In particular, Prigogine's theory of irreversible processes 
makes clear that the crux of what separates `emergents' from `resultants' is a 
distinction between the kind of processes that take place in `closed' systems 
(those that do not interact or exchange information with their 
environment) and those that take place in `open' systems' (those that 
interact with or exchange information with their environment). The former 
are, in principle, `reversible' processes (i. e., the logic of their mechanics is the 
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same in either direction) while the latter, he claims, are strictly `irreversible' 
(i. e., the logic of their `mechanics' only works in one direction: forwards). If 
this distinction between reversible and irreversible processes is not made we 
have no means to understand why emergents should be different from . 
resultants, so in this sense Prigogine's work can be seen as having provided a 
crucial layer of understanding to the emergentist debate. At this point, some 
background to Prigogine's work might be helpful. 
Prigogine's main aim was to better understand irreversible processes and 
hence the role of time in the physical sciences and in this regard he was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1977 for his contributions to 
thermodynamics. Prior to this work, irreversibility, or the `arrow of time' 
(which is the distinction between past and future) was associated only with 
gradual and fully deterministic thermodynamic change towards disorder. In 
other words the `arrow of time' was understood to manifest because things 
inevitably run down. More specifically, it was thought that the `arrow of 
time' appears only because there are simply more ways for a system to be 
disordered than ordered (so the chances of the universe becoming 
disordered are higher than the chances of it becoming ordered). With this 
logic irreversibility (or the arrow of time) appears a side effect of timeless 
physical processes. The arrow of time, in other words, is an illusion (Gell- 
Mann 1994 provides an example of this understanding of irreversibility). 
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With this understanding of irreversibility (which is also the understanding 
of the computer modelling community, Holland included) the system is 
`irreversible' in practice (because we can never have all the information 
required to delineate the initial conditions), but not in principle. Emmeche 
et al., put it like this 
Emergent phenomena ... are unpredictable until the moment 
when they are described. Then they are in a certain sense not 
unpredictable anymore. After the relations between the preceding 
conditions and the phenomena produced are described for the first 
time, one can claim that the event hereafter can be predicted and 
therefore is causally described (Emmeche, Kappe and Stjernfelt 
1997, p. 100). 
Prigogine showed, however, that this logic applies only to closed systems. 
When we are dealing with open systems - which are systems that interact 
with their environment - there are irreversible changes towards states that are 
more ordered. Furthermore, these irreversible changes are not deterministic 
but probabilistic. This irreversibility is therefore not only an irreversibility 
in practice (i. e., not only an apparent irreversibility) but an irreversibility in 
principle. A genuine irreversibility not an `effect' or `illusion' as Gell-Mann 
would have it (see Section 4.3.3). This, according to Prigogine - this 
probabilistic element - puts the `arrow of time' in a different position 
altogether. The `arrow of time, ' or irreversibility appears as an operator in 
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physical processes not an `effect' or `illusion. ' The `arrow of time, ' in other 
words, takes on ontological status and this is the crux of Prigogine's theory 
of `strong' emergence, the crux of what separates `emergents' from 
`resultants. ' The former are strictly irreversible, the latter only apparently 
irreversible. To appreciate how Prigogine's re-interpretation of 
irreversibility (the arrow of time) affects determinism, it is necessary to 
introduce three other concepts that Prigogine uses. These are, (i) non- 
equilibrium, (ii) self-organisation and (iii) bifurcation. 
4.4.2 Non-equilibrium and self organisation 
Non-equilibrium is a state that characterises open systems. The most 
obvious examples of such systems are boiling water, tornadoes, lightning 
and all living systems. These are systems that are exchanging energy and 
matter with their environment and which exist only because they are open. 
If an open system is cut off from its environment it dies or simply fades 
away. It cannot be separated from the fluxes that sustain it. In contrast to 
this, equilibrium systems are closed to their environment. They are 
essentially static, inert systems that, once formed, can be maintained 
indefinitely without further interaction with their environment. An 
example of a system at equilibrium is a container of cold water. If we started 
to apply heat from below we would be starting to push the system away 
182 
from equilibrium. Heat would be `coming in' to the system and the system 
would move into a `non-equilibrium' state. When the system has been 
pushed sufficiently far from equilibrium the water responds by organising 
itself into a macro-level pattern, i. e., it erupts into turbulence (it boils) 27 
The system `jumps' to a new level of order. This response is produced by 
the non-equilibrium situation and is a response that will be maintained as 
long as the non-equilibrium situation producing it is maintained. 
Furthermore, the spontaneous appearance of the macro-level pattern -a 
process which Prigogine calls `self-organisation' - is entirely in accord with 
known physical laws. The micro-level entities are simply obeying known 
physical laws and in doing so the macro-level pattern spontaneously 
emerges. There are many examples of such spontaneous patterning in 
nature, such as tornadoes, turbulence and the flocking behaviour of birds to 
name but a few 28 Prigogine calls these self-organised patterns `dissipative 
structures' and claims that the emergence of such structures is a 
characteristic of non-equilibrium. For Prigogine, non-equilibrium is at the 
source of order and by this he means it is at the source of all order. He 
insists that within the universe equilibrium is `a rare and precarious state' 
27 Turbulence is a complex pattern of order, not a disordered or chaotic state. 
28 A well-used, micro-level example is the case of the `Raleigh-Benactd instability. ' If we apply heat 
from below to a thin layer of water, the water responds by organising itself into tiny convection 
currents called Berard cells. In other words a macro-level pattern emerges which transcends 
and subsumes the micro-level components. 
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and that most of `reality' is not orderly, stable and equilibrial, but seething 
and bubbling with change and process and dissipative structures. 
We come to one of our main conclusions: At all levels, be it the 
level of macroscopic physics, the level of fluctuations, or the 
microscopic level, nonequilibrium is the source of order. 
Nonequdibrium brings `order out of chaos. ' (Prigogine and Stengers 
1984, pp. 286-287, emphasis original). 
But it is necessary to look a bit more closely at the concept of self- 
organisation because I have said that the lower level entities form 
themselves or `self-organise' into macro-level patterns entirely in accordance 
with known physical laws. This seems to imply that the macro-level structure 
that emerges at the higher level is entirely explainable in terms of known 
physical laws. If this were the case Prigogine's theory might be a theory of 
emergence, but it would not be a theory of `strong' emergence. It would 
mean that the universe is `unfolding' in an entirely deterministic fashion, 
like a Class 4 cellular automaton, according to a set of operating rules or 
laws. It is here that the concept of bifurcation is required. It is bifurcation - 
not self-organisation - that brings determinism into question. 
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4.4.3 Bifurcation and the role of chance: the roots of `strong' emergence 
According to Prigogine, while everything that is taking place at non- 
equilibrium takes place under necessary conditions these conditions, while 
necessary, do not determine in its full `reality' that which emerges in non- 
equilibrium conditions. This, he maintains, is because when a system 
responds to an external `flux' by `jumping' to a new level of order, there are 
always a number of structural possibilities for a higher level of order that 
would be equally satisfactory in terms of the known physical laws. This 
means that the single actualised version - the `solution' that is `chosen' by 
the emerging system - is always one among a number of plausible 
alternatives that happened not to occur. 
Prigogine calls the point at which these possibilities appear a bifurcation 
point. " This is a point that corresponds to a symmetry break (which means 
additional degrees of freedom have been provided in a particular dimension 
as a result of the system being pushed out of equilibrium) so at bifurcation 
the system must choose between several equally satisfactory symmetry 
options. Prigogine has shown that as a system is pushed further and further 
from equilibrium, additional bifurcations (symmetry breaks) will appear. 
`By stabilising the system becomes an historical object in the sense that its 
29 The name is misleading, however, as it means separation in two, when in fact there may be 
several possibilities. 
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subsequent evolution depends on this critical choice' (Nicolas and Prigogine 
1989, p. 72). 
So the question is how the system selects its options and this is where - 
Prigogine's work becomes contentious. Prigogine insists that the choice that 
is made is purely the result of chance (Pomian 1990 has collected some of the 
most important contributions to the determinism debate surrounding 
Prigogine's work). In Prigogine's words: 
The system `chooses' one of the possible branches available when 
far from equilibrium. But nothing in the macroscopic equations 
justifu the preference for any one solution. (Prigogine 1997, p. 68, 
emphasis added). 
The difficulty with this - and this is the difficulty that brings determinism 
into question - is that `chance' according to Prigogine3° `can neither be 
defined nor understood' (Prigogine 1997, p. 5). Chance is something that is 
in itself not present or, at least, always missing. This means we cannot use it 
to create a complete description of an emergent system's past or future . 
trajectory (all we can have are probabilities). It is in principle impossible to 
provide a complete description of the `emergent' level from its the 
`submergent' level `components. ' Such systems, in other words are 
30 Here Prigogine draws on Abraham De Moive, one of the founders of the classical theory of 
probability. 
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`strongly' emergent because what happens at the micro-level is in principle 
insufficient to provide a complete description of what emerges at the macro- 
level. But the probabilistic nature of processes taking place `far from 
equilibrium' has a deeper significance than simply that we can't accurately 
describe a system in terms of its lower level components. It also leads to 
Prigogine's re-interpretation of `irreversibility' (see, e. g., Gell-Mann 1994 
for a detailed account of the conventional interpretation of irreversibility) 
which -I believe - is the crux of what forces us to rethink our ideas about 
representation at the level of the sign. This, of course, also has implications 
for Cartesian or representational epistemology. I will return to this point 
in Chapter 5. 
4.4.4 Probability and irreversibility 
If chance is involved at each bifurcation and since it takes only a very few 
bifurcations to produce an inordinate number of options (Figure 4.8), the 
trajectory of the system is radically indeterminate. What we have, therefore, 
is a system that is indeterminate or strongly emergent despite the fact that it 
is operating according to known physical laws. Because probability is built 
into the system at every bifurcation, we must understand it as an operator 
in what emerges. It is not just that we have insufficient information about 
the system to know what will emerge, we cannot determine what will 
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emerge even in principle (all we have are probabilities). Probability 
therefore introduces an irreducible element into our description of nature 
which is quite foreign to strictly deterministic systems with trajectories that 
can be fully determined and therefore `read' forwards or backwards in time. 
Deterministic systems are, in principle, reversible systems, even if this 
reversibility cannot be achieved in practice. Their `irreversibility' is the 
result of ignorance (we cannot know everything we need to know to 
delineate the initial conditions) rather than being a structural feature of the 
system itself. 
Figure 4.8 
Fractal tree showing how simple binary branching can quickly 
lead to an inordinate number of outcomes. 
Once irreducible statistical features are introduced into our description then 
irreversibility or the `arrow of time' takes on ontological status. It is no 
longer an illusion product of ignorance. If the present is not contained in 
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the past, and the future is not contained in the present then irreversibility 
must exist. Probability therefore presupposes an irreversible direction of time 
(Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 259). In Prigogine's words 
Indeed, what could an arrow of time mean in a deterministic 
world in which both future and past are contained in the present? 
It is because the future is not contained in the present and that we 
go from the present to the future that the arrow of time is 
associated with the transition from present to future (Prigogine 
and Stengers 1984, p. 277). 
Irreversibility is therefore Prigogine's deepest level of explanation for the 
emergentist ontology he invokes. He cautions however that while (his 
interpretation oO irreversibility is a source of order at all levels, it `can be 
fully understood only in terms of a microscopic description' (Prigogine 
1997, p. 183). 
Far from being an `illusion' [irreversibility] expresses a broken 
time-symmetry on the microscopic level. Irreversibility is either 
true on all levels or on none (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 285). 
The universe, for Prigogine is emergent because of microscopic 
irreversibility, because of the arrow of time. He postulates that 
irreversibility itself - i. e., the `arrow of time' - precedes existence (Prigogine 
1997, p. 163). 
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Questions concerning the origins of time will probably always be 
with us. But the idea that time has no beginning - that indeed time 
precedes the existence of our universe - is becoming more and more 
plausible (Prigogine 1997, p. 182, emphasis added). 
It is irreversibility that puts us in an ever-emerging present. Furthermore, 
whatever emerges or comes into presence, because it is at the same time 
conditioning a rising future, necessarily calls forth that which is 
unimaginable or incalculable from the present. This is because the future 
evolution of the system is made possible not only by that which has already 
emerged but also by the arrow of time, which can never be `present' in that 
it is not something that can itself emerge. What emerges is therefore never 
the complete thing. The arrow of time is always missing from what is 
`present' but necessary for what is present to present itself. 
Because the universe is irreversible it cannot unfold like an automaton for 
which we must simply discover the rules which are `present' but hidden 
from view. Irreversibility, Prigogine insists, requires a reformulation of the 
fundamental laws of physics in terms of (irreversible) probability 
distributions, rather than the (reversible) trajectories used since the time of . 
Newton. Probability or `chance, ' in other words, must play a fundamental 
role in our descriptions of nature. The basic laws must be reformulated to 
acknowledge that there is an unalterable temporal direction functioning as 
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an operator in what is taking place. It is this reformulation of irreversibility 
that serves as complexity's critique of representation at the level of the sign. 
I will elaborate on this point in the next chapter. 
4.7 SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
In the preceding sections I have made an attempt to describe complexity not 
as an individual theory, but in terms of two opposing understandings which 
attempt to explain the world in terms of its interconnectivity (but of course 
the `field' if such exists, could be `cut' in other ways too). With both styles 
of theorising, the world is understood as a relational entity and, moreover, 
this relationality is of a nonlinear nature. For both styles of theorising, the 
non-linear nature of the relationality means that `time' is a structural 
component of complex systems, not something that is applied to the system 
from without. This, in turn, means that complex systems - or perhaps I 
should say complex processes - are, for both understandings, fundamentally 
irreversible and historical which in turn means that complex 
systems/processes cannot be understood by taking them apart. They cannot 
be understood in terms of the traditional reductionist methods of `ordinary' 
science, which attempt to understand the universe linearly, in terms of 
`parts' that are acted upon by processes or `rules' that are external to the 
parts themselves, such that A+B+C is always (predictably) equal to 
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ABC. With complexity, A+B+C may not only `add up' to something 
quite unpredictable, like 0, for example, but it is also the case that 0 cannot 
be understood as separate from A+B+C. In other words, `components', 
`product' and `process' are all caught up in the complex entity or 
phenomenon, and inseparable from each other. These features, common to 
both approaches, so I shall argue in the next section, have some profound 
implications for our understanding of what we can know. As such, 
complexity's challenge to representation has been taken up the the 
epistemological level by a number of theorists who are interested in 
developing what they refer to as `complexity thinking' (Cilliers 1998, 
Cilliers 2000a, Cilliers 2002, Richardson 2004, Richardson, Mathieson and 
Cilliers 2000). 
Nevertheless, the difference between the two approaches, their different 
understanding of the role of time or `irreversibility' in complex processes 
(which is connected to whether the system has a boundary or not) so I shall 
argue in the next chapter, leads also to a critique of representation at the 
level of the sign. At the level of representation itself. This in turn, leads to 
an even more profound shift in our understandings about knowledge. This 
difference between the two `complexity' approaches, has been largely 
overlooked by those working on the epistemological implications of 
complexity (but see Popolo 2003). In the next chapter I hope to show why 
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complexity presents more of a radical challenge to representational 
epistemology than has previously been thought. Both the `complexity 
thinking' approach of Richardson and Cilliers (Richardson and Cilliers 
2001) and the computer modelling approach (which Richardson and Cilliers 
have referred to as `new reductionism') assume that representation closes 
down meaning. This stems from a representational or dualistic 
understanding of the sign. Prigogine's interpretation however, suggests that 
representation opens meaning and it does this at precisely the same moment 
that it shuts it down. In this way it is very closely aligned with 




'THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF COMPLEXfrY 
Thinking beyond representational conceptions of knowledge 
5.1 PREAMBLE 
One of the `side-effects' of complexity research is a theoretical discussion 
about the `implications' of complexity for debates about knowledge and 
knowing. Such discussions (Cilliers 1998,2000a, 2002, Dillon 2000, Popolo 
2003, Richardson 2004, Richardson, Mathieson and Cilliers 2000) transpose 
insights from complexity science into the domain of epistemology and 
philosophy, which opens up another realm of exploration and debate for 
complexity. It is this `side-effect' or `outgrowth' of complexity that is the 
subject of this chapter. My interest is in articulating a way of working with 
or reading complexity that is more sensitive to its own conclusions: a 
reading that helps us think about the world and knowledge in a way that 
does not result in, or seek closure. I shall do this in two stages. 
First I explore complexity's challenge to representation at the 
epistemological level. I then explore its challenge to representation at the 
level of the sign. With the first line of argument I provide a reading of 
complexity, which suggests that all attempts to fully, or perfectly 
understand, model or `represent' complexity, miss the point of complexity. 
This critique does not mean to suggest that the attempt to engage with or 
`understand' complexity should be abandoned. The point, rather, is that the 
logical difficulties that arise in representing or `understanding' complexity 
suggest at least two alternatives to a `picture' theory of knowledge. An 
interpretivist (or `relativist') alternative which can be aligned with many 
`postmodern' philosophical positions and a pragmatist alternative (i. e., a 
`use' theory of knowledge) which can be aligned with Dewey's 
`transactional realism. ' This argument therefore does not take issue with the 
idea of representation itself. It does not challenge representation at the level 
of the binary sign (i. e., it does not take issue with the idea of `presence. '). 
With this argument the question is not whether we can have knowledge of 
what is present, but with the epistemological status of our knowledge of 
what is present. Because it assumes something (a structure of sorts) is 
present, it is a structuralist argument. 
In the second stage I show how complexity also poses a poststructuralist 
argument against representation. The poststructuralist argument takes issue 
with the notion of presence. To develop this argument I use insights 
generated by Prigogine's `microscopic theory of irreversibility' (Prigogine 
196 
and Stengers 1984, p. 310) to suggest that when we understand the 
historicity of complex systems in a Prigoginian sense we can no longer take 
for granted the idea that the world is `there' for us as every day objects are 
`there' for us. In this regard I show that when Prigogine's theory is taken 
into account, we arrive at an understanding of signification which can no 
longer rely on the idea of presence, i. e., the idea that the sign reflects that 
which is already there. This semiotic position, so I shall argue, can be 
aligned with deconstruction. 
5.2 THE STRUCTURALIST CHALLENGE TO REPRESENTATION 
The idea that models of complex systems do not have a `conventional' (i. e., 
one-to-one) representational relationship with `reality' has been strongly 
stated by Paul Cilliers (1998,2000b, 2001,2002) and related arguments have 
been put forward by several others (see for example Lissack and Richardson 
2001, Richardson 2002, Richardson, Cilliers and Lissack 2001, Richardson, 
Mathieson and Cilliers 2000). These authors are principally concerned with 
two intertwined features of complex systems that disallow a simple 
representational understanding of complex systems, these being (i) their 
nonlinearity and (ii) the uncertainty of their boundaries. Although 
nonlinearity and boundary problems are closely intertwined, in what 
follows I shall try to deal with each of these features separately in order to 
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give a more nuanced account of the 
`unrepresentability' of complex 
systems. 
5.2.1 Nonlinearity (`incompressibility 9 
As was described at some length in the previous chapter, the fact that the 
components making up a complex system are nonlinearly interconnected 
means the behaviour of the system is unpredictable a priori. This is because 
feedback loops within the interconnected network of components ensure 
that no one component has a discrete effect on any other. The effects of 
interaction are distributed throughout the system such that most of the 
information contained `in' a complex system lies in the relationships 
between the components of the system, not the components themselves. 
This interconnectedness of complex systems masks linear cause-and-effect 
type relationships between the individual components which means we 
can't just add up individual (linear) effects to predict the `total effect' 
produced by the system. Furthermore, we cannot take the system apart to 
understand it because in doing so we destroy the `part' that contains much 
of the information - i. e., the relationships. 
Cilliers uses this feature of complex systems to argue that such systems are 
`incompressible' (Cilliers 1998, pp. 9-10). By this he means that we cannot 
leave anything out of a complex system without producing a distortion. 
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This in itself is unremarkable, obviously if we leave anything out of any 
system we are going to get a distortion and this applies equally to linear and 
nonlinear systems. But this is not Cilliers' point. His point is that if we 
leave something out of a linear system we know exactly what the effect of 
that omission will be, and so we can compensate for it, but this is not the 
case with complex systems. Because of the nonlinear nature of the 
interactions and the unpredictability of the emergent products of these 
interactions, if we leave something out of such a system, Cilliers contends, 
we cannot accurately predict either the nature or the magnitude of the 
distortion this will produce. 
When this line of thinking is extended to models of complex systems, we 
see that to model a complex system we would have to model the whole 
thing, in its entirety (i. e., in a one-to-one sense), if we want the model to 
accurately reflect the system we are modelling. We cannot leave things out 
(i. e., `compress' the information) without introducing unpredictable effects. 
This conflicts with conventional understandings of modelling, which 
suggest that the model must always be simpler than the thing modelled. 
Holland, for example, suggests that making a `well conceived' model means 
(simply) `extract[ing] the regularities from incidental and irrelevant details' 
(Holland 1998, p. 4). 
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Shearing away detail is the very essence of model building. 
Whatever else we require, a model must be simpler than the thing 
modelled (Holland 1998, p. 24). 
Holland's argument is that even nonlinear systems obey laws that have a 
compact description and he uses computer simulations of complex systems 
- such as cellular automata" (CA's) - to demonstrate the fact. For Holland, 
the behaviour of CA's is isomorphic32 with that of `real' complex systems 
and so these models can be understood to suggest that in the `real' world 
very simple initial conditions plus a few simple transformative rules can 
combine to produce the unlimited complexity we see around us. 
Even with virtual reality... the underlying model obeys laws that 
have a compact description in the computer -a description that 
generates the details of the artificial world' (Holland 1998, p. 24). 
If Holland is correct, and complex systems can be represented in terms of 
their rules of interaction - i. e., by rule-based models - then complexity 
would pose no threat to the notion of representation and it would be 
31 See Chapter 4, (Section 43.1) for a brief description of the structure and functioning of cellular 
automata. 
32 I should state here that I do not mean isomorphic in the simplistic sense that one cannot draw 
an accurate picture of, say, an electron. As any physicist will endorse, it is impossible to draw a 
picture of an electron. An electron is a purely theoretical construct which provides an 
explanation for many actual physical phenomena. Nevertheless it is possible to make models of 
where an electron might be in an atom For example, quantum mechanical pictures of Hydrogen atoms use dots to represent the places where the electron is most likely to be. These 
models suggest that if we assume the existence of electrons, this is how electrons would actually behave in reality. Such models therefore claim to be isomorphic with `reality' in that they claim 
to reflect or depict something about the way the world really is. 
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possible to use models of complex systems to understand `real' complex 
systems. A `picture' theory of knowledge would therefore be quite 
sufficient. 
However I do not believe Holland is correct. Holland's mistake, in my 
view, is due to an undifferentiated understanding of causality/determinism. 
Holland does not differentiate between `explainable' (a priori) and 
`descriptive' (a posteriori or empirical) forms of causality/determinism. 
Holland's argument that complex systems can be reduced to their rules of 
operation is closely linked to the concept of emergence which, historically, 
has had a problematic relationship with the principle of causality (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3). Typically, emergence is understood as something 
in principle unexplainable by science and it has been considered the key 
ingredient that makes a system complex because in many ways it captures 
something of the a priori unpredictability of the output of complex 
systems. However, as Holland (1998) has remarked, the advent of high 
speed computers and nonlinear mathematics have shown that emergence, 
far from being something mysterious, can be accounted for by nonlinear 
dynamics. Computer simulations such as CA's, have shown that a simple 
set of rules governing nonlinear interactions can produce emergent features 
and moreover these emergent features are consistent in that the same set of 
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agents, organised in the same way, will repeatedly produce the same 
emergent feature/s. In other words, computer modelling approaches suggest 
that despite their a priori unpredictability, emergent effects are causally 
determined. Computer simulations therefore provide us with the extremely 
important insight that an outcome can in principle be determined a priori, 
even if it cannot in practice be predicted a priori, i. e., that predictability and 
determinism are not necessarily linked (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3). 
This insight has led Holland and other prominent complexity scientists 
(e. g., Kauffman 1995, Wolfram 2002) to (mistakenly, I think) understand 
emergence (and by implication, complexity) as something that is in 
principle (even if not in practice) explainable by or reduced to a simple set 
of rules. I believe this view is mistaken because even if emergent effects are 
causally determined this does not help us foresee the nature of any particular 
emergence. As Emmeche, Koppe and Stjernfelt (1997) point out, not all 
causality results in a priori predictability. These authors distinguish between 
(i) `explainable causality' which enables a priori predictability and (ii) 
`descriptive causality' which can result only in a posteriori predictability. In 
this context, their quote which I used before (see Section 4.4.1) can now be 
understood in a slightly different way: 
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Emergent phenomena ... are unpredictable until the moment they 
are described. Then they are in a certain sense not unpredictable 
anymore. After the relations between the preceding conditions 
and the phenomena produced are described for the first time, one 
can claim that the event hereafter can be predicted and is therefore 
causally described (Emmeche, et al.. 1997, p. 100). 
From this is should be evident that at most, what is `explained' by the 
nonlinear dynamics of computer simulations such as CA's is a low-level 
organising principle or mechanism by means of which the phenomenon of 
emergence per se is made causally possible. Such an `explanation' remains 
silent about the nature of any particular emergent effect. It cannot give an a 
priori explanation of why - given a certain set of initial conditions and rules 
of interaction -a particular emergent effect will emerge, nor can it describe 
exactly what emergent effect will emerge. Knowing about the rule and the 
elements does not in any way help us toward an a priori understanding of 
what exactly will happen when a particular set of elements interact with 
each other according to a particular rule or set of rules. To know we have to 
wait and see what happens. What this means is that even if we have an 
unlimited amount of information about a complex system, even if we know 
all of its components, and all its rules of interaction, we still cannot know 
how the system will behave or what emergent effects will emerge. There are 
limits to what we can know. Moreover, the same principle applied in 
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slightly different circumstances or with slightly different initial conditions 
can result in widely different emergent effects. It would seem, therefore, 
that - contrary to Holland's claims - the `incidental and irrelevant details' 
(Holland 1998, p. 4) cannot be `sheared away' to produce a model as these 
details are an integral part of the nature of the actual complex system, 
contributing as much, if not more, to the specific behaviour of the system as 
do the `rules of interaction'. As Cilliers (1998) has argued, by removing such 
`incidental and irrelevant details' we could significantly change the output 
of the system (alternatively the system may change little, or not at all, there 
is no way of knowing this in advance). 
Cilliers (1998) argues that it is precisely because models have to reduce + 
complexity (leave things out) in order to function as models that we cannot 
model complex systems. The nonlinearity of complex systems means we are 
unable to leave anything out of such systems without introducing a 
distortion of unpredictable magnitude. The emergent behaviour of our 
models of complex systems will therefore always be unpredictably different 
from that of the complex systems they purport to model. Cilliers adds that 
even if we could put all the components of the complex system into our 
model - which we cannot, for presumably we cannot make a replica of life, 
the universe and everything, and moreover this would defeat the objective 
of modelling - we still would not be able to understand the behaviour of a 
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complex system, as `the behaviour of the model would be as complex - and 
unpredictable - as that of the system itself (Cilliers 2000b, p. 48). 
My conclusion is that it is impossible to have a perfect model of a 
complex system. This is not because of some inadequacy in our 
modelling techniques, but a result of the meaning of the notions 
`model' and `complex. ' There will always be a gap between the 
two. This gap should serve as a creative impulse that continually 
challenges us to transform our models, not as a reason to give up 
(Cilliers 2001, p. 138). 
Since we cannot make a model of a complex system - due to the reductive 
nature of models and the nonreductive nature of complexity - it would 
seem that `picture' theories of knowledge are inappropriate when it comes to 
understanding complex systems. This, of course, also means that if `reality' is 
complex (as the complexity scientists would have it) then `picture' theories 
of knowledge are also insufficient more generally. 
The nonlinearity (or `incompressibility') argument, if it holds, is enough on 
its own to do away with the possibility of retaining a `picture' theory of 
knowledge at the same time as acknowledging the relationality of 
complexity. However, one problem with this argument is that it depends 
entirely on emergence not being predictable - or fully describable -a priori 
and this may not always be the case. As Emmeche et al., (1997) comment: 
the `unexplainable' nature of emergence has `always [run] the risk of being 
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overridden by history in the development of science' (Emmeche et al. 1997, 
p. 84). Complexity science and nonlinear mathematics have already shown 
how emergent features can be seen as being causally determined (if only 
after the fact) and if we were to concede that we may some day be able to 
make a priori predictions about the exact nature of a particular emergence 
(instead of only being able to `predict' such emergences after the event) we 
need to ask ourselves whether this would have any effect on the 
representability of complex systems. 
At first glance it would seem that everything would be turned around if we 
could predict an emergence a priori. If an emergence could be fully 
described in terms of a set of rules we could know why, given a certain set of 
components and rules of interaction, a particular emergent effect would 
emerge. If we could fully describe a particular emergent effect in terms of a 
rule, the emergent effect would be reducible to the rule, and if reducible, the 
difficulty of representing complex systems would be removed. In this case a 
`picture' theory of knowledge could stand (or be reinstated) even if we hold 
that the world is complex. 
The nonlinearity (incompressibility) argument, on its own, may therefore 
not be sufficient to do away with `picture' theories of knowledge. This, 
however, does not allow a relapse into direct or one-to-one 
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representationalism, as there is another feature of complexity that precludes 
the possibility of this sort of representation. This is the openness or 
undecidability of the boundaries of complex systems, as addressed in the 
section below. With this argument I have assumed that `descriptive' (a 
posteriori or empirical) causality is the equivalent of its stronger 
`explainable' (a priori) version (i. e., that emergent features are `explainable' 
simply because they are causally determined). 
5.2.2 The undecidability of boundaries 
One does not need to evoke all the old philosophical arguments that 
scientific models cannot be `proved true' or `verified' (see Chapter 3, section 
3.3) to understand that `real' complex systems cannot be represented with 
certainty. Although these arguments are crucially important, we can reach 
the same conclusion simply by examining the way in which rules function 
in alliance with boundaries to constitute a system. Open complex systems 
(such as language and ecosystems) have uncertain boundaries while closed 
complex systems (such as CA's3J) have certain or `hard' boundaries and this 
has implications for what we can say about the effect of an operating rule in 
33 Although CA's are good at showing that remarkable complexity can spring from a few simple 
rules of operation, CA's in almost all respects are closed systems and strictly speaking, cannot be 
considered as complex systems. In fact Giliers (2000b) suggests that such systems are more 
accurately described as `complicated' systems. Unlike `real' complex systems, CA's do not interact with or exchange information with their environment (except for the fact that they 
draw energy from an outside source). Their boundaries are well defined and the initial state of 
the system precisely known. 
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these two sorts of systems. My point is that boundaries 
(or the lack thereof), 
more than rules, affect our ability to represent a system precisely. 
In a closed, nonlinear system, such as a CA, where all the initial conditions 
are known - and presuming the principle of causality 
holds - there is only a 
single trajectory which the system can follow and the operating rules 
sharply determine this trajectory. As a rule is implemented/reiterated the 
system moves inexorably along this trajectory from an initial state towards 
its final state. All possible states of the system can therefore be reliably 
predicted and the outcome (or outcomes) of the initial conditions can be 
understood fully in terms of the basic rules of operation. Since the system is 
functioning in a pre-programmed way, it can be accurately described or 
represented in terms of the operating rule plus the initial conditions of the 
system. It is for this reason that Holland believes that emergence 
(complexity) can in principle be fully described (and therefore understood) 
by means of an operating rule. However the fact that CA's have a hard 
boundary - something that is not present in `natural' complex systems - is 
for the most part glossed over by Holland. It is crucially important 
however, as the boundary of the system must be understood to work 
together with the operating rules to constitute the system that it bounds. To 
put this another way, it is only when the boundary is known that we can 
confidently search for a rule that governs the behaviour of the system. 
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However, specifying clearly where a boundary could be is not obvious 
when we are dealing with open systems that interact with or exchange 
information with their environment, transforming themselves and the 
environment in the process. Such `boundaries' can never be certain or 
clearly defined. They are not `hard' boundaries. When this is the case, an 
operating rule can no longer be understood to sharply determine the 
trajectory or structure of the system. At most, such rules enable the system 
to `settle' into a state that more-or-less satisfies the constraints imposed 
upon it (Cilliers 2000b). Thus the `final state' (if such can be said to exist) is 
always contingent on numerous `external' factors (which themselves are 
emergent products of other interacting complex systems) so there can be no 
pre-determined path or definite pre-determined `final state' of the system, as 
was the case with CA's. `Real' complex systems remain radically contingent 
even if we concede that `operational' boundaries can emerge as a result of 
such systems `settling' into some state that more or less satisfies the 
constraints imposed upon them. This means that even if rules do govern the 
behaviour of the system, we can have no firm or accurate description of 
such systems. Without prior knowledge of the contingent `external' 
conditions affecting the system, open systems cannot be fully, completely, 
or even reliably represented. To represent them we have to create a 
boundary - which then functions more like a hypothesis/conjecture: i. e., 
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under these boundary conditions such-and-such may 
happen. The radical 
contingency of these systems prevents us 
from saying anything with 
certainty (see Cilliers 2002). 
But this is not all there is to say about `boundary problems. ' Engaging with 
the boundary problems of complex systems also leads to another set of 
insights which are connected with the radical interconnectivity of complex 
systems. The term `radical' qualifies `interconnectivity' here in the 
following way. It means interconnections extend not only within and 
between systems but also within and across different hierarchical levels of 
complexity. For example an emergent effect may feed back into the system 
that `produced' it (see Figure 5.1). Because of this radical interconnectivity 
complex systems are not neatly nested. The `parts' or `sub-systems' of a 
complex system are also always simultaneously part of many different 
systems (Cilliers 2001) which presumably have their own `rules' of 
operation. This means that different rules of operation criss-cross in 
`individual' complex systems (see Figure 5.1) and so it becomes questionable 






In this illustration the `rules' are depicted by means of interconnecting 
lines. Note that the light grey `system' in the dotted circle in the centre of 
the illustration - which is `isolated' in the solid circle in the top left-hand 
corner - is only a `system' if it is artificially delineated as one. Its 
`behaviour' is therefore contingent on `rules' which cannot be contained 
within its boundaries. The `isolated' model in the top left-hand corner 
would therefore exhibit different behaviour from its interconnected `real' 
counterpart, or, if it showed the same behaviour, it would do so only by 
means of a completely different set of rules, i. e., a set that operated with 
different boundary parameters. 
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As Cilliers (2000b) points out any `rules' that are developed to describe a 
particular system, are based on a framework or boundary that is selected for 
a specific purpose. Let me put it another way. To describe a system we have 
to impose a boundary for without boundaries there is no information at all: 
we have to impose boundaries to make sense. But in creating a boundary, 
we also create the condition of possibility for a rule to emerge. Only if we 
impose a boundary can `rules' emerge which allow us to describe the 
behaviour of this `system' but we have to remember that the rules exist, 
only because of the imposed boundary, and makes sense only in terms of 
the imposed boundary. Neither the boundary nor the rule is naturally 
given. 
This also means that if we want to argue that a model or theory represents 
some `real' pattern or regularity that actually exists, then we see that when 
we attempt to use our model to identify the rules of operation of this real 
pattern or regularity, we can't do this because the behaviour of any 
particular regularity (or pattern) is contingent on many different and 
overlapping sets of rules (note the `isolated' model in the top left-hand 
corner of Figure 5.1). So the problem becomes one of how we can represent 
the behaviour of a real complex system in terms of a single or unified set of 
rules when its output is partially determined by sets of rules that we have 
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no access to. My point is, if we want to model or theorise about the 
behaviour of a real complex system we first have to give it a boundary 
because only then can we start looking for its rules of operation. But in 
giving it a boundary, we then have to find a new set of rules that can work 
with these particular boundary conditions to produce the effect we are 
looking for. And in doing all this we find we have completely re-invented 
the system we wanted to find out about. So this means while our model (or 
theory) may produce (or account for) the same effect as that produced by 
the real system we are modeling (or theorising about), it is a completely 
different set of rules that produce (or account for) this effect. The rules of 
our models and theories are not isomorphic with the rules driving the real 
system. Rules and `laws' that we discover are not `real' features of the 
systems we are modelling. This conclusion can be understood from at least 
two perspectives. One leads to relativism, the other pragmatism. 
5.2.3 The relativist and pragmatist alternatives 
I shall deal with the relativist interpretation first, to get it out of the way 
and then I shall turn to pragmatism, which I believe is more interesting 
from an epistemological perspective as it leads away from the objectivism- 
relativism impasse I described in Chapter 3. 
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The relativist alternative arises from the idea that any `features' we 
`discover' (i. e., rules or laws of complex systems) can only ever be a 
function of the frame we have subjectively chosen. In other words, the 
boundaries we `see' are partly a function of the way in which we choose to 
see. We would have to acknowledge that our knowledge making , 
endeavours have a certain subjectivity? ' However this does not mean the 
boundaries or `entities' we see are entirely subjective. Cilliers puts it like 
this: 
... we 
frame the system by describing it in a certain way (for a 
certain reason), but we are constrained in where the frame can be 
drawn. The boundary of the system is therefore neither purely a 
function of our description, nor is it a purely natural thing. We 
can never be sure we have `found' or `defined' it clearly, and 
therefore the closure of the system is not something that can be 
described `objectively' (Cilliers 2001). 
As such, the `features' we `discover' are always context dependent. Because 
every representation of a complex system that we may come up with has 
been framed in this way, none of these representations can say anything 
universal about the nature of reality. Since the rules we `find' that enable 
our models to simulate `reality' do not describe the `real world' we cannot 
34 Even the concept `organism' cannot be conceived independently of our cognitive mapping of 
systems and their boundaries for it depends on the hierarchy of life one is trying to defend 
(Dillon 2000, p. 12). 
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set the rules of our models to achieve a certain outcome and then impose 
these rules on the real world and expect the same outcome (see Richardson 
2002). Neither can we assume that by observing the emergent behaviour of 
our models we may obtain a priori knowledge of complex natural systems 
which previously resisted empirical analysis, although as Richardson and 
Cilliers (2001) have noted, this is precisely the understanding that dominates 
much of the complexity literature (see also Horgan 1995). Instead, we are 
led once again to the conclusion that if we assume the world is complex, 
`picture' theories of knowledge are inadequate for understanding it. This 
perspective has similarities with a number of `postmodern' or 
`interpretivist' epistemologies which deny that there is any merit in looking 
for the truth, a move which is often construed as opening the way for an 
`anything goes' postmodern relativism. I would suggest, however, that we 
are not bound to an endless controversy between `truth-orientated' and 
`interpretivist' discourses, both of which, I should add, still share a concern 
with the accuracy of our `pictorial' representations. Both claim that either 
we can or cannot make accurate (i. e., pictorial) representations of our world 
and are therefore trapped in the logic of `picture' theories of knowledge. An 
alternative to both these stances - which I believe complexity also offers - 
would be to explore whether there is some other way of understanding 
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knowledge that gets us out of this impasse. It is here that I believe 
pragmatism is helpful. 
The pragmatist alternative arises from the idea that while the rules of our 
models of complex systems may produce the same effect as the `real' 
complex system, it is a completely different set of rules and initial 
conditions that create this effect. In other words, regularities exist, we can 
detect them and even find rules that reliably describe their behaviour, but 
the rules we find are not real things. There is no isomorphic relationship 
between the rule in the model and the rule in the `real' system (if such rules 
even exist). The correspondence is not representational or truthful but 
functional or pragmatic. Our models and theories are not pictures of `reality' 
but tools to help us do things in the world. The conclusion that our models 
and theories of complex systems are pragmatic rather than pictorial implies 
that what we consider to be knowledge of an independent complex `reality' 
that is wholly other to us is in fact only knowledge of the effects of our 
actions in the world which brings us very close to Dewey's understanding 
of knowledge and ontology (see Biesta and Burbules 2003, for details about 
Dewey's understanding of knowledge and truth). 
Dewey understood knowledge and learning as being about action or, more 
accurately, `transaction' (Dewey & Bently 1949; see also Biesta & Burbules 
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2003). Dewey articulated his `transactional' theory of knowledge very 
concisely using the concept of the `Reflex Arc' (Dewey 1896), which is 
conventionally understood in biology as a `stimulus' setting an organism in 
motion to produce a `response. ' Contrary to this linear understanding of 
the way in which an organism interacts with its environment, Dewey 
understood that 
the stimulus is only found at the very moment in which the 
(adequate) response has been found. It is only when the organism 
has `hit' upon an adequate response that coordination is achieved, 
that the organism `knows' what the stimulus was (Biesta and 
Burbules 2003, p. 35). 
Biesta and Burbules suggest that for Dewey, finding a response that brings 
about coordination is the same as saying that the meaning of the situation 
for this organism has become clear (Biesta and Burbules 2003, p. 36). 
Meaning in other words emerges from the complex organism-environment 
transaction. The experimental transaction of organism-environment not 
only leads to more specific habits, but also results in a more `differentiated', 
more meaningful world. In other words, `the world is no longer a vast 
penumbra of vague unfigured things, but gradually becomes a figured 
framework of objects' (ibid., p. 37). With this understanding we see that the 
quest for knowledge is not in order that we may develop more accurate or 
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pictorial understandings of the finished universe, as 
it is. Knowledge is not 
something to look at, nor is it itself a process of 
looking. Rather, the quest 
for knowledge is about finding more and more complex and creative ways 
of interacting with our environment and through 
doing this - through 
intervening in the processes of the universe - we find out how to create new 
and more complex environmental conditions with which we can interact in 
yet more complex and creative ways " The point is, for Dewey there are no 
final solutions, only ongoing interactions leading to increasingly more 
complex interactions (and `solutions'). With the pragmatist alternative we 
see that a complexity inspired understanding of knowledge puts the 
observer back in the world as an active participant rather than a disinterested 
observer. In this sense the world, and our actions in it are part of the same 
complex system. Nevertheless whatever emerges from the world-participant 
transaction can be understood to be the real `reality, ' which the participant 
can then have knowledge of. In this sense pragmatism is structuralist. At 
some level it is still foundational - something must pre-exist the sign, and 
hence the knowledge representation. As such, it does not escape the 
Cartesian epistemological framework where knowledge is still a 
35 Think about the invention of the wheel, cars, computers, the Internet, all of which enabled leaps 
in creative possibilities for our interactions in the world. 
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representation of something which lies outside itself. As a critique of 
representation, pragmatism is still representational at the level of the sign. 
From this discussion about nonlinearity and boundaries, I hope to have 
made clear that as long as nonlinear systems are `open, ' we cannot hope to 
understand these systems in a conventional one-to-one representational 
sense. Models with clearly defined boundaries that purport to be models of 
`real' or `natural' complex systems may be very good at simulating the 
complex processes we see around us, but the rules we `find' that enable 
these models to simulate `reality' do not give us a `picture' of the `real 
world. ' The nonlinearity and boundary arguments, it would seem, are more 
than sufficient to put `picture' theories of knowledge to rest, at least in 
terms of understanding complex systems. These arguments suggest that if 
we acknowledge that `reality' is complex we can only approach complexity 
in terms of interpretivist (relativist) or pragmatist (use) theories of 
knowledge. These however, are themselves reliant on the logic of 
representation at the level of the sign. They remain within a structuralist 
ontological framework and a Cartesian epistemological framework. But this 
is not all there is to say about complexity's challenge to representation. I 
believe complexity's challenge to representation also takes place within a 
poststructuralist framing. 
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5.3 THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST CHALLENGE TO REPRESENTATION 
The poststructuctural challenge to representation, as posed by complexity, 
is closely related to complexity's unusual nonlinear (as opposed to linear) 
understanding of temporality. I believe this feature of complex systems has 
not been given sufficient attention by theorists concerned with working out 
the epistemological implications of complexity. 
Since one of the central postulates in complexity science is the notion of 
`time irreversibility' (Prigogine and Stengers 1984) and moreover, since it 
has also been argued that emerging notions of temporality and history are 
the single most important phenomenon characterising the `collapse of 
representation' (see for example Foucault 2002/1970a), it would seem an 
analysis of temporality, with regard to the epistemology of complexity, is 
absolutely indispensable. 
5.3.1 A non-linear understanding of temporality 
Complexity's understanding of temporality and process contrasts with 
linear understandings which assume that processes (causal sequences of 
events) happen over time so can be understood from particular temporal 
standpoints (with no temporal standpoint being privileged). With linear 
understandings phenomena that are not static can be understood to `unfold' 
in time in a linear fashion. With this understanding, `reality' can be viewed 
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`not as a continuous flux ... 
but as a series of instantaneous "snapshots" 
extracted from this flux' (Gutting 1989, p. 51). The assumption is that the 
flux of time is divisible into isolated elements. What this means is that when 
time is brought into analyses of phenomena, it is brought in as just another 
variable, i. e., phenomena must be understood from a particular temporal 
standpoint (with no temporal standpoint being privileged). However it is 
precisely this `snapshot, ' `reversible' or `continuist' understanding of 
temporality as `just another variable' that complexity challenges. 
5.3.2 Two challenges to linear temporality 
There are at least two levels at which we can try to understand this 
challenge to linear temporality. The more basic level explanation is 
concerned with boundaries (albeit temporal rather than spatial boundaries), 
the other with the `irreversibility' of complex processes. I shall deal with 
both explanations, although it is the latter that is of the most interest and 
usefulness to this discussion. 
At the more basic level, we can understand the temporality of complex 
systems in terms of what I shall call `nonlinear causality. "' For this we see 
that the idea of framing a system by putting spatial boundaries around it is 
Which refers to the idea that the emergent effects produced by nonlinear interactions are 
causally determined but are not predictable a priori (Le., `explainable causality' does not hold). 
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wholly dependent on the assumption that we can also isolate it as a 
`snapshot' in time. If this cannot be done, the system cannot be spatially 
framed and therefore cannot be represented. However this argument is not 
much different from the `boundary argument' I discussed earlier (Section 
6.2.2) where I pointed out that interconnections extend not only within and 
between systems but also within and across different hierarchical levels. 
Cilliers puts it like this 
... 
hierarchies are not that well-structured. They interpenetrate 
each other, i. e., there are relationships which cut across different 
hierarchies. These interpenetrations may be fairly limited, or so 
extensive that it becomes difficult to typify the hierarchy 
accurately in terms of prime and subordinate parts (Cilliers 2001, 
p. 143). 
Cilliers, of course, is talking from a spatial rather than temporal perspective 
(although it becomes difficult to distinguish between these two perspectives 
with complex systems). However if we understand emergent features as 
phenomena on a different hierarchical level from the elements that 
interacted to produce the emergent feature, then we are led to explore 
complex systems from a temporal perspective. However, if we do this, we 
find that we cannot talk about one set of structures `giving rise to' another 
in the usual linear fashion. We cannot say that at `time A' we have 
interacting elements, while at `time B' we have the emergent feature 
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produced by these interacting elements. With complex or `emergent' 
systems there are no distinct elements or phenomena that precede or follow 
real points in time. We can begin to get some understanding of this by 
returning to the discussion of Emmeche, Kuppe, and Stjernfelt: 
Very often the idea of a temporal succession in the creation of new 
[emergent] levels is spontaneously interpreted so as to imply a 
causal process. This idea leads to a metaphysical mistake which is 
evident when one considers objects in which several levels coexist 
at the same time: the idea that the lower levels cause the higher 
levels to exist. Of course this is true in a common-sense use of the 
word `cause' but not in the standard scientific way of using it: if 
the higher level consists of units of the lower level, then they exist 
simultaneously [e. g., brain cells and consciousness]. There is no 
temporal, causal process going on `creating' the higher level out of 
the lower one, and no reductionist saying so has ever been able to 
show a cause running from the lower towards the higher level 
(Emmeche, Koppe, and Stjernfelt 1997, p. 93, italics original). 
Although one level is more `basic' in that it presupposes the higher level - 
i. e., the higher level could not exist without it - both levels must be 
understood to exist simultaneously. If the lower level exists, then at the same 
time the higher level also exists. Another way of understanding this is to 
visualise higher level emergences as stable, reproducible patterns in time and 
space of the lower level elements. Although the lower level elements 
constitute the pattern, the pattern cannot be `explained' by the lower level 
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elements. For Emmeche et al., `[t]he act of creation 
in the same moment 
create[s] conditions and product' (ibid., p. 93). The upper level is in this 
respect as much part of the regularity as is the lower one. However there is 
something more that must be taken into account. Here Emmeche et al. 
draw on Polanyi's (1968) theory of boundary conditions to suggest that the 
emergence of the higher level also places limits on the lower level. 
Each level relies for its operations on all levels below it. The level 
reduces according to Polyani the scope of the one immediately 
below it by imposing on it boundary conditions that harnesses it 
to the service of the next higher level, and so on (Emmeche et al. 
1997, p. 108). 
Because higher level emergences place limits on what is possible for the 
lower level, emergence can be understood to select its own constraining 
conditions. To illustrate this point we can use an example from physics and 
chemistry. John Holland offers the following: 
The laws of chemistry are indeed constrained by the laws of 
physics and, in this sense chemistry is reducible to physics. 
However, chemistry has its own [laws]. The macrolaws that 
govern the interaction of molecules are formulated and used 
without reference to the laws of particle physics. In unusual 
circumstances chemists refer to deeper levels (such as the effects of 
radioactivity), but these are the exception not the rule (Holland 
1998, p. 245). 
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If we understand this quote from Polanyi's perspective, we could say that in 
addition to chemistry being constrained by the laws of physics, the laws of 
physics are also constrained by chemistry in that they can only manifest in 
certain ways, i. e., according to what the laws of chemistry allow. They are 
harnessed by the laws of chemistry. Although it is the presence of lower 
level constraints (the laws of physics) that enable the emergence of a higher 
level order (chemistry), we also have to bear in mind that as soon as these 
preceding conditions bring about an emergence (chemistry), new 
constraints (the laws of chemistry) are in operation at precisely the same 
time as the emergence comes into effect. New emergence, new constraints. 
Thus emergence creates its own constraining conditions and this cannot be 
understood in a unidirectional or linear way. It must be understood that 
while the lower level provides the necessary conditions for the higher level 
to emerge, something else is also at stake here in the emergence of new (or 
`higher') levels of order. There is a `supplement' which is itself not present 
in the lower level. This `supplement' to the lower levels is provided by the 
`laws' of the higher level, i. e., `chemistry has its own [laws, which] ... are 
formulated and used without reference to the laws of particle physics' 
(Holland 1998, p. 245). 
These higher level laws, in other words, have introduced something (a 
`supplement') which was not there before. At this point linear determinism 
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fails. We are forced to give up the idea of foundational bits and pieces from 
which everything in the world can unfold - like an automaton - in a linear 
fashion. We see that there is always something missing. It is at this point that 
we begin to see complexity's challenge to the notion of `presence, ' upon 
which the whole dualistic structure of representation depends. To explore 
this challenge further in relation to complexity, we need to go to 
Prigogine's work. 
5.3.3 Complexity's challenge to the notion of presence 
Prigogine (1997) insists that although new order (emergence) results when a 
complex system explores and finds new ways of working with the initial 
conditions, and that these initial conditions are provided by the lower 
hierarchical level - and are `causal' in this regard - the elements making up 
the lower level do not provide everything necessary for order of a particular 
kind to emerge at the higher level. In his words: 
The system `chooses' one of the possible branches available when 
far from equilibrium. But nothing in the macroscopic equations 
justifies the preference for any one solution (Prigogine 1997, p. 68, 
emphasis added). 
The single actualised version - the `solution' that is `chosen' by the system - 
is always one among a number of plausible alternatives that happened not 
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to occur. This means that the `solution' a system will finally `settle on' is 
not a foregone conclusion, but always a matter of chance. To put this 
another way, the pattern (or organisation) that emerges at the higher level is 
not only a product of the system's relational past but also of `something' (a 
`supplement') that is not present in the system at all. The combination of 
the system's relational past with the totally intractable or unrepresentable 
to produce new emergent order that supervenes on lower levels ad 
infinitum ensures that the system is never in a state where it is fully 
actualised, it is never fully `present' at any point in time, because an integral 
part of it is that which is not part of it. It therefore remains always in the 
process of becoming without being or, more accurately, becoming 
something else without first being something concrete. 
What I have tried to argue is that complex systems (if such can be said to 
exist) are therefore not only open in space, but also open in time. Being 
open in space leaves open the possibility that they are spatial things, i. e., 
concrete entities with a structure that can be grasped. One problem with this 
sort of understanding is that it could be argued that the view of the universe 
as being composed of closed interacting entities could be replaced by the 
view that universe is instead `radically relational. ' This however is still a 
structuralist position. This is because the idea that the world is either like 
this or like that relies on the idea of a foundational world - one with all the 
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bits and pieces of its history ready to recombine in an infinite variety of 
new ways -a world that we can know, one that is separate from our 
knowledge of it. As long as complex systems are understood as spatial entities 
the temptation remains to look for the big picture, the biggest picture, 
which encompasses all the openness. To look for the one final or ultimate 
boundary in which all this interconnected `being' exists. However the 
openness in time is more intractable. When there is no moment in which to 
say `stop' we not only lose the boundaries of the present but we also have 
nowhere to begin. We lose The Past (the past as immutable, real, `true'). If 
complexity suggests an epistemology, this will be an epistemology which 
dispenses with foundations, dispenses with a structuralist ontological 
scheme. It will be `historical' but this `history' will have no place to begin. 
In the next section I draw on Prigogine's critique of determinism, Derrida's 
understanding of deconstruction and combine it with G. H. Mead's 
emergentism to outline a possible `epistemology of complexity. ' 
5.4 THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF COMPLEXITY 
My argument so far is that both Prigogine and Derrida bring into question 
the idea of presence, upon which the idea of representation is founded. 
Prigogine's work suggests that the existence of a world present to itself which 
can unfold - like an automaton - in a deterministic fashion is at least not an 
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inevitable assumption. This critique of classical determinism is not the only 
scientific discourse that brings determinism into question. It can also be 
found in a broader debate in theoretical physics which Max Planck has 
referred to as the `determinism quarrel' (see Freire 2003) which is mostly 
concerned with the philosophical (epistemological) implications of quantum 
mechanics" This debate about determinism framed within the quantum 
mechanics literature has raged for the last eighty years at least (Freire 2003). 
I believe the reason quantum mechanics has been (and continues to be) so 
unsettling in theoretical physics is precisely because it too brings into 
question the idea of presence, the foundation upon which modern 
epistemology depends. Quantum mechanics says the universe is not `there' 
for us, as objects in our every day world appear to be `there' for us 38 The 
debate about quantum mechanics is, in other words, a scientific controversy 
with fundamental semiotic and epistemological implications. But the 
problematisation of presence is perhaps most well developed in Derrida's 
critique of the `metaphysics of presence' (Derrida 1976b) which I introduced 
in Chapter 3. 
37 Max Planck was one of the founders of quantum mechanics. Planck's views on this are 
expressed in D&mirini a%Iri te»rinw, Leipzig, Barth, 1938. 
38 Werner Heisenberg, for example would have it that `the electron and the atom possess not any degree of physical `reality as the objects of daily experience' (Heisenberg 1926, in Miller 96, 
p. 120). 
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This, of course, raises the question as to why we need Prigogine to discuss 
the problem with presence, rather than these other better established 
debates lodged in quantum mechanics and deconstruction. One reason for 
using Prigogine is that he still employs metaphors we can relate to in our 
macroscopic world. This is not the case with much of modem physics 
(particularly quantum mechanics) or Derrida, both of which throw us into 
a crisis of imagination. " We can no longer use `real' world metaphors to 
imagine the world that is presented for us by Derrida or by quantum 
mechanics. Metaphor fails us. This `failure' of metaphor is momentous. 
Solomon Marcus comments:. 
For the first time in human history, the main concern of science, 
art and philosophy is situated beyond the macroscopic world, while 
human semiosis, as it was projected and developed during a long 
period of its history, had remained limited to the macroscopic 
world (Marcus 2000 in http: //www. uni-kassel. deliag- 
kulturforschung/archiv2/krise. htm). 
For this reason it is my belief that Prigogine's work gets us to a place where 
we can begin to feel more comfortable - or at least less uncomfortable - 
39 Some of the more `unimaginable' concepts include curved space, which is finite yet unbounded, 
a four-dimensional spacetime continuum; mutually exclusive properties possessed by the same 
subatomic entity the existence of fundamental fluctations of energy in a total vacuum (see Tarnas 1996, p. 358). Another case in point is the `Schrodinger's cat' thought experiment which 
shows the kind of absurdities that arise when we try to translate the ideas of quantum 
mechanics into the macroscopic world. 
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with Derrida and quantum mechanics. I do not believe Prigogine's work 
dispenses with the need to engage with Derrida and quantum mechanics, 
but that it provides us with an opening or gateway into, onto, or around 
these other `non-metaphorical' - and therefore non-representational - forms 
of logic. In view of this I believe Prigogine's problematisation of 
determinism - which brings into question the notion of `presence' - makes 
an extremely valuable contribution to a reconceptualisation of knowledge 
away from framings which are underpinned by a problematic Cartesian 
metaphysics. 
5.4.1 Epistemology without presence' 
When the notion of presence is brought into question we arrive at the idea 
that we can never understand complex processes because something is 
always missing from their foundational base, such that we are never able to 
justify any point of departure absolutely. The system, in other words, is 
never in a state where it is fully actualised, it is never fully `present' at any 
point in time. Because it can never become `present' it cannot be accurately 
re-presented and therefore it can never become knowledge in the 
representational sense, we can never `grasp' it. But at the same time we 
could also say that because what is missing is what prevents final closure, it 
is this very `missingness' that permits the appearance of the radically new 
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(i. e. it permits strong emergence). If we apply this 
insight to the idea of 
knowledge we could say that it is the very impossibility of knowing 
something completely that enables new 
knowledge to constantly emerge. In 
this sense what is `missing' from the world 
(i. e., that which makes 
knowledge of the world impossible) is the condition of possibility for 
`knowledge' to emerge. The impossibility of knowledge is its condition of 
possibility. In what follows I shall attempt to `explain' this conclusion 
by 
exploring what a lack of `presence' means 
for our knowledge of the past, 
the future and the present. 
5.4.2 Knowledge of the past (the loss of truth in history) 
Let me begin by reviewing the meaning of the past - history - in a fully 
deterministic world. With strict determinism each successive state of a 
system follows on and is entirely predictable from what came before. Since 
nothing is missing from the equations that describe each of these states - 
because chance is not involved - the process can be understood from any 
temporal standpoint, forwards or backwards in time. So if we are 
concerned with the history or past states of a system it is possible to refer 
back to any of the stages in the sequence and work out the correct history 
of the system, which is immutable, and eternal. With deterministic systems 
the history of the system is there to be read once and for all because the past 
232 
states can be read as fully as the present and future states. This 
understanding of `history, ' as a linearly temporal process, that can be `read 
off' sa series of stages was described by Henri Bergson as a 
`cinematographical' view of temporality where processes are understood as 
a series of `snapshots' of the transitions from one state to another (Bergson 
1911, p. 301). With this view, processes - or as Bergson would have it, `the 
flux of time' (Bergson 1911, p. 344) - is divisible into isolated elements 
which can be fully described. Each `snapshot' of the process is there, so to 
speak, and so a process can be fully understood from particular temporal 
standpoints which succeed each other (see Figure 5.2). 
PAST PRESENT FUTURE 
State of State of State of State of State of 
system at system at system at system a system at 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
Figure 5.2 
A linear understanding of temporality, in which history is immutable. 
It is because each `stage' of the process can be understood in the same way 
from any temporal standpoint - i. e., forwards or backwards in time - that 
the process can be described as `reversible'. According to Prigogine, the 
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introduction of chance as a fundamental aspect of the dynamics of a system 
destroys this view of temporality. 
If a system is probabilistic rather than deterministic this means we cannot 
create a series of equations that would accurately describe the trajectory of 
the system in a linear series of stages that lead up to its current state. We 
cannot do this because there is always something missing from our 
macroscopic equations when the system `jumps' from one state to the next, 
which prevents us from doing this. A vital part of what emerges at each 
stage is always a product of chance. This means the history of the system 
cannot be accurately described in terms of a linear series of definitive 
`stages. ' But if this is the case how should we understand the histories that 
we have already constructed? For example what should we make of the 
series of snapshots that trace the unfoldment of our universe all the way to 
the Big Bang? 
George Herbert Mead's Philosophy of the Present (Mead 1932) is quite helpful 
in this regard for he denies the idea that there is a real or immutable past 
which we have recourse to. He argues that it is only from our experience of 
the present that we are able to reconstruct the past. This means our historical 
accounts of the past will always give us a story of the past from the 
perspective of the present. The past, for Mead 
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must always be set over against a present in which the emergent 
appears, and the past, which must then be looked at from the 
standpoint of the emergent, becomes a different past (Mead 1932,, p. 
2, emphasis added). 
But in an emerging universe, a universe that is always becoming more 
complex, the present always includes more than was present in the present 
that has just passed (see Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3 
Diagram to show how each new present brings a reconstruction of the 
past. For example theories `a, ' `b' and `c' about the possible origin of the 
universe (these being theories which arise from different presents, a, h and 
c, respectively) would be qualitatively different not cumulatively different. 
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This means that with each subsequent present - which is to say with each 
additionally complex present, with each bigger present - we must rewrite the 
past. This is the story of our knowledge or significations of the past. As 
Mead puts it: 
There is an entire absence of finality in such presentations. It is of 
course the implication of our research method that the historian in 
any field of science will be able to reconstruct what has been, as an 
authenticated account of the past. Yet we look forward with vivid 
interest to the reconstruction, in the world that will be, of the 
world that has been, for we realise that the world that will be 
cannot differ from the world that is without rewriting the past to 
which we now look back (Mead 1932, p. 3). 
This is why our knowledge of the past - and indeed our understanding of 
the present - keeps changing and why it can never reach a point of finality, 
even in principle. Our representations of the past are not in any sense 
accurate in a timeless or immutable sense. They are not pictures of a past 
that is or has been `there'. We cannot represent the past as such, because the 
past is not present to be re-presented. All we can do is keep reconstructing 
the past in a way that makes sense from the perspective of the present. For 
Mead there is no universal or immutable past which is independent of all 
presents. The `correctness' of our knowledge of the past can be grounded 
only in our experience of the present, which is the only experience we have. 
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The materials out of which the past is constructed lie in the present and this 
present is different from past presents. `Reality' is always in a present which 
is more than its past which means each new present must necessarily bring a 
reinterpretation of the past and knowledge which is arising in the present is 
always already passing into being insufficient for that present. 
5.4.3 Knowledge of the future (openness to the unimaginable) 
But it is not only the impossibility of depicting the past states of emergent 
systems as a linear sequence of `snapshots' that is a problem. Since a `game 
of chance' is involved at each `bifurcation' (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3), we 
also cannot track the future trajectory of such systems. This is because the 
possibilities for a given process to go do not, in any sense, exist before hand. 
Furthermore, as it takes only a very few bifurcations to produce an 
inordinate number of possibilities (see Figure 4.8 in Chapter 4) the future 
trajectory of the system is radically inventionalistic. This point is driven 
home by physicist John Ziman who remarks 
... entities can emerge with 
features that are so novel that they do 
not conform to any... pre-existing criteria. It is not just that these 
new entities have different `properties. ' Previously unimaginable 
notions of what constitutes a 'property' are required (Ziman 2003, 
p. 1626, my emphasis). 
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If we could use our knowledge of the present to project 
forwards to a future 
knowledge, it might be possible - at least in principle - to work out a past 
from the perspective of the future, or to work out all possible pasts from 
the perspective of all possible futures. This, however, is also not possible 
for, as Prigogine has shown, `the emergent is not there in advance, and by 
definition could not be brought within even the fullest presentation of the 
present' (Mead 1932, p. 10). In a probabilistic, time-irreversible universe the 
future is in principle incalculable. Here we are reminded of the insights of 
the `British emergentists' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries who stressed that the new was not simply a `regrouping' of what 
was already there. For the emergentists, the emergent (and here I am 
referring to `strong' emergence, as described in Chapter 4) was always 
incalculable from the perspective of the present. 
Under what I call emergent evolution, stress is laid on the 
incoming of the new... if nothing new emerges - if there be only 
regrouping of pre-existing events and nothing more - then there is no 
emergent evolution (Morgan 1923, pp. 1-2, emphasis added). 
This description of `strong' emergence bears a resemblance to Derrida's 
radical description of invention. An invention, Derrida argues, is 
`incalculable' before it actually appears. It has to 
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... 
declare itself to be the invention of that which did not appear to 
be possible; otherwise it only makes explicit a program of 
possibilities within the economy of the same (Derrida 1989, p. 60, 
cited in Biesta 2001b, p. 33, emphasis added). 
Since Derrida is very concerned with `that which cannot be foreseen as a 
possibility' (Biesta 2001b, p. 48) - which he calls the impossible or the 
incalculable -I take the liberty of reading Derrida as being concerned with 
`strong' emergence although to my knowledge he has not used the notion 
of emergence in his work. This move makes it possible to see the links 
between deconstruction on the one hand, and the epistemological 
consequences of a `Prigoginian' understanding of emergence (`strong' 
emergence) on the other. 
5.4.4 Knowledge of the present (experiencing the impossible) 
As we have seen from Mead, in an emergent (probabilistic, irreversible or 
time-orientated) world - which is therefore not a fully `present' world - 
knowledge or significations that are arising in the present are always already 
passing into being insufficient for the present that is passing. This is because 
knowledge or meaning, as it emerges (the act of signification), is 
immediately a structural element of the irreducible system from which it 
emerged and its incorporation into this irreducible system increases the 
complexity of the system (or information contained in the system). 
239 
Signifying practices therefore change (the meaning ofd our `reality' as we 
signify this `reality' (i. e., each new signification put us in a present which 
has a different meaning to the present that has just passed). Meaning, in this 
sense, reaches me not as something I can receive, but as a response to a 
meaning I am presented with. Meaning is renewed whenever human beings 
respond to what they are presented with. From the perspective of 
emergence `meaning making, ' or simply `meaning' - which could equally 
well be called `emergent' thinking' or `response' - is continually taking 
place. It takes place as we respond to our world. Meanings are perpetually 
made anew in the light of the meanings to hand in the present. This, 
however, is not to say that emergent meaning follows on logically from past 
meanings. As I explained in Section 5.3.2, what emerges does not emerge 
according to a set of `lower level' rules. Although what emerges is 
constrained or conditioned by what came before, each new meaning is 
necessarily a radically new meaning. It is `radically' new because it is 
`unthinkable' from the ground which precedes it. This capacity for meaning 
to emerge into that which is `unthinkable' (because it does not follow on 
logically from past meanings) implies that emergent meaning necessarily 
challenges the meanings that precede it, i. e., emergent meaning brings into 
question the meanings we thought we `had. ' It is about using what we have, 
but not as a ground to think our way into that which follows on logically 
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(deterministically) from it (and thereby to `grasp' or `understand' the way 
something is), but rather to find new `ground' which we `know' nothing 
about. If we were only taking `the next logical step' this would imply we 
would be responding always from a set of pre-given rules. From the 
perspective of complexity `meaning making' is therefore a totally different 
activity from understanding or `grasping' a meaning in its `essence. ' 
Complexity suggests such `pure' understanding - certainty of meaning - is 
never possible because a meaning is not a presentation or a representation of 
anything fixed or positive. It is not something we can receive. Rather, as a 
response, it is a movement continually emerging into a new form. 
Complexity - in other words - is calling for the legitimation of the notion 
of response in the creation of knowledge. 
From this perspective knowledge does not reduce a gap between our 
understanding of the world and the `real world. ' We can never `catch up' 
with our own knowledge because it does not bring us closer to an 
immutable understanding of a world that is there, but rather it always 
brings forth a new world. However we think about the world, there will 
always be more and different ways to think about it. Each act of knowing 
opens up new possibilities for knowing and thus opens up a new future, 
which is incalculable from the perspective of the present. This seems to 
imply that knowledge and signification should be thought of as something 
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that enables us to penetrate deeper into that which did not seem possible from 
the perspective of the present - to penetrate deeper into the impossible, to 
experience or bring forth the impossible, or that which is unimaginable from 
the present. Again Derrida comes to mind, this time with his oft quoted 
`definition' of deconstruction as `the experience of the impossible' which he 
suggests is the `least bad definition of deconstruction' (Derrida 1992a, p. 
200). 
5.4.5 Complexity and poststructuralism 
The main thrust of Prigogine's argument is that relationality does not exist 
in itself. It is not simply that all the bits and pieces of the world exist only in 
relation to each other. His argument makes clear that there is always 
something else involved in this relationality that is never fully actualised 
and by definition cannot be fully actualised. This is what Michael Dillon - 
in referring to the `ethic of poststructuralism' - would call the `radical non- 
relational. ' In his words: 
... the radically non-relational 
is the utterly intractable, that which 
resists being drawn into and subsumed by relation albeit it transits 
all relationality as a disruptive movement that continuously 
prevents the full realisation or final closure of relationality, and 
thus the misfire that continuously precipitates new life and new 
meaning. There is no relational purchase to be had on the 
intractable. It resists relation (Dillon 2000, p. 5). 
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Dillon believes that both complexity and poststructuralism understand the 
world as `radically relational' but that these two positions differ from each 
other in terms of their understanding of this `radical relationality. ' He 
believes that: `For complexity thinkers the anteriority of radical 
relationality is just that, the anteriority of radical relationality... For 
poststructuralists the anteriority of radical relationality is relationality with 
the radically non-relational' (Dillon 2000, p. 5, emphasis added). However, I 
believe Dillon is mistaken. Dillon has not taken into account Prigogine's 
radical reinterpretation of process. If Prigogine's views on process are taken 
into account, then we must concede that together with poststructuralism, 
complexity has a concern with the `radically non-relational' (ibid). Indeed, 
contra Dillon, I believe that `relationality to the radically non-relational' 
(ibid) could be considered key to Prigogine's logic. The radical non- 
relational, for Prigogine, is `chance. ' Chance is always missing from the 
`preconditions' of what emerges and it is this very missingness that (as 
Dillon puts it) is `the misfire that continuously precipitates new life and 
new meaning' (ibid). What Prigogine is saying in other words is that the 
world is not simply `present. ' We should understand it, rather, as existing in 
a state that is fundamentally incomplete. It is `incomplete' because chance 
cannot make its appearance in the domain of that which is present. It is 
nevertheless constititive of that which is present. This, I believe, is very close 
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to what Derrida is saying. Derrida attempts to show `that presence cannot 
present itself, but needs the "help" of what is not present, of absence' (Biesta 
2001b, p. 39). But if the world is not simply present then it is also not 
representable. In this regard, Dillon comments 
... 
for poststructuralist thinkers, not only is there more to life than 
meets the eye, that `more' is never something that will ultimately 
make its appearance in the domain of representation. It is the 
intractable always already at work within but resistant to 
representation. Its presence-as-absence spoils the show for 
representation since it is always already subverting 
representation's productions (Dillon 2000, p. 15). 
In view of my remarks about Prigogine, I believe this is also the case for 
complexity. Chance is `always already at work' in complex systems, 
thereby `spoiling the show' for representation. ' 
5.5 SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have explored issues of representation and presentation 
using complexity theory, Deweyan transactional realism and 
deconstruction. Drawing on structuralist arguments I showed how 
complexity challenges the idea and possibility of representation at the 
epistemological level, partly through the idea of incompressibility and 
partly by showing the problem of attempting to represent open systems 
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(reality) by closed systems (representations, models, theories). The upshot 
of this is not that we should no longer attempt to develop knowledge in 
terms of models, or theories (representations of reality) - but that we 
shouldn't think of them as `pictures' of the world. Rather we should 
understand knowledge-representations as `tools' that we use to engage with 
`the world. ' I argued however, that while this releases us from a `picture' 
theory of knowledge it does not escape the Cartesian epistemological 
framework 
I then pushed this argument one step further - into the poststructural 
domain - by also problematising the idea and possibility of `presentation' 
and `presence. ' The main step here was to see that time is not a static 
variable unaffected by systems, but rather an operator in the system itself. 
By using this line of thinking, and combining it with some insight from 
deconstruction, I suggested that complex systems can only be understood if 
we acknowledge the `presence' of something that cannot be presented, that 
can never become `present. ' Along these lines I have tried to show that 
complexity problematises conventional - i. e., Cartesian or representational 
- ways to think about knowledge in its relation to `reality, ' and offers in 
place of representational understandings an emergentist alternative. I showed 
that when we use insights from complexity to re-think knowledge outside of 
the Cartesian framework then we must think of knowing not as acquisition 
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of something already present, but as a response which calls forth something 
radically new. In this regard a complexity-inspired epistemology shows a 
strong affinity with deconstruction. In the following chapter I explore what 
this alternative epistemology implies for a practice of schooling that, for the 




CURRICULUM AND EMERGENCE 
Rethinking schooling frý om an `emergentist foundation' 
6.1 PREAMBLE 
In the previous chapter I showed how an emergentist inspired 
understanding of the sign brings into view the idea that our significations 
change our `reality' - they put us in a different present - which immediately 
opens up a new space of signification which includes more than was present 
before, i. e. it includes a `supplement. ' If this is the case, we can use 
signification to open up new ways of being, but we cannot assume 
significations represent that which is truly `there. ' As we signify we emerge 
into new worlds which engage us in further acts of signification and so on 
ad infinitum. This of course, has implications for knowledge. The 
epistemology that arises from such an understanding of the sign moves 
away from representational metaphors for knowledge (where meaning pre- 
exists signification) and towards emergentist metaphors for knowledge 
(where `the world, ' meaning and signification emerge together). The 
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knowledge that emerges from this practice of signification is always 
radically inventionalistic, such that it does not passively reflect what is 
`present' (what `came before') but always includes more, bringing prior 
knowledge into question, challenging it. This different conception of 
knowledge has deep implications for schooling. 
6.1.1 The `emergentist' critique of representational schooling 
If we wish to rethink the epistemology of schooling along emergentist lines 
then the knowledge taught in schools should not be thought of as 
representing a world that is unproblematically present. With complexity, 
knowledge cannot be a picture of a past, present or future world for neither 
the past, present or future is `present' to be depicted in this way. This opens 
questions about why we have schools and what we are doing in these 
institutions. 
With a representational view of knowledge schooling becomes a practice 
that is concerned with closing a gap in knowledge between the student's 
`inadequate' understanding of the world and the world as it `really' is. This 
can only result in the development of pedagogies of transmission. As I 
argued in Chapter 2, modern schooling practices are, for the most part, 
built around the idea of teaching students about the world or about a 
particular way of life which they do not know about. This is the case 
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regardless of whether students are (i) expected to `swallow' the required 
meanings in tact, or (ii) encouraged to `(re)construct' their own version of 
these meanings, or (iii) understood to be able to acquire these meanings 
only through their participation in appropriate `real world' settings. 
So in teaching we either tell students about this world or we help them find 
out about it for themselves. Whatever the method we choose for doing this 
(e. g., traditional, progressive, or `participatory) teachers ultimately want 
their students to understand the world `correctly, ' as if this world or way of 
life is something that is present in and of itself. 
For such pedagogies to make sense it is necessary to assume that any 
presentation of meaning - any signification (and this could be the 
meaningful order of the world itself, or representations of this order) - is a 
passive carrier of the meaning it discloses. We must believe that such 
presentations simply transmit meaning - pass it on - without themselves 
corrupting or complicating it. If signifiers carry meaning, then meaning 
must be there before signification can take place, which in turn suggests that 
the world itself is the absolute origin of all meaning. This collection of 
assumptions adds up to what Derrida refers to as the `metaphysics of 
presence. ' We can say therefore that the metaphysics of presence, the 
assumption of an absolute origin of meaning in a world present to itself, is 
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behind all forms of modern schooling. So if the idea of presence is brought 
into question - and I believe this is what Prigogine 
does, together with 
Derrida and quantum mechanics, as I suggested in the previous chapter - 
then this means we have to think again about what we are doing in schools. 
If the world is not present to itself, then it cannot be the origin of all 
meaning, and if this is the case then meaning cannot be transferred from the 
world to the child. Whatever is happening in schools, it is not the transfer 
of meaning from the world into the child. What, then, is education? 
This final chapter, then, is concerned with how we can theorise education, 
schooling and the curriculum if we can no longer rely on the idea of 
meaning being transferred from the world into the child. It is concerned 
with what happens when we abandon a model of schooling which charges 
schools with passing on meanings that already exist and in which the 
meanings being passed are assumed to be unaffected by the passing. Does it 
make sense to look at education in these terms? Does it even make sense to 
look at education if knowledge and meaning do not reflect something that 
is present? Does the concept of education itself make sense? 
6.1.2 The logic of the argument 
In rethinking education and schooling from a position not underpinned by 
a representational logic or semiology (and hence a representational 
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epistemology of one sort or another) I first examine the kind of pedagogy 
that would be required if we take seriously the idea that any attempt to 
transfer meaning from the world into the student is misguided. As such, 
education and schooling would be about inventing meaning rather than 
acquiring it. In this case we are faced with a question about what meanings 
can be `made' or `invented' in schools and whether the `invention' of 
meaning is educational. More importantly, however, we are faced with the 
question of whether it is possible to maintain an emergentist conception of 
meaning in an `educational' context, i. e., within the structures of schooling. 
Does it `make sense' to do so? 
In this regard I provide three examples of `pedagogies of invention' each of 
which attempts to facilitate (or has been accused of facilitating) the 
`invention' of meaning in the classroom. In doing this I show that two of 
these `pedagogies of invention' in no way challenge the representational 
logic of schooling while the third, although overtly challenging 
representational logic, relies on it at a deeper level in that it still attempts to 
pass on a meaning that already exists. Gregory Ulmer refers to this covert 
representational effect as `the pedagogical effect of discipleship' (Ulmer 
1985, p. 173). 
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From this I conclude that it is not possible to challenge the representational 
logic of schooling either at the epistemological level, or at the level of the 
sign. If it is to be challenged, something else is also required. I then show that 
if we bear in mind that it is not only meaning (knowledge) that emerges 
from a pedagogical intervention but also the subjectivity of the one being 
educated then we have to concede that education always shapes the 
subjectivity of the one being educated. It is in this regard that education is 
vulnerable to the obdurate representational problem of `discipleship' 
(reproduction of the master's style)(Ulmer 1985, pp. 162-173). 
Next, I argue that `the pedagogical effect of discipleship' (Ulmer 1985, p. 
173) is produced only in curricula that are designed with an idea already in 
mind of what a human subject is. To avoid this pedagogical effect, and 
facilitate a form of education not premised on representational logic, it is 
therefore necessary to develop a curriculum around an understanding of 
human subjectivity that leaves open the question of what it means to be a 
human subject. Here, again, the logic of emergence is useful for it is only 
with this logic that it becomes possible to leave open the question of what it 
means to be a human subject. 
The argument I try to make is that it is only when emergentist logic is 
applied in a double sense, to knowledge/signification and to human 
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subjectivity that the representational logic of modern Western schooling 
can be unsettled. In place of a representational foundation for schooling, I 
therefore offer an emergentist foundation, which is not a foundation in the 
usual sense of the word (because this `foundation' itself emerges and in so 
doing it brings itself into question, and hence erases itself). Nevertheless it is 
a place from which to start theorising education along the lines of a non- 
representational logic, even if this is a temporary starting place. Finally, I 
describe some of the surprising consequences of theorising education from 
this alternative emergentist `foundation. ' 
6.2 THE EMERGENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. PEDAGOGIES OF INVENTION 
The semiotic shift suggested by a complexity inspired epistemology - in 
which re/presentations are not passive reflectors of meaning but add to it - 
changes the way we understand the process of `knowledge building. ' We no 
longer build in the sense of acquire knowledge through a process of 
uncovering a meaning that is already there. Instead we build in the sense of 
invent knowledge by adding to or complicating pre-existing knowledge. 
With the former, a superfluous excess is removed in order that we may 
`build' our knowledge (i. e., understand more clearly and accurately). With 
the latter, what is `superfluous' is necessary for it is this very supplement that 
enables knowledge to `grow. ' With the latter there is a concern for the 
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opening up, rather than the narrowing 
down or closure of knowledge. If 
`knowledge building' is understood in this way this raises the question of 
what it might mean to allow for the opening up or `invention' of 
knowledge in modern schooling practices. 
6.2.1 Inventing meaning in `romantic' progressive education 
The idea of `inventing meaning' is regarded with a good measure of _ 
suspicion by many educators for it is often (mistakenly) linked to the much 
criticised `romantic' or 'anti-authoritarian' version of progressive education 
which is actually a form of `discovery learning'40 in which teachers are 
advised to recognise the `teachable moment' and provided they facilitate 
`learning experiences, ' it does not matter precisely what is learned (Kalantzis 
and Cope 1993). With this form of progressivism the learning process is 
considered all-important and the role of the teacher is downplayed to the 
extent that children are left in the position of `reinventing the wheel. ' 
Furthermore, since assessment is deemed immaterial and since all meanings 
are considered to be equally acceptable `romantic' versions of progressivism 
are open to accusations of `anything goes' inventionalism. 41 It has been 
argued again and again by conservatives and radicals alike, that that this 
40 Since the meanings that are constructed or `discovered' are assumed to reflect a pre-given world, 
this pedagogy is still heavily reliant on a Cartesian or representational epistemological scheme. 
41 Encouraging young people to `make things up' rather than deal with the `reality of the world. 
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pedagogy has no real `educational' value (see for example Ravtich 2000). 
Dewey himself claimed the approach was not only uneducational but 
`really stupid' (Dewey 1984/1926, p. 59) while Arendt (1954a, p. 179) 
accused it of educational `bankruptcy. ' I mention this approach simply to 
get it out of the way. 
6.2.2 Inventing knowledge for the 'knowledge society' 
In another endeavour, and one which has attracted a considerable amount 
of attention in North America, Carl Bereiter (1997,2002a, 2002b) draws on 
Popper's conception of `World 3, ' the world of immaterial knowledge 
objects, 42 -a world wholly created by the human intellect, which Popper 
also calls `objective knowledge' (Popper 1972) - to address the issue of the 
`invention' of knowledge in the school. Bereiter points out that although 
`World 3' knowledge is a human construction in that it has been produced 
by minds, it can also be understood as an entity in its own right (i. e., outside 
of minds) because it can be understood as something that has been created 
to some purpose and which can be engaged with, criticised, expanded, or 
used to achieve a different end altogether. One advantage of objectifying 
knowledge in this way - treating it as an artifact - so he suggests, is that it 
can be understood as the `product' of a particular form of labour. Bearing in 
42 Popper's `World 1' is the physical world and `World 2' is the experiential or subjective world. 
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mind this understanding of 
knowledge, Bereiter then suggests a curriculum 
which socialises young people 
into being `producers of knowledge' for the 
`knowledge society. ' This entails designing classrooms as communities of 
practice whose work is with `World 3' 
knowledge (Bereiter 1997). 
Bereiter argues that even work conventionally categorised as `unskilled' 
involves a great deal of knowledge, but `knowledge work' is different in 
that it not only uses knowledge but also produces it, i. e., theoretical 
knowledge (scientific theories in particular) is the product of this type of 
work. This kind of work, Bereiter claims, requires a special set of skills. He 
believes it is 
reasonable to assume that students who have had years of 
experience in explicitly working with knowledge will have an 
advantage over ones whose experience has been limited to the 
traditional kinds of scholastic learning and doing in which 
knowledge, as such [i. e., `World 3' knowledge], is seldom the 
object of attention (Bereiter 1997, p. 298). 
One problem with this understanding of knowledge building is that it 
assumes that for `new' knowledge to be produced, all that is required is to 
teach people how to `work' with abstract knowledge. To `work' with 
abstract knowledge implies learning a set of rules. Bereiter (1997,2002a) 
assumes that it is only once these rules are learned (different rules for each 
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different body of knowledge) that `new knowledge' can be produced. In 
effect, this means that the only `new knowledge' that can be (legitimately) 
`invented' is knowledge that `builds' on prior knowledge and does so 
according to a set of rules -a logic - which has already been `authorised. ' 
Any `new' knowledge which does not `follow' from what came before is 
illigitimate knowledge. However, for this rather linear process of 
knowledge building to occur it is necessary for prior knowledge - those 
`abstract' meanings that already exist - to exist in a stable form. Such abstract 
knowledge must be assumed to passively carry its meaning. In other words, 
it is only with a representational understanding of abstract knowledge that 
educators can entertain the idea that abstract knowledge can be used as 
building blocks in the production of new (abstract) knowledge. This idea, 
however, is precisely what an emergentist epistemology denies. With an 
emergentist epistemology knowledge cannot be `built' in this way because 
the meaning `in' any particular knowledge is always already complicated in 
its very presentation (as `abstract' knowledge). 
Another problem with Bereiter's pedagogy is that it does not open meaning 
enough. As I argued in the previous chapter, any meanings that result from 
the application of a set of rules to meanings that already exist are simply 
rearrangements of what was already there. While they may be `new' in a 
mechanistic sense, they cannot be considered new in an emergent sense, i. e., 
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in the sense of something that has never been in the world before 
(something unimaginable before it appears). They are not radically new. 
Bereiter's pedagogy therefore constrains and prescribes the kind of `new' 
knowledge that can be invented. In fact it would seem that Bereiter is only 
interested in the production of scientific knowledge about a world that he 
assumes is already `there' (waiting to be `discovered'). In following Popper, 
he must necessarily adopt a foundational stance, which forces him to 
understand knowledge as beginning somewhere (i. e., in the `real' world). As 
argued in Chapter 5, when knowledge is understood to have a point of 
origin, its `invention' can only be understood in terms of a linear (or 
mechanistic) process of development from this point of origin which leaves 
no room for the unexpected and radically novel. It leaves no room for 
emergence. 
Although Bereiter's pedagogy makes significant moves away from 
`traditional' representational schooling practices it is still heavily reliant on a 
representational understanding of knowledge. What is needed, therefore, is 
a pedagogy which allows for a form of meaning making in which the new 
or `invented' meanings are in excess of the meanings that preceded them. In 
other words preceding meanings should not just `add up' to form a new 
meaning. Any new meaning that emerges should always be in excess of 
what came before (and hence unexplainable in terms of what came before). 
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An emergentist pedagogy would allow for the radically new to appear. It 
would allow for the emergence of what is `incalculable' or `unthinkable' 
from the ground (i. e., the meanings) that precede it. Gregory Ulmer's 
`applied grammatology' approaches this kind of openness in terms of 
meaning making. 
6.2.3 Ulmers `applied grammatology' 
Ulmer (1985) articulates what he calls an `applied grammatology' (his 
preferred term for what he also calls a `pedagogy of invention') which he 
proposes might take the place of a practice of teaching underpinned by 
representational epistemology. This pedagogy (applied grammatology) relies 
on a conception of meaning making articulated by Derrida's `theoretical' 
grammatology (Derrida 1976) - more familiarly known as `deconstruction' 
- which I introduced in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.2) and which is remarkably 
close to the emergentist conception of meaning making I outlined in the 
previous chapter. Like an emergentist conception of meaning making, 
`theoretical' grammatology articulates the idea that every signification (that 
which presents or represents a concept) `always exceeds its concept' (Ulmer 
1985, p. 162), i. e., it always exceeds what it signifies. `Applied 
grammatology' is therefore a useful way of understanding the pedagogical 
manifestation of an emergentist conception of meaning making. 
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Ulmer explains that a pedagogical presentation in a grammatological 
classroom would be one which is organised around the principle of the 
`hieroglyph' (ibid., p. 265) this being an ideogrammatic/pictorial form of 
writing which provokes a response from the receiver 
(and this response is not 
only rational but also physiological and subconscious, e. g., knife plus heart 
= sorrow)(see Moeller 2003, 
for an account of the relationship between 
Chinese semiotics and Derrida's semiotics). This idea draws on the notion, 
well developed in psychoanalysis, that the consciousness is affected before 
any meaning is formed, before anything is signified. It is only through an 
addition to itself (the response of the receiver) that the hieroglyph becomes 
`receivable. ' Without such response it is `unreceivable' (not understandable 
in itself j. Since every presentation of a hieroglyph provokes a subjective 
response (a text) which adds itself to the presented (but unreceivable) text, 
every such presentation must be understood as bringing forth a wider 
reading of itself. It combines subjective and presented `elements' in 
something different (a `double text'). A grammatological pedagogy - so 
Ulmer claims - is therefore fundamentally inventionalistic or creative. It 
takes into account an emergentist mode of meaning making, which is _ 
neither `inner speech' (subjective text) nor `objective writing' (presented 
text) but an elaboration of both which always brings something new into the 
world (Ulmer 1985, p. 157-188). It would seem, therefore, that in the 
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grammatological classroom something entirely other than the reproduction 
of an idea in the mind of the student is taking place. What is taking place, 
Ulmer says, is `inventio' (Ulmer 1985, p. xii). Ulmer considers the 
presentational strategies adopted by (i) the French psychoanalyst, Jacques 
Lacan (1901-1981), (ii) the German 'artist-pedagogue, "' Joseph Beuys (1921- 
1986) and (iii) the Russian film director, Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948) to be 
exemplary in making use of the idea of the hieroglyph to produce a `double 
text' (or `inventio') and so a brief mention of these presentational strategies 
follows to illustrate how a grammatological pedagogy might actually be 
performed. 
Jacques Lacan used the principles of psychoanalysis - i. e., the idea that the 
consciousness is affected before any meaning is formed (before anything is 
signified) - in his presentation style to demonstrate to his students the 
nature of psychoanalytic knowing itself. To convey this experience to his 
students, he would exploit both verbal (e. g., homophones) and nonverbal 
(e. g., images) representational strategies to say `something else, ' to trigger 
`unconscious thought' thereby evoking certain feelings in his students, 
induce in them certain `effects. ' (Ulmer 1985, p. 192-208). In this manner 
the class was placed in the position of the therapist or analyst, and had to 
43 Ulmer calls Beuys an `artist-pedagogue' because his explanations of his art are an integral part of 
the artworks themselves. 
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`psychoanalyse' Lacan's presentation, build connections and come up with 
their own text. His students were thus provoked into generating their own 
text around or over Lacan's text, provoked into colluding with Lacan's 
perfomance to create a double text. The invitation to generate a 
double text 
is what serves to open up thought. It is this that sets the scene for the taking 
place of `inventio. ' 
Joseph Beuys also adopted a style which involved his audience being moved 
subconsciously in order to stimulate them to produce something out of 
themselves in response to his performance art. `In Beuys's case, the objects 
[of his art] produce the effect of reference, but without referring to 
anything. Or rather, the reference is now supplied by the recipient, who in 
response to the stimulus produces it out of himself (Ulmer 1985, p. 251). 
What Ulmer tries to put across is that Beuys's works do not transfer a 
message. They are designed, rather, to move the spectator - by evoking 
associated memories - into producing a message. The message is produced as 
these memories are explored, `not to recover the past but ... in order to 
think with them into the future' (ibid., p. 240, emphasis added). The evocative 
nature of his presentations generates rather than transmits meaning. The 
meaning `comes through' already contaminated by other layers of 
meanings. The effect is the genesis of something new, an inventio. 
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Sergei Eisenstein worked out a style of editing which broke with notions 
of film as `passive reproduction' of the `stagnant order of things' (Ulmer 
1985, p. 276). He believed that film editing was more than merely a method 
used to link scenes together. Rather, careful editing could actually be used 
to stir the emotions of the audience and bring about the formation of new 
concepts. In this regard he developed a theory of editing that he called 
`montage' (Eisenstein 1943,1949) in which images independent from the 
action would be inserted between footage of the action in a way that would 
create the maximum psychological impact. The juxtaposition of unrelated 
images unsettled traditional feelings and understandings about the content 
of the images he was showing. " He used cinema not to reproduce a `reality' 
which is `there' but rather to provoke an alternative reading from the 
viewer of the images (Ulmer 1985, p. 276). With Eisenstein there is no 
question of the viewer passively acknowledging the `truth' of his images for 
his images are not `true'. Eisenstein leaves his viewers with no choice but to 
respond to the images they are presented with. In demanding a response 
from the viewer his images are instrumental in producing an `inventio'. His 
style is `a disturbance that excites (incites, not insights), generating 
"information"' (Ulmer 1985, p. 314). 
as For example in Strike which recounts the repression of a strike by the soldiers of the tsar, 
Eisenstein juxtaposed shots of workers being mown down by machine guns with shots of cattle 
being butchered in a slaughterhouse. 
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6.2.4 The pedagogical effect of `discipleship' 
Ulmer articulates a pedagogy which opens a space for the elaboration of 
knowledge, and does so in terms of an emergentist conception of meaning 
making. This, however, does not mean that Ulmer's pedagogy no longer 
transmits a self-contained message. Ulmer has designed a pedagogy to draw 
out `creative' responses believing he knows what it means to be `creative. ' 
In this sense his own understanding of what it means to be creative re- 
appears in his students. Ulmer labels this representational effect (which he 
does not notice in his own pedagogy) `the undesirable pedagogic effect of 
discipleship' and describes it as a `reproduction of the master's style' (Ulmer 
1985, p. 173). This problem in his work is connected to his understanding 
of the human subject. 
Ulmer's subject is a discrete and isolated being that `owns' the `memories' 
(rational, mythic, unconscious, habitual, cultural, bodily and so on) which 
it uses to create an inventio. In this sense it could be called an individualistic 
subject. It is only this assumption about the human subject that enables 
Ulmer to work out the principles of a pedagogy in which the subject ends 
up producing something new, an inventio. This assumption about the 
subject is, in other words, the raw material or foundation from which he 
works out his scheme. He develops his pedagogy from a particular starting 
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point, focussing on how, given this particular starting point, the human 
subject can be stimulated or `incited' (ibid., p. 314) to produce an inventio. 
This, however, immediately puts him in the position of having designed a 
pedagogy which will function to replicate a meaning (in this case `creativity' 
or 'inventio) that already exists. He has designed a pedagogy specifically to 
stimulate creativity (inventio) in those who are being educated. This is 
evident in the following remark: 
[a pedagogy of invention is] intended not only to show people the 
principles of creativity and how to put them into practice but also 
... to stimulate the 
desire to create (not necessarily in `art' but in 
the lived, sociopolitical world) (Ulmer 1985, p. 264). 
Ulmer believes that he knows what the principles of creativity are and he 
wants to replicate this knowledge through education. The `master' has, in 
other words, designed a pedagogy which will `reproduce the master's style. ' 
Although the objective of Ulmer's pedagogy is creativity itself (which 
masks its representational logic to some extent) this pedagogy can still be 
understood to be replicating a particular understanding of creativity. It is 
transmitting an idea. As such, and despite his emergentist (or 
`grammatological') understanding of signification and meaning, Ulmer's 
pedagogy is still governed by an underlying representational logic. It aims to 
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replicate (or mirror) in the mind of the student, a meaning that exists 
`outside. ' 
Ulmer's work makes clear that simply designing a pedagogy that allows for 
the `elaboration of knowledge' or the `invention of meaning' in an 
emergentist sense does not release pedagogy 
from representational logic. 
Furthermore, his work also provides a clue as to where the `discipleship' 
problem originates. It lies in having a preconceived idea of what constitutes 
the human subject. It is only in having a pre-conception of what the subject 
is that Ulmer is able to design a pedagogy that moves this subject towards a 
particular end (in this case towards being creative). In starting at a given 
point, and moving to another point, Ulmer prescribes a `possible course of 
action' (Ulmer 1985, p. x) which is meant to channel the human subject in a 
pre-determined direction and hence close down other possibilities for the 
subject's emergence. Having a starting point suggests we are heading 
somewhere, and so implies a goal. It is this (the presence of a `starting point') 
that produces `the pedagogical effect of discipleship' with its underlying 
representational logic. 
In producing a pedagogy that replicates his understanding of creativity, 
Ulmer's pedagogy shapes the subject in a certain way. In this regard Ulmer 
is no less representational in his pedagogical intent than Bereiter, who wants 
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to teach young people how to be producers of (scientific) knowledge for the 
knowledge society. While Bereiter is arguing for a pedagogy that produces 
people who can work with `abstract knowledge, ' Ulmer is arguing for a 
pedagogy that produces people who are creative (in Ulmer's sense of the 
word). The problem of course, is that in suggesting a `possible course of 
action' both Ulmer and Bereiter are intentionally shutting down other 
possibilities for the emergence of human subjectivity. In trying to control 
the product of the pedagogical intervention (i. e., in having a goal) they 
succeed in replicating their own understandings of the world. In this regard 
one could argue that their pedagogies are designed specifically to transmit a 
pre-existing message or ideal. It is in this sense that they rely on a 
representational logic. 
6.2.5 Double emergence 
From the discussion so far we can see that an emergentist conception of 
meaning is not sufficient to release education from the logic of 
representation. Because the emergence of meaning cannot be separated from 
the emergence of human subjectivity, we see that in trying to produce a 
certain kind of subject, educators are still trying to reproduce a meaning that 
already exists. At this point we could give up and say that it is not possible to 
free education from the logic of representation because being an educator is 
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precisely about directing the subjectivity of others. 
To give up the attempt 
to direct the subjectivity of others is to give up education. If this would be 
the case the bringing into question of representational logic would spell the 
death of education. Complexity offers a different way out, however. 
Since what ties education to the logic of representation is the idea that the 
goal of education should be to form a certain kind of human subject, what 
seems to be called for is a conception of human subjectivity which leaves 
open the question of what it means to be a human subject. This is where the 
notion of emergence is once again helpful. In the same way as an 
emergentist conception of meaning leaves open the question of the meaning 
of a meaning (including the notion of emergence itself, as I explained in 
Chapter 5), an emergentist conception of subjectivity leaves open the 
question of what it means to be a human subject. While an emergentist 
conception of meaning, on its own, opens different possibilities for 
pedagogy it is unable to challenge the basic educational logic - born of a 
dualistic understanding of the sign - which wants to reunite the subject 
with a pre-existing presence that it is separated from. However, when an 
emergentist conception of subjectivity is also taken into account, pedagogy 
can no longer presume to reunite the subject with what it is separated from. 
To do so would imply a pre-knowledge of the constitution of the human 
subject. It is only when we can no longer assume what constitutes a human 
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subject that we can educate without a pre-determined end, i. e., without trying 
to replicate some `presence. ' 
The argument I am trying to make is that to theorise education away from 
representational logic, it is necessary to use the concept of emergence on two 
levels. We need emergence on the level of meaning itself (i. e., at the level of 
the sign), but because meaning is attached to human subjectivity we also (at 
the same time) need it at the level of human subjectivity. In other words, we 
need the concept of emergence in a double sense. In the next section I 
therefore explore the notion of emergence as it applies to human 
subjectivity. For this I rely heavily on an argument developed by Gert 
Biesta (1998,1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2004a) who is concerned with how not to 
close down possibilities for understanding the human subject in an 
educational context. To do this Biesta draws mainly on Nancy, Arendt and 
Levinas. In the discussion that follows I have mostly returned to Biesta's 
original sources. 
6.3 THE EMERGENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY. PEDAGOGY WITHOUT HUMANISM 
An `emergentist' perspective on subjectivity would leave open the question 
of what it means to be a human subject. It would support the notion that 
human subjectivity can emerge into that which is `unimaginable' or 
`incalculable' from the perspective of the present. It would be concerned, in 
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other words, with not closing down possibilities for human subjectivity, not 
representing the human subject as being either like this or like that. 
Jean-Luc Nancy (1991) has suggested that much of the theorising about 
human subjectivity is a form of theorising about the human subject that is 
premised on the question of what it is. This is a form of theorising which is 
forever closing down possibilities for human subjectivity, rather than 
opening up possibilities or, at least, keeping possibilities open. It is a form of 
theorising which says this is what a human subject is, not that, which closes 
down other possibilities. This, clearly, is a representational understanding of 
subjectivity. The question then, is how to move from a `representational' 
understanding of subjectivity to an `emergentist' conception of subjectivity. 
Nancy explains that one way of not objectifying the human subject is to 
understand it in terms of who it is rather that what it is (Nancy 1991). 
6.3.1 Moving from `what' to `who' 
Nancy (1991) makes the point that when we understand the human subject 
in terms of what it is we are understanding it as a kind of something, a case 
of something more general. He suggests furthermore that the question 
about human subjectivity - about what makes `me' me - is a question about 
uniqueness. It would seem, therefore, that if we are to `understand' human 
subjectivity, we need to focus on human beings in their uniqueness. More 
270 
precisely, we need to focus on who a subject is (in its uniqueness) rather 
than what a subject is (which is only ever what it is a case off. There is, 
however, a substantial difficulty in trying to understand the human subject 
as a unique `who. ' The problem, as Nancy (1991) points out, is that we can 
always say that someone has become who they are (a particular kind of 
being) because of x, y and z, because of something that lies behind them 
which has caused them to become who they are. The question of `who' 
someone is therefore immediately reverts to a question of what it is that 
causes the `who' to become `what' it is. Nancy suggests that one way out of 
this dilemma is to understand who a subject is in terms of where it `comes 
into presence' (Nancy 1991, p. 7). According to Nancy this `coming into 
presence' is always a unique event, something that `takes place' (ibid. ), and 
so cannot be understood as a linear sequence of events and so does not 
reduce the subject to a case of something more general. For Nancy the one 
who comes into presence is always `one and unique in its coming' (ibid., 
emphasis added). The `one' who comes into presence, in other words, only 
has a `shape' in terms of the space where it comes into presence. It only has a 
`shape' in terms of what it is not, i. e., in terms of the space itself. Because no 
two spaces can be the same, the one who `comes' must also be completely 
unique (in the same sense as two spaces are unique). 
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The `who' that Nancy is articulating is an emergentist who in that it is a 
`who' who `comes into presence' in a space which cannot be reduced to 
either a spatial or a temporal location. The `who' cannot be described in 
terms of what it is because every attempt to trace what it is (i. e., what lies 
behind the who) immediately explodes it into a myriad of relations and 
relationships which cannot be contained in the `who. ' The point I wish to 
make is that if we take seriously the `who' of the subject (such that we do 
not relapse into the `what' of the `who') we are faced with radical 
contingency, with the idea that we can never know who emerges because 
the `who' that emerges is partially constituted by an `otherness' which is not 
the who that emerges. In other words, part of what constitutes the `who' 
that emerges is missing and not just `missing' in the sense that we can't get it 
all into the frame at the same time but radically missing in a Prigoginian or 
Derridian sense (as explained in Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3). The `who' that 
emerges, is never altogether there, and so can never be described, can never 
become a `what. ' Such ideas, of course, are not just compatable with 
complexity theory in general, which describes complex systems as relational 
systems (see Chapter 4, Section 4.7). They also come very close to the 
notion of `strong' emergence which, as I explained in Chapter 5 (Section 
5.4.5), draws on the peculiar logic of radical relationality or deconstruction. 
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6.3.2 Arendt andLevinas on human subjectivity 
Two theorists whose understanding of human subjectivity come 
particularly close to the idea of `strong' emergence are Hannah Arendt and 
Emmanual Levinas, both of whom are concerned with who a subject is, 
rather than with what a subject is. They are concerned with the human 
subject in its uniqueness. While I do not want to go into details a brief 
description of their positions is helpful for understanding what an 
emergentist conception of subjectivity entails. 
Arendt's strategy for understanding the `who' of the subject is to frame it in 
terms of human action which she describes as `beginning something new' 
(Arendt 1958, p. 157). To act, for Arendt, is to make a beginning. This she 
equates to the condition of natality (being born). For Arendt each one of us 
is a `beginning and a beginner' (Arendt 1954b, p. 170). When we begin 
something - when we act - we `show ourselves' in the human world (as we 
do when we are born). Furthermore, we cannot refrain from acting, from 
making beginnings (any more than we can refrain from being born). 
However, because we live with others - i. e., in a `public' or `political' space 
- our beginnings are always frustrated by the beginnings of others whose 
beginnings are likewise frustrated by our own beginnings. We are, in other 
words, never in a position in which `one man remains master of his doings 
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from beginning to end' (Arendt, in Biesta 2001a, p. 391). This frustration of 
the `purity' of our beginnings is, nevertheless, the condition of possibility for 
us to come into the world as distinctly unique beings. This is because the 
contamination of each one of our beginnings by the beginnings of others 
has the effect of making each and every beginning completely unique. Since 
every time we make a beginning we show ourselves and since every 
beginning we make is completely unique (because contaminated by the 
beginnings of others) Arendt can claim that when we make a beginning - 
when we act - we show ourselves in our unique distinctness. 
Arendt insists, however, that the disclosure of our unique identity (through 
action) is not a disclosure of a pre-existing identity. Because our actions are 
always contaminated by the actions of others we are never the sole author 
or producer of our beginnings and therefore also not the sole author of the 
`who' that we reveal through these beginnings. As Arendt comments: 
`Nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or 
word' (Arendt, in Biesta 2001a, p. 392). The `who' that we reveal is always 
radically contingent on other `who's' with whom we live. This means we 
are who we are only by virtue of others who frustrate our actions. If we try 
to preserve the purity of our actions (by not being with others, or by 
forcing others to do what we want them to do, thereby preventing them 
from making their own beginnings) we deprive ourselves of the 
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opportunity to come into presence in our unique distinctness. In this regard, 
`action' - i. e., making a beginning with others who frustrate our beginnings 
- is the condition of possibility for becoming a unique `who. ' For Arendt, 
who we are is not something that exists before the other, nor is it something 
that appears because of the other. Rather it appears only in relation to the 
other (neither before nor after). This understanding of subjectivity suggests 
that being with others - with those who are different from ourselves and 
whose beginnings frustrate our own beginnings - is the only condition in 
which subjectivity can take place, the only condition in which we can show 
ourselves in our uniqueness. As Biesta comments: 
As soon as we erase the otherness of others... we deprive both 
ourselves and others of the possibility for action and hence for 
subjectivity (Biesta 2004c, p. 16). 
Levinas's account of human subjectivity (Levinas 1981,1989) is vastly 
different from Arendt's but on the level I wish to discuss it, it has an 
important similarity with Arendt's conception. While Arendt uses the 
concept of human action (which she understands as making-a-beginning- 
with-others) to develop her radically contingent conception of human 
subjectivity, Levinas frames it in terms of response and responsibility. How 
we respond to others establishes our commitment to them, we have a 
responsibility to respond - to attend to the other - and therefore 
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responsibility precedes understanding. 
Understanding is possible only 
because before I even try to understand you I assume responsibility toward 
you. This responsibility is therefore `a responsibility that 
is justified by no 
prior commitment' (Levinas 1989, p. 92, in Biesta 1999a, p. 213). 
For Levinas, human subjectivity takes place when the subject is faced with 
another and so forced to respond. Responding to the other is therefore not a 
choice, not something one can avoid. The face of the other commands a 
response. It is this very inescapability from the other, the fact that we cannot 
refuse the other, we cannot not respond, that constitutes us in our 
subjectivity. In responding to the other one is forced to take a position. This 
positioning is, however, always `already identified from the outside, ' 
(Levinas 1989, p. 96, in Biesta 1999a, p. 214) identified by the other. The self 
that is `called up' by the encounter with the other is therefore a self that can 
only show itself, in relation to an assignation that it cannot choose, an 
assignation presented to it by the other. In this sense subjectivity, so Levinas 
argues, is a subjection to the other, a being-taken-hostage by the other 
(Levinas 1989, in Biesta 1999a, p. 213). For Levinas then, as for Arendt, the 
self is not something that exists before the other. It only appears in relation 
to the other or, as Levinas might say, in the moment of obligation to the 
other. Since Levinas's self is not a self except in relation to the other with 
whom it is faced we can never say what it is. As such, even the word `se1P' 
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or `subject' becomes problematic, for it suggests a containment that is not 
there. As Caputo remarks, 
... the word `self' will not 
do, because... [t]he `self is something 
which we define in terms of its self-identity. Yet what seems to 
characterise `us' above all is non-identity... The self is precisely not 
that which always abides in itself... The `self' is much more a place 
of disruption, irruption, solicitation (Caputo 1987, p. 289). 
Understandings such as those of Arendt and Levinas in which `the subject is 
not one but split, not sovereign but dependent, not an absolute origin but a 
function ceaselessly modified' (Foucault, interview material, quoted in 
Drefus 2004) make it very difficult indeed to understand the human subject 
in terms of what or even of who it is. As Caputo remarks: `We do not know 
who we are, not if we are honest' (Caputo 1987, p. 288). 
6.3.3 Biesta's pedagogy without humanism' 
Biesta has argued that while conceptions of subjectivity such as those of 
Arendt and Levinas - which are radically relational conceptions of 
subjectivity - suggest we cannot know what or who we are dealing with 
when we are dealing with the human subject, they do suggest something 
about the nature of the space in which the human subject emerges. Because 
we can theorise about the space in which the subject 'comes into presence' 
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(Biests 2005, in press) Biesta argues that this space - which, I would argue is 
an `emergent space' - can therefore be used as a `foundation' 
for educational 
theorising (Biesta 1999a). This `foundation' however, is not a foundation in 
the usual sense of the word. Since the space in which the subject emerges is 
a space of radical contingency (Biesta 1999b, 2001a), it is a space in which the 
notion of foundations has no place. 
To my knowledge there is hardly any work which uses an emergentist 
perspective on subjectivity in order to theorise education. Although Biesta 
does not use the term `emergence' and does not specifically situate his work 
in the field of curriculum studies, much of his work - and particularly his 
later work - can nevertheless be understood in terms of a retheorisation of 
`curriculum' as a `space of emergence. ' This should be evident from the 
following remark: 
Education, in other words, takes place in the gap between the 
teacher and the learner. [... ] If this is the location of education, if 
this is where education literally `takes place, ' then a theory of 
education should be a theory about the interaction between the 
teacher and student. A theory of education is, in other words, a 
theory about the educational relationship, though not about the 
`constituents' of this relationship (i. e., the teacher and the learner) 
but about the `relationality' of the relationship. I do not think that 
we already have many of such theories, and perhaps we do not 
have any at all (Biesta 2004d, p. 12). 
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In view of what I believe to be a close association between Biesta's 
`pedagogy without humanism' and the concept of emergence, in what 
follows I explore/reconstruct those of his ideas that I believe relate to the 
notion of the curriculum as a `space of emergence' and describe some of the 
surprising forms education takes when we begin to theorise it from this 
different `foundation. ' 
The first thing to notice about Biesta's `space of emergence' is that it is not a 
space of common ground. Because human subjectivity emerges only when 
one acts with others who are different (Arendt 1958, Biesta 1999a, 1999b) 
this means education only takes place where `otherness' - being with others 
who are different from us - creates such a space. Biesta's educational vision 
therefore involves the condition of being in contact with those `with whom 
we have nothing in common' (Siesta 2004b). In this sense it is the plurality 
of the `space of emergence' that educates, not the teacher (Biesta 2004d). 
However, if plurality is the condition of possibility of education, then this 
challenges the conventional logic of schooling whereby everything possible 
is done to reduce the differences between those being educated (e. g., in terms 
of age, gender, ability, interests, etc. ) in order to better 'facilitate' the desired 
educational outcome. The idea of a 'space of emergence' suggests that such 
regimentation prevents education from taking place. For Biesta, theorising 
education from an emergentist logic means the classroom must be 
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transformed into a space of difference, of otherness, a `public' or `worldly 
space' (Biesta unpublished manuscript). In his words: we need `to make sure 
there are at least opportunities within education to meet and encounter 
what is different, strange and other' (Biesta 2004b, p. 322). With the 
increasing balkanisation of communities and `the creation of quasi-public 
spaces such as the shopping-mall and high-security university campus - 
spaces that look public but are organised around private interests' (Biesta 
unpublished manuscript) - it could happen that schools become the only 
places left for otherness and plurality. 
Another consequence of theorising education in this alternative mode is 
that if, through plurality, we become unique individuals, then we also can 
no longer understand education as bringing about the convergence of 
individual perspectives (as Dewey, for example, would have it). Education, 
in other words, is not to make people more similar, not to initiate them 
into a common way of life (Biesta 1997) but to make them more unique, 
more irreplaceable as singular human beings. Education, in short, is about 
becoming someone. This point is pressed home by Michael Serres: 
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When all the people of the world finally speak the same language 
and commune in the same message or the same norm of reason, 
we will descend, idiot, imbeciles, lower than rats, more stupidly 
than lizards. The same maniacal language and science, the same 
repetitions of the same in all latitudes - an earth covered with 
screeching parrots (Serres 1997, p. 124). 
When a curriculum with fixed goals is imposed on a person, particularly a 
young person, there is little scope for this person to develop in any 
idiosyncratic way. In fact the very purpose of the curriculum has been to 
`iron-out' these idiosyncracies, to iron out the `kinks' such that the one 
being educated can develop in the `right' way. Such a curriculum produces a 
type that fits into a system, it produces interchangeable units, a product, not 
a human being in its singular uniqueness. By fulfilling their educational 
responsibility to achieve the desired curricular end, educators are giving up 
their responsibility to individuals. 
Biesta also shows that when we understand education as taking place in a 
`space of emergence, ' it is necessary to acknowledge that situations in which 
it is difficult or impossible to become the master of our own actions , i. e., 
where it is difficult to achieve what we want to achieve, are the very 
situations which make education possible (Biesta 2001a, p. 386). This is 
because from an emergentist perspective it is only through the frustration of 
our intentions (i. e., through the perpetual contamination of our beginnings 
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such that we are never the master of our own actions) that we `come into 
presence. ' This frustration of our intentions - that which makes education 
difficult or even impossible - must therefore be understood as the condition 
that makes education possible (Biesta 2001a). This is contrary to 
conventional educational logic where, because the curriculum is conceived 
as a linear process, directed towards a predetermined end, it is believed 
necessary to remove any obstacles to reaching the desired educational goal. 
The goal must be reached as quickly and easily as possible. With an 
emergentist conception of education it becomes possible to see that this 
logic is detrimental to a human being `becoming somebody. ' In this sense, 
narrow, instrumental and teleological curricula that are designed to produce 
interchangeable units with minimum fuss can only be seen as un. 
educational. They may be good at delivering a product, but are not 
conducive to the emergence of individual subjectivity. 
Because coming into presence in a `space of emergence' can only be 
achieved through response, and because we are always forced to respond - 
to take a position - by those whom we are with (we cannot not take a 
position) it becomes possible to understand all those in the `space of 
emergence' as the ones being called into presence. This includes educators 
and students. The `educator' calls the student into presence by posing 
difficult questions such as `What do you think about it?, ' `Where do you 
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stand?, ' `How will you respond? ' (Biesta 2004a, p. 79). Such questions 
demand an individual response from the student. However the student calls 
the educator into presence with the same questions which likewise require an 
individual response. Educator and student provoke each other into 
responding. The educational relationship, that which takes place in 
curricular space, is therefore not an easy relationship. It is difficult and 
provocative and often uncomfortable. Biesta goes so far as to suggest there is 
a certain `violence' in the educational relationship (Biesta 2004a, p. 77). It is 
`violent' because it faces all those in the curricular space with `deep, 
transforming and disturbing challenges' which bring forth unforeseen (and 
not always pleasant) changes (Biesta 2004a, p. 79). It is violent also because 
those responding have no choice but to take a position, show themselves, in 
relation to such questioning. Both the educator and the student disturb each 
other's complacency, disorganise each other's organisations, re-open each 
other's closures, forcing each other to keep on showing themselves. Their 
personal space, their privacy is therefore invaded. By engaging in education 
(as a teacher or student) one is therefore always exposing oneself, placing 
oneself at risk. One does not know, cannot know, what will happen, only 
that something will happen. 
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I want to argue that it is important not to deny the violence 
involved in coming, or maybe we should say calling, into 
presence... It is violent in that it doesn't leave individuals alone, in 
that it asks difficult questions and creates difficult situations (Biesta 
2004a, p. 79). 
But the educational relationship is not perfectly symmetrical. It `should not be 
understood in terms of full reciprocal discursivity' (Biesta 1998, p. 12). 
Biests (unpublished manuscript) argues that the educator is responsible not 
only for calling the other into presence. Responsible not only for unsettling 
the student's closures, but also for the singularity, for the uniqueness of the 
student (Biesta 1998, p. 13). `This ... articulation of the pedagogical is not 
interested in what the subject is; it is interested in who the subject is' (ibid. ). 
Educators must acknowledge that their actions call up a particular who. 
They cannot educate without in some way shaping the who that is called 
into presence. This is not only unavoidable, but any attempt to avoid it 
would be an act of neglect, for it would mean leaving the student alone. In 
this sense educators are responsible for a closure (a particular being is called 
into presence through an educator's actions) at the same time as being 
responsible for the opening of this `who. ' The educational responsibility 
must therefore be understood in a double sense. Biesta refers to this as a 
`double duty, ' a term he borrows from Derrida (Biesta unpublished 
manuscript). Educators are responsible for the one called (which is a closure) 
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and for the unsettlement (violating, opening) of the one called. In other 
words they are responsible, at the same time, for the closing and re-opening 
of subjectivity. They are responsible for keeping the play in play. This, as 
Biesta remarks, 
... 
is an extremely difficult task and implies a huge responsibility 
for those who dare to take on this task. This responsibility [double 
duty] for the uniqueness, the subjectivity of students, learners, is 
an unlimited responsibility, that is, a responsibility that cannot be 
calculated. It is a responsibility without knowledge (Biesta 2004a, 
p. 80). 
6.4 UNDOING THE REPRESENTATIONAL LOGIC OF SCHOOLING 
In this section I explain further why an emergentist conception of 
subjectivity is of such consequence for the critique of the representational 
logic of modern Western schooling, why this - rather than an emergentist 
conception of knowledge - is required for disrupting the representational 
foundation of schooling. 
6.4.1 The death of the subject not the death of education 
The emergentist idea that the human subject is not an object that can be can 
be known, described and theorised about - an idea popularly touted as `the 
death of the subject' and attributed to Foucault 2002/1970b (see Allen 2000, 
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for two opposing view's on the meaning of this phrase) - has profound 
consequences for education. Some of these were described in Section 6.3.3. 
The consequences are profound because the loss of the subject as an object 
challenges the representational foundation upon which the entire edifice of 
modern education is built. This is because the idea of reproducing in the 
student/subject something that is initially outside of the student/subject 
depends on the idea that there is a kind of being (a `what') that can be guided 
in a certain predetermined direction. We need to know what we are dealing 
with before we can `shape' it. However if we cannot know what we are 
dealing with, then we have no definite starting point, and so we cannot 
know where we will end up. This loss of the subject-as-object therefore 
interrupts the idea that education is about representing in the student a 
world that is present somewhere or somehow outside the student. An 
emergentist conception of subjectivity destroys the representational rationale 
or dualist foundation upon which modern schooling is built. 
One could therefore say that while the critique of representation at the 
epistemological level and at the level of the sign poses a challenge for 
pedagogy, this does not directly challenge the underlying dualistic logic of 
modern schooling, as it emerged in the seventeenth century. As I showed 
with Ulmer (1985), it does not challenge the idea that what is outside (the 
student/school) can be reproduced or re-presented inside (the 
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student/school). This logic reappears as the `pedagogical effect of 
discipleship. ' The representational logic of schooling can be challenged only 
indirectly through the `death of the subject, ' i. e. the through the emergentist 
challenge to the idea of subject-as-object. 
As I argued in Chapter 2, it was only with the birth of a dualistic 
understanding of the sign in the seventeenth century that education became 
`representational. ' At this point it made sense to teach inside the school, 
that which was outside its boundaries. As I argued before, education before 
this time had mostly been a process of enculturation or apprenticeship. One 
immersed oneself in the culture one was learning about rather than 
separating oneself from it in order to then learn about it. To separate oneself 
from the culture one was learning about would have made no sense before 
the advent of a dualistic conception of knowledge. Modern schooling has 
therefore taken shape around this dualistic notion of knowledge. As I 
argued in Chapter 2, modern schooling is understood in terms of this logic. 
By unsettling the dualistic logic of modern schooling, the `death of the 
subject' has therefore thrown the idea of modern schooling into its own 
crisis of representation. On the one hand it is argued that if we cannot put 
the world into the student (teach the student about something) then 
education seems to have no purpose. On the other hand the idea of a world 
in which there is no longer a place for education of some sort or another 
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(i. e., either along presentational or representational lines, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4) seems inconceivable. I would like to argue, however, 
that this dilemma, this crisis of indecision in education - this impossible 
choice - exists only if we maintain a dualistic 
frame of reference. If we 
switch to the logic of emergence/deconstruction, we transcend the crisis. 
6.4.2 Transcending the crisis of representation in education 
Emergentist logic demands that we abandon the idea that education is about 
putting knowledge (or significations) of the world into the student. It 
challenges the idea that we `acquire' meaning and suggests instead that 
signification and meaning come into existence together and, furthermore, 
that this act is never completed. Meaning is therefore not something we can 
ever `have. ' Futhermore, since the continuous `bringing forth' of meaning is 
a human activity, one could also say that it is only in bringing forth 
meaning that human beings are who they are. Through meaning making, 
which is to say through practices of signification, we are forced to take a 
position, we are forced to be someone in-the-world-with-others. We come 
into presence not as we get closer to truth, but as we make meaning, as we 
take a position with others. This `taking of a position' is therefore always a 
political taking of a position and the meanings we make (with others), 
therefore always alter the politics of our being-in-the-world-with-others, 
288 
thereby immediately facilitating a new round of meaning making. But 
because our meanings are always political, these meanings also alter `the 
world' itself, so our meanings are not passive/neutral but active participants 
- agents - in `worldmaking. '45 The world is only `the world' because it is 
meaningful to us and it is therefore only `the world' in a political sense. In 
this regard, `the world' is never simply `present, ' not passively `there' to be 
signified, but emerges as we engage in signifying practices. 
Through this conflation of signification, meaning making and the 
emergence of human subjectivity it becomes possible to understand the 
concern of education as not being about the process of putting meanings 
into the student, but with the process of the student's emergence into and 
with the world. Education is therefore about coming into the world or 
`coming into presence' (Biesta 2005, in press). Moreover, it is about `coming 
into presence' in the company of others who are themselves `coming into 
presence. ' For an educator this would involve attending closely to the 
others who are `coming into presence' in the educator's presence (who is also 
coming into presence). The educational responsibility is therefore about 
attending to the emergence of these others rather than seeing to it that these 
others obtain a `correct' understanding of a world or way of life that is 
41 This term comes from Nelson Goodman's Wads qf Wor? dm%k4 (1978), although I do not share 
Goodman's views on this, which I believe are still informed by a dualistic or representational 
understanding of the sign. 
289 
being presented to them as an object. Educators, in other words, are 
responsible for being with and responding to the student from their own 
position and without manipulative intent. Responsible for making it possible 
that the student is able to emerge, able to find their voice, express their 
opinion, and thereby `become someone. ' 
6.4.3 Schooling, curriculum and emergence 
At one level, the death of the subject-as-object and consequent loss of the 
representational logic of modern schooling seems to suggest that the idea of 
the school curriculum as something that shapes the subjectivity of the 
subject - which, as I argued in Chapter 2, is absolutely central to the project 
of modem education - is no longer useful. This, however, is not the case. I 
have shown that the `death of the subject' rather than doing away with a 
curricular concern for the subjectivity of the subject, takes it up at a 
different level. The subject is no longer an object to be manipulated but a 
being uniquely positioned and in the process of emerging. Rather than 
`shaping' the `subject-as-object' according to some pre given measure of 
adequacy, which in fact is not to respect the emergent subjectivity of the 
subject, but to control the subject, an emergentist conception of curriculum 
would call up the subjectivity of the subject by offering a space in which the 
subject can express an opinion, take a position, and therefore be someone. 
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This is completely contrary to the logic of representational schooling where 
the subject is always coerced to take up someone else's meanings. Even if the 
student is allowed to express an opinion, this opinion is always manipulated 
in the direction the educator wants for it. 
With the representational or dualistic view, schools were concerned with 
how best to transfer meanings into the student, and the subject of schooling 
could only be a subject after the transfer of `knowledge' had taken place, 
i. e., after `schooling' had taken place. Before schooling had taken place the 
subject was not considered to be a subject in its own right. Educators were 
more concerned with the transfer of knowledge than with the subject (who 
was not yet a subject). The transfer was crucially important in order that 
the subject could become a subject. With the emergentist view, the subject is 
already a subject. With an emergentist view, what is important is the not the 
success of transfer, but the quality of the `space of emergence' The quality 
of the interaction between the teacher and the student. Education takes 
place wherever human subjectivity is allowed to emerge. Perhaps one could 
go so far as to say that education is the passage of emergence, this being a 
`difficult accompaniment' into the impossible. The accompaniment itself 
facilitates the passage into the impossible. The accompaniment is the 
`curriculum' that facilitates the emergence of subjectivity. 
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If the curriculum facilitates the emergence of the human subject, then one 
could say that the primary function of schools is not to provide students 
with the opportunity to reproduce what already exists (although they can also 
do this) but to provide students with the opportunity to come into presence. 
Schools can be places where new meanings are allowed to appear. In this 
way schools would reposition themselves as being integrally involved in 
calling forth new worlds that are unimaginable from the perspective of the 
present, rather than being guardians of a world which took place in a 
different political time and space. In this case schools would reposition 
themselves in the emerging world rather than positioning themselves on the 
outside of it. 
In conclusion, I turn to the words of Hannah Arendt, who, while being 
conservative in her general approach to education, nevertheless makes the 
following comment: 
Our hope always hangs on the new which every generation 
brings; but precisely because we can base our hope only on this, 
we destroy everything if we so try to control the new that we, the 
old, can dictate how it will look (Arendt 1954a, p. 192). 
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6.5 SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have presented three `pedagogies of invention' and a 
`pedagogy without humanism' to show how the representational logic of 
schooling cannot be disrupted only through challenges to representation 
which take place at the epistemological level or at the level of the sign. 
Because meaning making is linked to human subjectivity, the only way to 
disrupt the representational logic of modern schooling is indirectly, through 
challenging a conception of human subjectivity that relies on a 
representational understanding of the sign. It is therefore necessary to use 
the metaphor of `strong' emergence in a double sense. In this chapter I used 
`strong' emergence (i) in relation to the emergence of knowledge and 
signification, and (ii) in relation to the emergence of human subjectivity. 
When emergence is used in this double sense, we find that schooling can no 
longer manipulate the subject. With no clear idea of what it is starting with, 
it cannot manipulate the start point (the human subject) to another 
position; one defined in advance. It cannot, in other words, aim to 
reproduce or replicate in the student a meaning which already exists. 
If we take seriously the idea the critique of presence offered by complexity 
and deconstruction, we are obliged to rethink schooling along lines that are 
more compatible with the epistemology suggested by this critique. 
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Rethinking schooling along these lines, so I have argued in this chapter, is 
more radical than previous critiques of representational schooling practices 
have implied. While previous critiques of representational schooling have 
left in place the idea that what is present outside the school can be replicated 
in the student, and so leave in place the dualistic logic of modern schooling, 
an emergentist conception of subjectivity requires a fundamental 
reorganisation of schooling, which is not another pedagogical version on 
the representational-presentational spectrum that I discussed in the Chapter 
2.1 have argued that if we re-think the purposes of schooling from the 
premises of `strong' emergence and deconstruction - which suggest that 
neither the world nor the subjectivity of the subject is simply `present' - 
then we must think of education as being concerned with providing 
opportunities for the subject to emerge or `come into presence' through 
meaning making in the presence of others. 
I have also shown that the critique of presence offered by complexity and 
deconstruction calls for a different understanding of the notion of 
curriculum. With complexity and deconstruction the curriculum is not 
something that can be implemented or prearranged. It has no moral, no cause 
nor effects, no beginning end or middle. It is not something one can have or 
control. Rather the `curriculum' is the space in which a subject is allowed to 
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come into presence in the presence of others who are themselves coming 
into presence. 
Finally, I have shown that if we theorise education and schooling from an 
emergentist perspective, we find that the educator's first responsibility is 
not an epistemological responsibility, but a responsibility to be with the 
student and respond to the student in a genuine (non-manipulative) way, 
from his or her own unique position. Through this interaction the educator 
is directly responsible for the student's `coming into presence, ' directly 
responsible for the singularity and uniqueness of the student. To put this 
more plainly, the educator's primary responsibility is to respond and make 
room for the student to respond in turn (and so come into presence). This 
means keeping open a space in which responsible responses (which are 
responses without preconceptions of what `should' be done) can take place. 
However I would also like to add that since we all live in the world with 
others, we are all always in a space of emergence. We are all educating and 
being educated by those we with whom we live. We are all not only in-the- 
world-with-others, but also in-the-world-educating-and-being-educated-by- 
others. While the educator has a special responsibility, a duty or perhaps 
one could say a `calling' to those being educated, `educational responsibility' 
is also not something that any one of us can avoid. It is not something that 
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happens only in `pedagogical settings. ' In this sense we are all educators. We 
are all responsible for what and who emerges in our world. We are all 
responsible for keeping things open, for keeping the play in play. 
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Chapter 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Significance of the research and possibilities for further study 
7.1 SUMMARY OF TH Bis 
In this thesis I have argued that the curriculum of modern Western 
schooling is organised around a representational understanding of the sign 
which emerged together with mass education in the seventeenth century. 
This representational understanding of the sign, which holds that a sign 
stands for some pre-existing `presence' facilitates representational or 
Cartesian epistemology, which relies on the idea that knowledge stands for 
something in the `real' world. I argued that regardless of epistemological 
differences traditional, progressive and situated understandings of 
curriculum rely on a representational understanding of the sign. The job of 
the curriculum is to reproduce in the learner those meanings which initially 
lie outside the learner. 
I then showed how the notion of representation has been challenged at the 
epistemological and semiotic level in the past century. Here I pointed out 
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that the epistemological critique of representation, because it does not 
challenge representation at the level of the sign, has little impact on the 
basic organisation of schooling, which, ever since the seventeenth century 
has been structured around the idea that schools can reproduce knowledge 
that exists outside the school, inside the learner. Replacing a `picture' theory 
of knowledge with a `use' theory of knowledge therefore does not replace 
the underlying representational epistemology of schooling. The critique of 
representation at the level of the sign, does, however, suggest that the 
representational logic of schooling might be replaced by a `deconstructionist 
logic' or something which similarly challenges representation at the level of 
the sign. This provides the answer to my first research question: What might 
take the place of the representational epistemology of schooling? (see Section 
1.4.2). 
I then introduced complexity as another contender for challenging 
representation at the level of the sign, the reason being that it has for some 
time been known that complexity resists representation in the traditional 
sense. In exploring the logic of complexity I showed that the logic of 
`strong' emergence and the logic of deconstruction both suggest that the 
sign is partially constituted by that which is not present. Both therefore 
bring into question the idea of presence preceding signification. 
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I then explored what happens to the `geography' of schooling when its 
representational foundation is replaced with an emergentist or 
deconstructionist `foundation. ' This was done on two levels, the level of the 
sign and the level of human subjectivity. I showed that it is only when 
knowledge is linked to human subjectivity and human subjectivity linked to 
an emergentist conception of subjectivity that the underlying 
representational logic of schooling is disrupted. Only when this is done, is it 
possible to rethink schooling along non-representational (emergentist) lines. 
Once this is done it is possible to move from an understanding of schooling 
where pre-existing meanings are put into the student, to a practice of 
schooling which is concerned with the students emergence into the world. 
With a representational foundation the educator is responsible for moving 
knowledge from the world into the child. With an emergentist conception, 
the educator is responsible for accompanying the child into the world. This is 
a significant shift. This answers my second research question: What would be 
the `shape' or `geography' of a schooling practice that is not premised on 
representational epistemology? (see Section 1.4.2). 
The answer to my third research question: Is complexity helpful for addressing 
either of the first two research questions? is that complexity is indeed helpful 
for addressing both questions. First, the logic of `strong' emergence provides 
an epistemology which unsettles representation at the level of the sign and 
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therefore provides an adequate replacement for the representational 
epistemology of schooling. It could be argued, however, that the logic of 
deconstruction does the same job and therefore there is no need to invoke 
complexity or emergence. However, the utility of `strong' emergence is that 
it provides an extremely useful and serviceable metaphor for non- 
representational conceptions of signification (such as deconstruction). It is 
therefore useful both for understanding what takes the place of the 
representational epistemology of schooling and for understanding the shape 
of a schooling practice not premised on representational logic. 
7.2 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
In Chapter 2,1 synthesised aspects of the work of Aries, Mollenhauer and 
Foucault to show that the representational foundation of schooling is 
representational at the level of the sign not the level of knowledge. This 
enabled me to show that critiques of representation that come from the 
fields of curriculum studies and learning theory are not able to challenge the 
underlying representational organisation of schooling because they launch 
these critiques at the level of knowledge (the epistemological level) rather 
than the level of the sign (the semiotic level). In this regard the work makes 
a novel contribution to discussions about curriculum reform which, for the 
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most part, are structured by representational understandings of the sign 
(and hence by the dualist logic of Cartesian epistemology). 
In Chapter 31 outline the critique of representation first at the 
epistemological level and then at the level of the sign (the semiotic level). In 
doing this I show that of all the critiques of representation discussed, it is 
only deconstruction that challenges the representational logic of the 
dualistic sign. While important for my argument, this, work is not `original' 
in the sense that it brings something new to the field of epistemology. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are closely linked. In these chapters I introduce 
`complexity science' and in doing so divide the `field' in terms of two 
fundamentally different positions on determinism. Prigogine's approach on 
the one hand, and everything else, on the other hand. The difference 
between these two `approaches, ' I would contend, has been largely 
overlooked by those working on the epistemological implications of 
complexity, at least in the English speaking world. The debate, I believe, is 
better developed in the French literature (see Pomian 1990). The difference, 
however, is crucially important for epistemology, as it makes it possible to 
align the `epistemology of complexity' with poststructural frames, whereas 
most of the work in complexity thinking is structuralist. In this regard the 
work makes a significant contribution to the `complexity thinking' 
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approach within the field of `complexity studies'. Chapter 5 continues this 
epistemological work and I eventually develop an `epistemology of 
complexity' which is based on the notion of `strong' emergence. The 
development of this epistemology is facilitated by a reading of Prigogine 
which compares his ideas with those of the `British emergentists' of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the one hand and Derrida's 
deconstruction on the other. This move translates his `microscopic theory 
of irreversibility' into a theory of `strong' emergence and thereby provides a 
novel reading of Prigogine which is extremely useful for making links 
between the non-deterministic forms of science that have emerged in the 
last century and deconstruction. 
Finally, in Chapter 6,1 show how the logic of emergence can be used to re- 
think modern Western schooling. For this I rely heavily on arguments 
coming from a deconstructionist perspective (in particular, Gregory Ulmer 
and Gert Biesta). Nevertheless the work in this chapter is still `original' in 
that it provides an alternative to the `soft' or metaphorical approach to 
complexity, which is largely the way in which complexity has been used in 
the `field' of complexity and educational research. Instead of using 
complexity as a metaphor to `understand' complex social systems, my work 
suggests that complexity can be used to challenge the logic which suggests 
that complexity can be used as a metaphor to understand social systems. In 
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using complexity to challenge this logic, my work opens a different 
perspective for research on complexity and education. 
7.3 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RESEARCH AND FURTHER WORK 
There are at least two areas where the research could have been improved. 
First the relationship between pragmatism and deconstruction is likely to be 
far more complex than I have portrayed in this thesis. Due to time 
constraints I was unable to engage with pragmatism as deeply as I would 
have liked. I expect a deeper engagement with this discourse (particularly 
Dewey's version of pragmatism, as explicated by Biesta and Burbules 2003) 
would result in an analysis which showed that a `use' theory of knowledge 
cannot simply be excluded from deconstructive/emergentist thinking. It is 
likely that deconstruction/emergence bears the same relationship to 
pragmatism as it bears to structuralism. In the same way as Derrida's 
critique of de Saussure's drew on de Saussure's to move his conclusions to 
another place, I believe emergence/deconstruction uses pragmatism to reach 
another place. I would like to see this link articulated more explicitly. 
Second, and again due to time constraints, it was not possible to explore the 
phenomenological critique of representation nor the links between `strong' 
emergence and phenomenology. Due to the extent of the literature on 
phenomenology, this aspect was purposely omitted from the study. 
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Nevertheless phenomenology - and in particular the work of Maturana and 
Varela (1987) and Gregory Bateson (1972) - informs much of the research in 
complexity and education, and a close reading of this work would 
undoubtedly prove fruitful in relation to the argument presented in this 
thesis. 
Future research on the issue of `rethinking education' from a non- 
representational foundation might benefit from an engagement with both 
pragmatism and phenomenology as well as a deeper engagement with 
Derrida and deconstruction at various levels and in various contexts. The 
research might also benefit from an engagement with a newly emerging 
field: the `semiotics of the very infinitely small' (see Marcus 2004). In the 
week before submitting this thesis I came across the work of Solomon 
Marcus which I have not had sufficient time to either read or incorporate 
into the text except in the most superficial manner (see Section 5.4 and 
Section 7.4 of this chapter). Nevertheless, Marcus appears to have arrived at 
a similar conclusion to the one I reached concerning the move away from 
the macroscopic metaphors of everyday reality that has taken place in 
deconstruction and quantum physics. In Chapter 5 (Section 5.4) 1 argued 
that 
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One reason for using Prigogine is that he still employs metaphors 
we can relate to in our macroscopic world. This is not the case 
with much of modern physics (particularly quantum mechanics) 
or Derrida, both of which throw us into a crisis of imagination. 
We can no longer use metaphor to imagine the world that is 
presented for us by Derrida or by quantum mechanics (see p. 230 
of this thesis). 
Here I sign-posted Marcus's work, adding that 
For the first time in human history, the main concern of science, 
art and philosophy is situated beyond the macroscopic world, while 
human semiosis, as it was projected and developed during a long 
period of its history, had remained limited to the macroscopic 
world (Marcus 2000, in http: //www. uni-kassel. de/iag- 
kulturforschung/archiv2/krise. htm). 
I have since been in communication with Marcus, and a collaboration in the 
area where complexity, semiotics and deconstruction overlap is likely. 
What seems necessary is a more thorough exploration of the interaction 
between the metaphors used by complexity and those metaphors (if these 
can still be called `metaphors') that are situated beyond the macroscopic 
world (as employed, for example by Derrida and quantum mechanics). Such 
an investigation would certainly be of importance to modern schooling, in 
view of its current representational organisation. 
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7.4 AFTERWORD: BEGINNING AGAIN 
`Let us begin again' (Derrida 1981b, p. 65) 
According to Derrida (1981b) the Western philosophic tradition has, ever 
since the Greeks, assumed the presence of a `reality' that we have recourse 
to as something that is wholly and entirely `there. ' Foucault (2002/1970b) 
adds that prior to the seventeenth century this `reality' was assumed to exist 
in `the signs' which required accurate interpretation and that since the 
seventeenth century, this `reality' was understood to exist independently of 
signification, i. e., outside of the signs themselves - such that significations 
became transparent representations of this reality. In the last two centuries 
- at least according to Foucault's analysis - knowledge has been understood 
in a temporal sense as a process. Nevertheless this process was still 
understood as a series of `snapshots' in linear time - which Henri Bergson 
called a `cinematographical' view of `reality' (Bergson, 1911, p. 301) -a 
series of static pictures that can be unrolled like a scroll or `spread out 
behind us in its entirety' as we make new discoveries (Mead 1932, p. 29). 
Each of these shifts in understanding entailed a rethink of the meaning of 
the term `knowledge. ' And each time knowledge was redefined it was 
necessary to begin again with the philosophical project of knowing. 
Nevertheless, throughout all these beginnings we could always rely on the 
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idea of a `reality' that was `present' as things in our everyday macroscopic 
world are present. 
We are now at a point where our assumptions about knowledge are again 
being questioned. For the first time in human history, according to 
Solomon Marcus, the main concern of science, art and philosophy is 
situated beyond the macroscopic world (Marcus 2000). Beyond the 
macroscopic world we find that our ideas about linear temporality are 
challenged and we can no longer rely on the idea of presence. Without 
presence the Newtonian rules of physics no longer make sense. Neither is it 
possible to understand language and semiosis in terms of a dualistic or 
representational (metaphorical) logic. The current `crisis of representation' 
demands nothing short of a fundamental reconsideration of the foundations 
of semiosis (Marcus 2000). It seems we must, therefore (again), begin again. 
Let me begin again. In his address entitled `Between normality and pathology' 
at the first Crisis of Representation Semiotic Colloquium, Marcus remarks 
Crisis is usually perceived as the appearance of a tension ... or as a 
symptom that something no longer works in the usual way. 
However, this negative perception of a crisis is only one side of 
the coin. In many cases, the crisis is the symptom of a change that 
will later be perceived as a positive phenomenon (Marcus 2003, p. 
18, my emphasis). 
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Marcus argues that as the symptoms of change that provoke a crisis 
become 
permanent, `they turn to normality' 
(Marcus 2003, p. 24). With regard to 
the logic of deconstruction/emergence, this already 
has started happening. 
Rusterholz remarks that Derrida himself describes his concept of differance 
as `anticipating a future that will completely 
break with constituted 
normality, a future which can only provisionally make itself 
known in the 
form of a monstrosity' (Rusterholz 2003, p. 54-55). Yet: 
It is interesting and thought-provoking that the vision of 
monstrosity which Derrida had in 1967, and which was received 
in the same vein by most traditional scholars at the time, is today 
apparently being granted at least the plausibility of increasing 
evidence (Rusterholz 2003, p. 55). 
Undoubtedly much of what we consider `normal' is shaped by cultural 
patterns as Foucault has repeatedly argued (see, e. g., his work entitled 
Madness and Civilization), and so the distinction between what is `normal' 
and what is `pathological' is, to a large extent, conventional (Marcus 2003). 
In this regard the `postmodern society' is assisting the `normalisation' of 
emergentist/deconstructive logic. According to Marcus, `the postmodern 
society has opened the doors for reconsidering many of yesterday's 
pathological representations as today's symptoms of health' (Marcus 2003, 
p. 24). 
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This, however, is not to say that the time is now `right' for the logic of 
emergence/deconstruction to be `applied' to education and schooling, with 
the insinuation that this logic is now more `legitimate' than previous styles 
of thought. Rather, the tendency towards the normalisation of knowledge 
practices should serve as a constant reminder that every normalised practice 
operates within an accepted system of rules. As Jean-Francois Lyotard has 
remarked, these rules 
do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the 
object of a contract, explicit or not, between players (which is not 
to say that the players invent the rules) ... 
if there are no rules, 
there is no game' (Lyotard 1984, p. 10). 
With regard to the application of the logic and language of complexity 
science to educational practice, Anne Phelan cautions that `we are in danger 
of forgetting that the whole of relevant `reality' is more complex than any 
one educational theory suggests or implies' (Phelan 2004, p. 15). 
My fear is that we are constructing a redemptive tale and that in 
complexity science we see not simply another language game but a 
shining new set of guarantees. And so I am led to wonder what 
this new language game is up to? ... What 
happens to the educator 
who begins to play this game? (Phelan 2004, pp. 12-13) 
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While such questions are relevant, they are nevertheless caught in the very 
logic that emergence/deconstruction brings into question. They assume that 
deconstruction/emergence is a theory about something which can be applied 
to something else. This, as I tried to make clear in Chapter 5, is not in 
keeping with the logic of emergence/deconstruction. The reconstruction of 
meaning in terms of emergence or deconstruction replaces one set of rules 
with another only if one plays by the rules of representation. 
In this thesis I have argued that when the idea of `strong' emergence is used 
as a metaphor to think through some of the epistemological implications of 
complexity, i. e., if the conclusions of complexity are recursively applied to 
the `theory' of complexity itself, " then we see that complexity `theory' - 
and the notion of emergence itself - erases itself in a deconstructive 
movement. While complexity is a theory (or collection of theories) its 
conclusions (or at least those of Prigogine) suggest it cannot be a theory 
about something. If complexity theory is `knowledge' then knowledge does 
not `stand for' some pre-existing presence. Rather, knowledge is that which 
`brings forth' something new. Something incalculable from the perspective 
of the present. In this sense knowledge and deconstruction are one and the 
same. This knowledge/deconstruction amalgam is what Derrida refers to as 
46 In the same way, Derrida recursively applied de Saussure's conclusions to the theory that 
produced these conclusions, a movement which produces deconstructive logic. 
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`the experience and experiment of the impossible' (Derrida 1992b, pp. 44- 
45). `Strong' emergence is a theory and a metaphor by means of which 
knowledge/deconstruction is brought, at least partially, into the 
macroscopic world. But we must suffice with a partial metaphor (partly in- 
the-world and partly out of it) and moreover one which is always already in 
the process of erasing itself. This erasure, or `deconstructive movement' - 
the `taking place' of emergence - is, for Derrida is the condition of 
possibility of responsibility. The exercise of responsibility, Derrida argues, is 
not something that takes place according to a set of pre-given rules. 
Responsibility, for Derrida is always an `impossible' responsibility, that is, 
it takes place outside the parameters of rules and laws, it takes place outside 
of the `possible. ' He explains it like this: 
When a responsibility is exercised in the order of the possible, it 
simply follows a direction and elaborates a programme. It makes 
of action the applied consequence, the simple application of a 
knowledge or know-how. It makes of ethics and politics a 
technology. No longer of the order of practical reason or decision, 
it begins to be irresponsible (Derrida 1992b, p. 45). 
If deconstruction/emergence is a game, it is therefore a game of 
responsibility (to the other) which is one that cannot play out through any 
set of pre-given the rules. If it has rules at all, these emerge in the playing of 
the game. Furthermore, the rules that emerge would necessarily self-destruct 
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as the game emerged. With deconstruction/emergence we enter a 
different 
logic, one which cannot be understood in terms of the 
logic of what-has- 
come-before (the logic of `what-has-come-before' 
is a representational- 
deterministic logic). 
At present this logic of emergence/deconstruction is caught between 
strangeness and familiarity, or, as Marcus might say, between `pathology' 
and `normality' (Marcus 2003). While in some respects 
it seems to be `right' 
for our time (given developments in quantum mechanics, complexity and 
semiotics), working through its `implications' for education47 presents us 
with the strange and/or impossible. While the logic of 
emergence/deconstruction does away with the guardrails of metaphysics 
(the idea of `presence'), thereby suggesting we can take nothing for granted, 
it does not suggest we can say/do nothing. Rather, it opens an entirely new 
arena for `theory. ' With regard to education and curriculum theory, it 
opens an arena of curriculum theorising which is not just another version of 
the representational-presentational (traditional-progressive) debate I 
discussed in Chapter 2 which has occupied educational theorists since the 
emergence of modem schooling in the seventeenth century. Rather, it offers 
47 Bearing in mind that its `implications' for education suggests `education' as we know it is rxx 
education and therefore it cannot have `implications' for education or, rather, that education 
must traraceniitse 
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a place from which to begin again. This `place, ' however, offers no 
guidelines or guardrails for `educational action. ' On that note, and to `close' 
this thesis, I therefore offer the following words from Rousseau: 
I give my dreams as dreams, and leave the reader to discover 
whether there is anything in them which may prove useful to 




The participants of the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity held at 
the Convento da Arräbida in Portugal on November 2-7,1994 have adopted 
a Charter, which comprises the fundamental principles of the `community' 
of transdisciplinary researchers. The Charter is as follows: 
Article 1: Any attempt to reduce the human being by formally defining 
what a human being is and subjecting the human being to reductive analyses 
within a framework of formal structures, no matter what they are, is 
incompatible with the transdisciplinary vision. 
Article 2: The recognition of the existence of different levels of `reality' 
governed by different types of logic is inherent in the transdisciplinary 
attitude. Any attempt to reduce `reality' to a single level governed by a single 
form of logic does not lie within the scope of transdisciplinarity. 
Article 3: Transdisciplinarity complements disciplinary approaches. It 
occasions the emergence of new data and new interactions from out of the 
encounter between disciplines. It offers us a new vision of nature and reality. 
Transdisciplinarity does not strive for mastery of several disciplines but aims 
to open all disciplines to that which they share and to that which lies beyond 
them. 
Article 4: The keystone of transdisciplinarity is the semantic and practical 
unification of the meanings that traverse and 
lay beyond different disciplines. It 
presupposes an open-minded rationality 
by re-examining the concepts of 
`definition' and `objectivity. ' An excess of formalism, rigidity of definitions 
and a claim to total objectivity, entailing the exclusion of the subject, can only 
have a life-negating effect. 
Article 5: The transdisciplinary vision is resolutely open insofar as it goes 
beyond the field of the exact sciences and demands their dialogue and their 
reconciliation with the humanities and the social sciences, as well as with art, 
literature, poetry and spiritual experience. 
Article 6: In comparison with interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity, 
transdisciplinarity is multireferential and multidimensional. While taking 
account of the various approaches to time and history, transdisciplinarity does 
not exclude a transhistorical horizon. 
Article 7: Transdisciplinarity constitutes neither a new religion, nor a new 
philosophy, nor a new metaphysics, nor a science of sciences. 
Article 8: The dignity of the human being is of both planetary and cosmic 
dimensions. The appearance of human beings on Earth is one of the stages in 
the history of the Universe. The recognition of the Earth as our home is one 
of the imperatives of transdisciplinarity. Every human being is entitled to a 
nationality, but as an inhabitant of the Earth is also a transnational being. The 
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acknowledgement by international law of this twofold belonging, to a nation 
and to the Earth, is one of the goals of transdisciplinary research. 
Article 9: Transdisciplinarity leads to an open attitude towards myths and 
religions, and also towards those who respect them in a transdisciplinary 
spirit. 
Article 10 : No single culture is privileged over any other culture. The 
transdisciplinary approach is inherently transcultural. 
Article 11: Authentic education cannot value abstraction over other forms 
of knowledge. It must teach contextual, concrete and global approaches. 
Transdisciplinary education revalues the role of intuition, imagination, 
sensibility and the body in the transmission of knowledge. '8 
Article 12 : The development of a transdisciplinary economy is based on 
the postulate that the economy must serve the human being and not the 
reverse. 
Article 13 : The transdisciplinary ethic rejects any attitude that refuses 
dialogue and discussion, regardless of whether the origin of this attitude is 
ideological, scientistic, religious, economic, political or philosophical. Shared 
knowledge should lead to a shared understanding based on an absolute respect 
48 This article is problematic in my view, for it is still goverened by the logic of disciplinary 
thought, i. e., it is concerned with the `transmission' of knowledge, which suggests transmission 
of something stable and permanent, a 'disciplinary' system of thought. 
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for the collective and individual Otherness united 
by our common life on one 
and the same Earth. 
Article 14 : Rigor, openness, and tolerance are the fundamental 
characteristics of the transdisciplinary attitude and vision. Rigor 
in argument, 
taking into account all existing data, is the best defense against possible 
distortions. Openness involves an acceptance of the unknown, the unexpected 
and the unforeseeable. Tolerance implies acknowledging the right to ideas and 
truths opposed to our own. 
Article final : The present Charter of Transdisciplinarity was adopted by the 
participants of the first World Congress of Transdisciplinarity, with no claim 
to any authority other than that of their own work and activity. 
In accordance with procedures to be agreed upon by transdisciplinary- 
minded persons of all countries, this Charter is open to the signature of 
anyone who is interested in promoting progressive national, international 
and transnational measures to ensure the application of these Articles in 
everyday life. 
Convento da Arräbida, 6th November 1994 
Editorial Committee: Lima de Freitas, Edgar Morin and Basarab Nicolescu 





Allen, A. (2000) The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the 
Death of the Subject, The Philosophical Forum, XXXI (2) 113-130. 
Apple, M. W. (1993) Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a 
Conservative Age, Routledge, New York. 
Arendt, H. (1954a) 'The Crisis in Education' in Between Past and Future, 
Faber and Faber, London, pp. 173-196. URL: 
http: //www. eco. utexas. edu/facstaff/Cleaver/35OkPEEArendtCrisis 
InEdTable. pdf, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Arendt, H. (1954b) 'What Is Freedom? ' in Between Past and Future, Faber 
and Faber, London, pp. 143-171. 
Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago/London. 
Aries, P. (1962) Centuries of Childhood A Social History ofFamily Life, 
Trans., Baldick, R., Vintage Books, New York. 
Auyang, S. Y. (1998) Foundations of Complex-System Theories in Economics, 
Evolutionary Biology, and Statistical Physics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Badenhorst, D. (1998) 'Complex Systems Theory: Some Implications for 
Education' in Metatheories in Educational Research, (Ed., Higgs, P. ) 
Heinemann, Sandton, South Africa, pp. 231-250. 
Bateson, G. (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind, University of Chicago Press, 
Chigago. 
Bedau, M., A (1997) 'Weak Emergence' in Philosophical Perspectives: Mind, 
Causation, and World, Vol. 11, (Ed., Tomberlin, J. ) Blackwell 
Publishers, Malden, MA, pp. 375-399. 
Bereiter, C. (1997) 'Situated Cognition and How to Overcome It' in 
Situated Cognition: Social, Semiotic and Psychological Perspectives, 
(Ed., Whitson, J. A. ) Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey, pp. 281-300. 
Bereiter, C. (2002a) 'Artifacts, Canons, and the Progress of Pedagogy: A 
Response to Contributors' in Liberal Education in a Knowledge 
Society, (Ed., Smith, B. ) Open Court, Chicago, pp. 223-244. 
Bereiter, C. (2002b) Education and Mind in the Knowledge Age, Laurence 
Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ. 
321 
Bergson, H. (1911) Creative Evolution, Trans., Mitchell, A., Henry Holt 
and Company, New York. 
Bernstein, R. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science 
Hermeneutics and Praxis, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia. 
Best, S. and Kellner, D. (1999) Kevin Kelly's Complexity Theory, 
Organisation and Environment, 12 (2) 141-162. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (1997) 'Education, Not Initiation' in Philosophy of Education 
1996, (Ed., Margonis, F. ) Philosophy of Education Society, Urbana, 
Illinois, pp. 90-98. URL: http: //www. ed. uiuc. edu/EPS/PES- 
yearbook/96 docs/biesta. html, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (1998) Pedagogy without Humanism: Foucault and the 
Subject of Education, Interchange, 29 (1) 1-16. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (1999a) Radical Intersubjectivity: Reflections on the 
'Different' Foundation of Education, Studies in Philosophy and 
Education, 18 (4) 203-220. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (1999b) 'Where Are You? Where Am I? Education, Identity 
and the Question of Location' in Identity. Questioning the Logic of 
Identity within Educational Theory, (Ed., Säfström, C. A. ) 
Studentlitteratur, Lund, pp. 21-45. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2001a) How Difficult Should Education Be?, Educational 
Theory, 51 (4) 385-400. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2001b) 'Preparing for the Incalculable' in Derrida and 
Education, (Ed., Egea-Kuehne, D. ) Routledge, London and New 
York, pp. 32-54. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2004a) Against Learning. Reclaiming a Language for 
Education in an Age of Learning, Nordisk Pedagogik, 24 70-82. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2004b) The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in 
Common: Education and the Language of Responsibility, 
Interchange, 35 (3) 307-324. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2004c) 'Democracy: A Problem for Education or an 
Educational Problem? ' in Five Professors on Education and 
Democracy. Inaugural Lectures 1999-2003, (Ed., Englund, T. ) Reports 
from the Department of Education, 8. Obero University, Obero, 
pp. 1-23. 
322 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2004d) 'Mind the Gap! Communication and the Educational 
Relation' in No Education without Relation, (Ed., Sidorkin, A. M. ) 
Peter Lang, New York, pp. 11-22. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (2005, in press) Coming into Presence. Education after the 
Death of the Subject, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, Ca. 
Biesta, G. J. J. (unpublished manuscript) Bildung/Building: On the 
Architecture of Education. 
Biesta, G. J. J. and Burbules, N. (2003) Pragmatism and Educational 
Research, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., London. 
Biesta, G. J. J. and Egea-Kuehne, D. (Eds. ) (2001) Derrida and Education, 
Routledge, London and New York. 
Britzman, D. (1995) Is There a Queer Pedagogy? Or, Stop Reading Straight, 
Educational Theory, 45 (2) 151-165. 
Brown, J. S., Collins, A. and Duguid, P. (1989) Situated Cognition and the 
Culture of Learning, Educational Researcher, 18 (1) 32-42. 
Byrne, D. (1998) Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, Routledge, 
London. 
Capra, F. (1996) The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter, 
Harper Collins, London. 
Caputo, J., D (1987) Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction, and 
the Hermeneutic Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis. 
Chalmers, D. J. (2002) 'Varieties of Emergence' Manuscript written for the 
Templeton Foundation workshop, Granada, August 2002. URL: 
http: //consc. net/papers/granada. html, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Cilliers, P. (1993) Modelling Complexity, Ph. D thesis, University of 
Stellenbosch, South Africa 
Cilliers, P. (1998) Complexity and Postmodernism, Routledge, London. 
Cilliers, P. (2000a) Knowledge, Complexity, and Understanding, Emergence, 
2(4)7-13. 
Cilliers, P. (2000b) Rules and Complex Systems, Emergence, 2 (3) 40-50. 
Cilliers, P. (2001) Boundaries, Hierarchies and Networks in Complex 
Systems, International Journal of Innovation Management, 5 (2) 135- 
147. 
323 
Cilliers, P. (2002) Why We Cannot Know Complex Things Completely, 
Emergence, 4 (1/2) 77-84. 
Cottingham, J. (1992) 'Cartesianism' in A Companion to Epistemology, (Ed., 
Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 57. 
Cuban, L. (1984) How Teachers Taught: Constancy and Change in American 
Classrooms, 1890-1980, Longman, New York. 
Culler, J. (1986) Saussure, (Revised Edition), Fontana Press, London. 
Dancy, J. (1992) 'Introduction' in A Companion to Epistemology, (Ed., Sosa, 
E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. xiii-xv. 
Davis, A. B., Sumara, D. J. and Thomas, K. E. (1996) Cognition, Co- 
Emergence, Curriculum, Journal of Curriculum Studies, 28 (2) 151- 
169. 
Davis, B. and Sumara, D. (1997) Cognition, Complexity and Teacher 
Education, Harvard Educational Review, 67 (1) 105-125. 
Davis, B. and Sumara, D. (2001) 'Learning Communities: Understanding 
the Workplace as a Complex System' in New Directionsfor Adult 
and Continuing Education: Sociocultural Perspectives on Learning 
through Work, 92, (Ed., Fenwick, T. ) Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 
85-98. 
Davis, B. and Sumara, D. (2004) 'A Pedagogy of Invention' Paper presented 
at the annual conference of the British Educational Research 
Association, Manchester, 15-18 September, 2004. 
Davis, B., Sumara, D. and Luce-Kapler, R. (2000) Engaging Minds: Learning 
and Teaching in a Complex World, Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ. 
de Saussure, F. (1983/1916) 'Course in General Linguistics' Trans., Harris, 
R. (Ed., Sechehaye, A. ) Duckworth Publishers, London. 
Dent, E. B. (1999) Complexity Science: A Worldview Shift, Emergence, 1 (4) 
5-19. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds. ) (1998) The Landscape of Qualitative 
Research. Theories and Issues, Sage Publications, London. 
Derrida, J. (1973) 'Speech and Phenomena' and Other Essays on Husserl'S 
7beory of Signs, Trans., Allison, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston. 
Derrida, J. (1976a) Entre Crochets (Interview). Digraphe, 8 (April) 97-114. 
324 
Derrida, J. (1976b) Of Grammatology, Trans., Spivak, G. C., Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore. 
Derrida, J. (1981a) 'Outwork' Trans., Johnson, B. in Dissemination, 
Athlone Press, London, pp. 3-59. 
Derrida, J. (1981b) 'Plato's Pharmacy' Trans., Johnson, B. in Dissemination, 
The Athlone Press, London, pp. 61-171. 
Derrida, J. (1989) 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other' Trans., Porter, C. in 
Reading De Man Reading, (Ed., Waters, L. ) University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, pp. 25-65. 
Derrida, J. (1992a) 'Afterw. Rds: Or, at Least, Less Than a Letter About a 
Letter Less' Trans., Bennington, G. in Afterwords, (Ed., Royle, N. ) 
Outside Books, Tampere, Finland, pp. 197-217. 
Derrida, J. (1992b) The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, Trans., 
Naas, M. B., Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
Dewey, J. (1896) The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, Psychological 
Review, 3 357-370. 
Dewey, J. (1897) My Pedagogic Creed, The School Journal, LIV (3) 77-80. 
Dewey, J. (1981/1925) 'Experience and Nature' in Later Works of John 
Dewey, 1925.1953, Vol. 1, (Ed., Boydston, J. A. ) Southern Illinois 
University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville. 
Dewey, J. (1984/1926) 'Individuality and Experience' in Later Works of John 
Dewey, 1925-1953, Vol. 2, (Ed., Boydston, J. A. ) Southern Illinois 
University Press, Carbondale, Illinois, pp. 55-61. 
Dewey, J. (1990/1902) 'The Child and the Curriculum' in The School and 
Society/the Child and the Curriculum, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, pp. 179-209. 
Dewey, J. (1990/1956) The School and Society / the Child and the Curriculum, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Dewey, J. and Bentley, A. F. (1949) Knowing and the Known, Beacon Press, 
Boston. 
Dillon, M. (2000) Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics, Theory, 
Culture and Society, 17 (5) 1-26. 
Doll, W. (1993) A Post Modern Perspective on Curriculum, Teachers College 
Press, New York. 
325 
Dreyfus, H. L. (2004) Heidegger and Foucault on the Subject, Agency and 
Practices, Manuscript of University of California, Berkley. URL- 
http: //socrates. berkeley. edu/ --- hdreyfus/html/paper heidandfouca 
ult. html, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Duhem, P. (1953) 'Physical Theory and Experiment' in Readings in the 
Philosophy of Science, (Ed., Brodbeck, M. ) Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
New York, pp. 235-252. 
Eisenstein, S. (1943) The Film Sense, Faber and Faber, London. 
Eisenstein, S. (1949) The Film Form, Harcourt Brace, New York. 
Emmeche, C., Knappe, S. and Stjernfelt, F. (1997) Explaining Emergence: 
Towards an Ontology of Levels, Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science, 28 83-119. 
Eve, R., Horsfall, S. and Lee, M. (1997) Chaos, Complexity and Sociology, 
Sage Publications, London. 
Feyerabend, P. (1975) Against Method, Verso, London. 
Feyerabend, P. (1987) Farewell to Reason, Verso, London. 
Foucault, M. (2002/1970a) 'The Limits of Representation' in The Order of 
Things, Routledge, London, pp. 235-271. 
Foucault, M. (2002/1970b) The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences, Routledge, London and New York. 
Freire, O. J. (2003) A Story without an Ending: The Quantum Physics 
Controversy 1950-1970, Science and Education, 12 573-586. 
Fullan, M. (1999) Change Forces: The Sequel, Falmer Press, London. 
Fullan, M. (2001) The New Meaning of Educational Change, Teachers College 
Press, New York and London. 
Gell-Mann, M. (1994) The Quark and the jaguar: Adventures in the Simple 
and Complex, Little Brown Company, London. 
Gergen, K. J. (1994) Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social 
Constructionism, Harvard University Press, London. 
Gibboney, R. A. (1994) The Stone Trumpet: A Story of Practical School 
Reform (1960-1990), Suny Press, Albany, New York. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P. and 
Trow, M. (1994) The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of 
Science and Research on Contemporary Societies, Sage Publications, 
London. 
326 
Goldman, A. (2001) 'Social Epistemology' in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, (Spring 2001 Edition) (Ed., Zalta, E. N. ). URL: 
http: //plato. stanford. edu/archives/spr2001/entries/epistemology- 
social/, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Goldspink, C. (2000) Modelling Social Systems as Complex: Towards a 
Social Simulation Meta-Model, Journal ofArtificial Societies and 
Social Simulation, 3 (2). URL: 
http: //jasss. soc. surrey. ac. uk/3/2/l. html, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Goldspink, C. (2002) Methodological Implications of Complex Systems 
Approaches to Sociality: Simulation as a Foundation for Knowledge, 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 5 (1). URL: 
http: //jasss. soc. surrey. ac. uk/5/1/3. html, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Goodman, N. (1978) Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett Publishing Company, 
Indianapolis. 
Goodwin, B. (1995) How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, Phoenix, London. 
Gough, N. (2002) 'Blank Spots, Blind Spots, and Methodological Questions 
in Postgraduate Research' Paper presented at the Postgraduate 
Research ConferenceDeakin University, 4-6 October, 2002. URL: 
http: //www. deakin. edu. au/dusa/stud support/noelg DUSA 2002. 
pf, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Graves, F. P. (1914) A History of Education: During the Middle Ages and the 
Transition to Modern Times, Macmillan, New York. 
Greco, J. (1998) 'Introduction: What Is Epistemology? ' in The Blackwell 
Guide to Epistemology, (Ed., Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 
pp. 1-32. 
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1998) 'Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research' in The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and 
Issues, (Ed., Lincoln, Y. S. ) Sage Publications, London, pp. 195-220. 
Gundem, B. B. and Hopman, S. (Eds. ) (1998) Didaktik and/or Curriculum: 
An International Dialogue, Peter Lang, New York. 
Gutting, G. (1989) Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U. K. 
Harding, S. (1987) Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis. 
Harland, R. (1987) Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and 
Poststructuralism, Methuen, London. 
327 
Hetherington, S. (2001) Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas 
of Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Holland, J. (1998) Emergence: From Chaos to Order, Helix Books, 
Massachusetts. 
Horgan, J. (1995) From Complexity to Perplexity, Scientific American, 272 
(6) 104-109. 
Jackson, P. (Ed. ) (1992) Handbook of Research on Curriculum, Macmillan, 
New York. 
Jorna, R. and van Heusden, B. (2003) Why Representation(S) Will Not Go 
Away: Crisis of Concept or Crisis of Theory?, Semiotica, 143 (1/4) 
113-134. 
Kalantzis, M. and Cope, B. (1993) 'Histories of Pedagogy, Cultures of 
Schooling' in The Power of Literacy: A Genre Approach to Teaching 
and Writing, (Ed., Kalantzis, M. ) Falmer Press, London, pp. 38-62. 
Kauffman, S. (1993) The Origins of Order: Self Organisation and Selection in 
Evolution, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Kauffman, S. (1995) At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of 
Complexity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Keeves, J. P. (Ed. ) (1997) Educational Research Methodology and Measurement: 
An International Handbook, (2nd Edition), Pergamon Press, New 
York. 
Kelly, K. (1995) Out of Control The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, 
and the Economic World, Addison-Wesley, New York. 
Kiel, L. D. and Elliot, E. (1997) Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences, 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour. 
Kim, J. (1999) Making Sense of Emergence, Philosophical studies, 95 3-36. 
Klein, J. T. (1994) 'Notes toward a Social Epistemology of Transdisciplinarity' 
Paper presented at the First World Congress of Trandisciplinarity, 
Convento da Arräbida, Portugal, 2-6 November 1994. 
Klein, J. T. (1996) Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarities, and 
Interdisciplinarities, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville VA. 
Klein, J. T. (2004) 'Disciplinary Origins and Differences' Paper presented at 
the Fenner Conference of the Environment. Understanding the 
population-environment debate: Bridging disciplinary divides, 
Canberra, 24-25 May 2004. URL: 
328 
httpJ/www. science. org. au/events/fenner/klein. htm, last accessed 
25/05/2005. 
Kliebard, H. (2004) The Struggle for the American Curriculum 1893-1958, (3rd 
Edition), Routledge, London and New York. 
Kohn, A. (1999) The Schools Our Children Deserve: Moving Beyond 
Traditional Classrooms and 'Tougher Standards, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston. 
Krell, D. (2000) The Purest of Bastards: Works ofMourn ing, Art, and 
Affirmation in the Thought ofJacques Derrida, The Pensylvania State 
University Press, University Park PA. 
Kuhn, T. (1996/1962) The Structure of ScientificRevolutions, (3rd Edition), 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Lakatos, I. (1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
Lather, P. (1991) Getting Smart, Routledge, New York and London. 
Lather, P. (2003) Applied Derrida: (Mis)Reading the Work of Mourning in 
Educational Research, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 35 (3) 257- 
270. 
Lave, J. (1991) 'Situating Learning in Communities of Practice' in 
Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, (Ed., Teasley, S. D. ) 
American Psychological Assocation, Washington, DC, pp. 63-82. 
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation, Cambridge Press, New York. 
Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge, Westview, Boulder, CO. 
Levinas, E. (1981) Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, Trans., Lingis, 
A., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 
Levinas, E. (1989) 'Substitution' in The Levinas Reader, (Ed., Hand, S. ) 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 88-125. 
Lewes, G. H. (1875) Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. 2, Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Turbner, London. 
Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage 
Publications, London. 
Lissack, M. R. and Richardson, K. (2001) When Modeling Social Systems, 
Models [Do Not Equal] the Modeled. Reacting to Wolfram's a New 
Kind of Science, Emergence, 3 (4) 95-111. 
329 
Lyotard, J: F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
Maguire, S. and McKelvey, B. (1999) Complexity and Management: Moving 
from Fad to Firm Foundations, Emergence, 1 (2) 19-61. 
Mandelbrot, B. (1982) The Fractal Geometry of Nature, W. H. Freeman, New 
York. 
Marcus, S. (2000) 'Crisis as Sign: From Change of Representation to 
Representation of Change' Abstract submitted to the German- 
Italian Semiotic Colloquium on Crisis of Representation held at the 
University of Kassel, Germany, 18-19 February, 2000. URL: 
http: //www. uni-kassel. de/iag-kulturforschung/archiv2/krise. htm, 
last accessed on 12 /12/2002. 
Marcus, S. (2003) Representation: Between Normality and Pathology, 
Semiotica, 143 (1/4) 17-24. 
Marcus, S. (2004) 'The Semiotics of the Infinitely Small (Molecular 
Computing and Quantum Computing)' in Semiotic Systems and 
Communication-Action-Interaction, Situation and Change. Proceedings 
of the 6th National Congress of the Hellenic Semiotic Society, (Ed., 
Tsoukala, K. ) Hellenic Semiotic Society, Thessaloniki, 28-30 
September, 2001, pp. 15-22. 
Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1987) The Tree of Knowledge: The 
Biological Roots of Human Understanding, Shambhala, Boston. 
McKelvey, B. (1999) Complexity Theory in Organization Science: Seizing 
the Promise or Becoming a Fad. ), Emergence, 1 (1) 3-32. 
Mead, G. H. (1932) The Philosophy of the Present, Open Court, La Salle, 
Illinois. 
Miller, A. (1996) Insights of Genius; Imagery and Creativity in Science and 
Art, Copernicus, New York. 
Miller, J. (2000) What's Left in the Field... A Curriculum Memoir, journal 
of Curriculum Studies, 32 (2) 253-266. 
Moeller, H: G. (2003) Before and after Representation, Semiotica, 143 (1/4) 
69-77. 
Mollenhauer, K. (1983) Vergessene Zusamenhange, Juventa, Weinheim 
(Unpublished English translation by Robert Nussbaum, available 
from Deborah Osberg). 
Morgan, C. L. (1923) Emergent Evolution, Williams and Norgate, London. 
330 
Moser, P. K. (1992a) 'Gettier Problem' in A Companion to Epistemology, 
(Ed., Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 157-159. 
Moser, P. K. (1992b) 'Tripartite Definition of Knowledge' in A Companion 
to Epistemology, (Ed., Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 
509. 
Munitz, M. K. (1981) Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Collier Macmillan 
Publishers, London. 
Nancy, J: L. (1991) 'Introduction' in Who Comes after the Subject? (Ed., 
Nancy, J. -L. ) Routledge, New York/London, pp. 1-8. 
Newman, L. (2000) 'Descartes' Epistemology' in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, (Fall 2000 Edition) (Ed., Zalta, E. N. ) URL: 
http: //plato. stanford. edu/archives/fa112000/entries/descartes- 
epistemology/, last accessed on 25/05/2005. 
Nicolescu, B. (2001) Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, State University of 
New York Press, New York. 
Nicolis, G. and Prigogine, I. (1989) Exploring Complexity, W. H. Freeman, 
New York. 
Noth, W. and Ljungberg, C. (2003) Introduction, Semiotica, 143 (1/4) 3-7. 
Oreskes, N., Shrader-Frechette, K. and Belitz, K. (1994) Verification, 
Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth 
Sciences, Science, 263 641-646. 
Peschl, M. and Riegler, A. (1999) 'Does Representation Need Reality? 
Rethinking Epistemological Issues in the Light of Recent 
Developments and Concepts in Cognitive Science' in Understanding 
Representation in the Cognitive Sciences, (Ed., von Stein, A. ) Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York. 
Phelan, A. M. (2004) Rationalism, Complexity Science and Curriculum: A 
Cautionary Tale, Complicity: An International Journal of Complexity 
and Education, 1 (1) 9-17. 
Pinar, W., F and Reynolds, M. C. (1992) Understanding Curriculum as 
Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text, Teachers College Press, 
New York. 
Pinar, W., F, Reynolds, W., M, Slattery, P. and Taubman, P., M (1995) 
Understanding Curriculum, Peter Lang, New York. 
Polanyi, M. (1968) Life's Irreducible Structure, Science, 160 (3834, Jun 21) 
1308-1312. 
331 
Pomian, K. (Ed. ) (1990) La Querelle Du D'Eterminisme. Philosophie De La 
ScienceAujourd'Hui., Gallimard/Le D'ebat., Paris. 
Popolo, D. (2003) French Philosophy, Complexity, and Scientific 
Epistemology: Moving Beyond the Modern'Episteme', Emergence, 5 
(1) 77-98. 
Popper, K., R (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (German edition 
published in 1934), Basic Books, New York. 
Popper, K. R. (1962) Conjectures and Refutations, Harper, New York. 
Popper, K. R. (1972) Objective Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Popper, K. R. (1980) 'Replies to My Critics' in The Philosophy of Karl 
Popper, (Ed., Schlipp, P. A. ) Open Court Publishers, La Salle, 
Illinois. 
Poundstone, W. (1985) The Recursive Universe: Cosmic Complexity and the 
Limits of Scientific Knowledge, William Morrow and Company, New 
York, NY. 
Prigogine, I. (1997) The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of 
Nature, The Free Press, London. 
Prigogine, I. and Nicolis, G. (1977) Self Organisation in Non-Equilibrium 
Systems: From Dissipative Structures to Order through Fluctuations, J. 
Wiley and Sons, New York. 
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. (1984) Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue 
with Nature, Bantam Books, London. 
Quine, W. V. (1953) From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Ravitch, D. (2000) Left Back: A Century ofFailed School Reforms, Simon and 
Schuster, New York. 
Reid, W. A. (1997) Principle and Pragmatism in English Curriculum 
Making 1868-1918, Journal of Curriculum Studies, 29 (6) 667-682. 
Rescher, N. (2002) 'Process Philosophy' in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, (Ed., Zalta, E. N. ) Summer 2002 Edition. URL 
http: //plato. stanford. edu/archives/sum2002/entries/process- 
philosophy, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Richardson, K. (2002) Methodological Implications of Complex Systems 
Approaches to Sociality: Some Further Remarks, Journal ofArtiicial 
332 
Societies and Social Simulation, 5 (2). URL: 
http: //jasss. soc. surrey. ac. uk/5/2/6. html, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Richardson, K. (2004) The Problematisation of Existence: Towards a 
Philosophy of Complexity, Nonlinear Dynamics Psychology and the 
Life Sciences, 8 (1) 17-40. 
Richardson, K. (forthcoming) The Hegemony of the Physical Sciences - an 
Exploration in Complexity Thinking. To Appear In, Futures. URL: 
http: //kurtrichardson. com/, last accessed 25/05/2005. 
Richardson, K. and Cilliers, P. (2001) What Is Complexity Science? A View 
from Different Directions, Emergence, 3 (1) 5-22. 
Richardson, K., Cilliers, P. and Lissack, M. R. (2001) Complexity Science: 
A 'Grey' Science for the Stuff in Between, Emergence, 3 (2) 6-19. 
Richardson, K. A., Mathieson, G. and Cilliers, P. (2000) The Theory and 
Practice of Complexity Science - Epistemological Implications for 
Military Operational Analysis, SysteMexico, 1 (2) 25-68. 
Rogoff, B. (1990) Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in 
Social Context, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Ross, K. L. (1998) 'Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and the Meditations on First 
Philosophy' in The Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series, 
URL: http: //www. friesian. com/friesian. htm, last accessed 
25/05/2005. 
Rusterholz, P. (2003) On the Crisis of Representation, Semiotica, 143 (1/4) 
53-60. 
Ryle, G. (1945) Knowing How and Knowing That, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 46 1-16. 
Salmon, W., C (1992) 'Epistemology of Natural Science' in A Companion to 
Epistemology, (Ed., Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 292- 
296. 
Serres, M. (1997) The Troubador of Knowledge, (trans. S. F. Glaser with W. 
Paulson), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour, Michigan. 
Sfard, A. (1998) On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of 
Choosing Just One, Educational Researcher, 27 (2) 4-13. 
Silberman, R. (2002) The Challenge of Liberal Education, Journal of 
Education, 183 (3) 1-6. 
333 
Slezak, P. (2000) 'The Mind-Brain Problem' in Integrative Neuroscience, (Ed., 
Gordon, E. ) Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, pp. 49-63. 
Solomon, J. (Ed. ) (2003) The Passion to Learn: An Inquiry into 
Autodidactism, Routledge Falmer, London. 
Stein, E. (1992) 'Evolutionary Epistemology' in A Companion to 
Epistemology, (Ed., Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 122- 
124. 
Stroud, B. (1992) 'Hume, David' in A Companion to Epistemology, (Ed., 
Sosa, E. ) Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 182-184. 
Sumara, D. and Davis, B. (1997) 'Enlarging the Space of the Possible: 
Complexity, Complicity, and Action Research' in Action Research as 
a Living Practice, Peter Lang, New York, pp. 299-312. 
Tarnas, R. (1996) The Passion of the Western Mind Understanding the Ideas 
That Have Shaped Our World View, Pimlico, London. 
Taylor, C. (1995) 'Overcoming Epistemology' in Philosophical Arguments, 
Harvard University Press, London, pp. 1-19. 
Thomas, D. (1979) Naturalism and Social Science: A Post-Empiricist 
Philosophy of Social Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Thrift, N. (1999) The Place of Complexity, Theory, Culture & Society, 16 (3) 
31-69. 
Trifonas, P. P. and Peters, M. (Eds. ) (2004) Derrida, Deconstruction and 
Education. Ethics of Pedagogy and Research, Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford. 
Ulmer, G. L. (1985) Applied Grammatology: Posq'E}Pedagogy from Jacques 
Derrida to Joseph Beuys, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Vallacher, R. R. and Nowak, A. (Eds. ) (1994) Dynamical Systems in Social 
Psychology, Academic, San Diego, CA. 
Vallacher, R. R. and Nowak, A. (1997) The Emergence of Dynamical Social 
Psychology, Psychological Enquiry, 8 (2) 73-99. 
Van Uden, J., Richardson, K. and Cilliers, P. (2001) Postmodernism 
Revisited. ) Complexity Science and the Study of Organisations, 
Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science, 1 (3) 53-67. 
Varela, F. (1997) Laying Doom a Path in Walking: Essays on Enactive 
Cognition, MIT Press, New York. 
334 
von Glasersfeld, E. (1984) 'An Introduction to Radical Constructivism' in 
The Invented Reality, (Ed., Watzlawick, P. ) Norton, New York. 
von Glasersfeld, E. (1989) 'Constructivism in Education' in The 
International Encyclopedia of Education. Research and Studies., 1, (Ed., 
Postlethwaite, T. N. ) Pergamon Press, Oxford, pp. 162-163. 
von Glasersfeld, E. (1995) Radical Constructivism, The Falmer Press, 
London. 
von Glasersfeld, E. (1999) 'Piaget's Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity' 
in Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does 
Representation Need Reality? (Ed., von Stein, A. ) Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, London. 
Waldrop, M. M. (1994) Complexity, Penguin, London. 
Walker, J. C. and Evers, C. W. (1997) 'Research in Education: 
Epistemological Issues' in Educational Research Methodology and 
Measurement: An International Handbook, (2nd Edition) (Ed., 
Keeves, J. P. ) Pergamon Press, New York. 
Westbury, I. (2000) 'Teaching as a Reflective Practice: What Might Didaktic 
Teach Curriculum? ' in Teaching as a Reflective Practice: The German 
Didaktic Tradition, (Ed., Riquarts, K. ) Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, London. 
Westbury, I., Hopmann, S. and Riquarts, K. (2000) Teaching as a Reflective 
Practice: The German Didaktic Tradition, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, London. 
Whitehead, A. N. (1985) Process and Reality: Corrected Edition, (Eds. Griffin, 
D and Sherburne, D), The Free Press, New York. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2001) Philosophical Investigations, (3rd Edition), 
Trans., Anscome, G. E. M., Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
Wolfram, S. (1984) Universality and Complexity in Cellular Automata, 
Physica, D (10) 1-35. 
Wolfram, S. (2002) A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media Inc. 
Ziman, J. (2003) Emerging out of Nature into History: The Plurality of the 
Sciences, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 
361 (1809) 1617-1633. 
335 
